WAHHABISM IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA Part 2

WAHHABISM AT THE DOORSTEPS OF EUROPE          

THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL

During the 1970s and 1980s, Bosnia and other parts of Yugoslavia witnessed Islamic revival.

The Islamic revival in BIH started in the 1970s due to several factors:

- a certain aperture of the then Yugoslav regime.

- an improved economic situation.

- the graduation of a new generation of young Muslims intellectuals from Yugoslav and Middle Eastern universities.

- global trends in the Muslim world that began in the Petroleum Crisis in 1973 and culminated in the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

- the main manifestations of revival until 1992 were:

- rebuilding or construction of mosques financed by local money except in a few cases.

- opening or reopening of education institutions.

- publishing of Islamic texts and periodicals.

- intensified personal religiosity and use of Islamic social symbols.

- establishment of Muslim political organizations.

- emergence of Muslim solidarity institutions.

SUPREME ISLAMIC ASSEMBLY IN SARAJEVO PASSED A NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITY

During this period, the Islamic revival in BIH merged with the institutional framework of the Islamic Community. Alternative organizations were practically ignored. This would be dramatically changed after April 1992.

For all these activities the existing Constitution of the Islamic Community was too narrow. Also in 1974 Yugoslavia adopted a new constitution, which moved the state organization toward confederacy. As in the past, changes in the political system found reflection in the organization of the Islamic Community.

On 12 April 1990 the Supreme Islamic Assembly in Sarajevo passed a new Constitution of the Islamic Community. This constitution divided the institutional structure of the Islamic Community into organs, institutions, and officials. 

The organs of the Community were local yamaas boards, formed mostly formed in the level of boroughs, Mufti offices which were almost at the level of district, the Islamic Communities assemblies and their executive organs, mashiats, the jurisdiction of which coincided with the borders of the Yugoslav states, and finally, the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Community as the highest representative body of the Muslims in Yugoslavia. The executive body of this assembly was the Riaset, at the head of which stands Rais Ul Ulema as a religious leader of the Muslims in Yugoslavia. The seat of Riaset is in Sarajevo. 

Members of all these bodies were to be elected and their term of office was limited. There was also the Islamic Council, a body of scholars in charge of keeping constitution within the Islamic Community and providing interpretation of Islamic teachings.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE YUGOSLAV FEDERATION CAUSED A ‘DOMINO EFFECT’ ENDING ALL ORGANIZATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS

The institutions of the Islamic Community were madrasas, faculties, institutes, libraries and a museum. The Constitution also provided for the establishment of charitable, humanitarian and other institution, something that was unimaginable in BOSNIA during previous decades.

In 1992 the Yugoslav Federation broke down and its ‘domino effect’ brought an end to all organizations, associations and institutions built on the same principle.

In 1993 the representatives of different bodies of the Islamic Community, Muslim organizations and institutions, met in Sarajevo and proclaimed themselves as the Constituent Assembly of the Islamic Community. This Assembly called for the reconstruction of the autonomous Islamic Community in BOSNIA and proclaimed itself as the highest authority in the Community and passed on the same day an interim Basic Regulation that will serve as a legal basis for the organization and function of the Islamic Community until the end of the war.

However, the interim Basic Regulation for all practical purposes relied mainly on the Constitution of the Islamic Community of 1990, which had been adjusted in certain aspects to meet demands of the new situation. The new organization structure again was composed of organs, institutions and officials. Basic organs were the same: yamaa, boards, Mufti offices. Others were adjusted: Naibu Ar Rais, Deputy Rais, replaced the President of the Mashiat, the Riaset replaced Mashiat and Constituent Assembly replaced the Assembly of the Islamic Community. Institutions and officials remained the same.

The organization of the Islamic Community from the time of the Yugoslav Federation was slightly modified to fit the circumstances of independent Republic of BIH. The basic regulation of 1993 provides that the Constituent Assembly will call for elections after the war and thus replace the emergency administration with a permanent one. The elections were conducted in the spring of 1995 and permanent Assembly of the Islamic Community was constituted on 28 April 1995. On 26 November 1997 this Assembly adopted a new Constitution, which is a legal basis for the present administration of Islamic Affairs in BOSNIA.

TRADITIONAL ISLAM IN BIH VERSUS WAHABISM / SALAFISM

For more than 500 years BOSNIAN Muslims have maintained the Hanafi tradition, following a moderate and open-minded version of Islam: rich on tradition, tolerant of other communities and compatible with western values. The Islamic revival in BIH, which began after the secularist Tito period, underwent radical changes from the beginning of the war in April 1992. In those parts of BIH under SERBIAN and CROATIAN forces, 75 per cent of BOSNIAN territory was ‘cleansed’ of Muslims, while mosques and other Islamic buildings were in almost all cases destroyed.

FOREIGN AGENCIES BECAME THE PRIME FOUNDERS OF THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL

However, freedom for Islamic activities became almost unlimited in some territories under the control of the Army of the Republic of BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. It is reported that several hundred Afghan-Arab Mujahidin, or Holy Warriors, joined with, fought alongside BOSNIAKS during the 1992-5 war in BIH. Highly religious and motivated, they brought a specific understanding of Islam with them and they tried to indoctrinate those ideas into BOSNIAK minds, having the opportunity to preach and spread propaganda freely. Thus the Wahhabi ideas surfaced for the first time on a wider scale. This foreign creed was different from the moderate and traditional version of Islam in BIH. During this time the relations between BIH and the Muslim world were elevated to an unprecedented level. The number of graduates of Islamic Studies outside the country increased and Islamic literature arrived in significant quantities. Additionally, the economic power of local populations was practically reduced to nothing and the foreign agencies became the prime founders of the Islamic revival. This financial support, coming from foreign Muslim countries, undermined the power of the well-organized and structured Bosnian Islamic community. SAUDI ARABIAN funding of mosques and economic help aimed to confirm SAUDI global Muslim leadership (vs. IRAN) and to bring BOSNIAN Muslims closer to beliefs and practices acceptable to Wahhabism.

Bugojno Police Station bombing June 2010

The activities of the Islamic Community in BIH have always included charity, income-generating projects and Waqf (religious endowment). The Islamic Community of BIH has been the exclusive administrator of these endowments for decades. However, several multimillion dollar foreign Waqfs were established after 1995, which, according to the contract with the Islamic Community, were granted full autonomy for various periods of time, usually two decades. The Cultural Centre King Fahd (CCKF) in Sarajevo is an example of this process, together with the SAUDI cultural centre in Bugojno and the Cultural Centre in Hadžići.
 

The June 2010 Bugojno police station bomb attack was carried out by Wahhabis. For further background information see:  http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Security-Watch/Articles/Detail//?lng=en&id=118664

THE FINANCING OF THE RECONSTRUCTION OF A MOSQUE BY A SAUDI BASED ORGANIZATION WAS A PART OF A STRATEGY AIMED AT ACQUIRING THE SPIRITUAL LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY. 

The result of this process is the replacement of the Hanafi, the moderate traditional local version of Islam, with Wahhabism, a more radical and intolerant SAUDI version that in some cases might be a shift toward more radical and, possibly, terrorist activities. The elder and established Imams in some areas, who stand for a more moderate Islam, were more controlled and restricted in their activities.

In the past, the High SAUDI Commission for the Relief of Bosnian Muslims (HSC) has administered the Cultural Centre King Fahd without consulting the Islamic Community of BIH. The HSC gave full support to different Wahhabi organizations, including Active Islamic Youth (AIO) and different Islamic NGO’s. After the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 Sep 01, the situation changed because the media identified the HSC and related organizations as potential sources of extremism. Some of their members were arrested or questioned by local police or international forces about their links to terrorism. At the end of 2002, the Cultural Centre King Fahd, tried to change its public image and attempted to distance itself from these extremist circles, and established closer relations with the official Islamic Community of BIH. When the government of SAUDI ARABIA decided to close the HSC all the mosques whose construction was financed by the HSC were handed over to the BIH Islamic Community, and the King Fahd Cultural Centres in Sarajevo and Mostar to the Embassy of SAUDI ARABIA for management. According to the Cultural Attaché of the Saudi Arabia Embassy in BIH, the King Fahd Cultural Centre is a cultural institution that remains under the supervision and care of the SAUDI ARABIAN Embassy. Despite of this fact, the facilities of the Cultural Centre King Fahd and the King Fahd Mosque in Dobrinje, Sarajevo, are still the epicenter of the spreading of radical ideas in BIH.

RADICAL MOVEMENTS ARE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE POOR CONDITION OF EDUCATION AND SOCIAL SERVICES, IN SOME AREAS IN BIH, AND OFFERING YOUNG PEOPLE A VARIETY OF POSSIBILITIES, AS MEANS TO SUBSEQUENTLY RECRUIT THEM

The spreading of radical ideas in BIH has been linked to the return process of the people who were displaced during the war and to the social, economic and education situation within the country. The return of Muslims to some areas of BIH controlled by BOSNIAN SERBS or B-CROATS is creating an unstable local climate, potentially leading to increased ethnic tensions and inter-ethnic incidents. Some of these Muslim returnees are members of the Wahhabi sect. The perceived harassment of BOSNIAKS may stimulate an increased involvement of organizations tied to Islamic extremism in local communities. Reportedly, Wahhabism was already attempting to take advantage of BOSNIAK feelings of frustration by trying to radicalize the youth of these areas. These radical movements are taking advantage of the poor condition of education and social services, in some areas, and offering young people a variety of possibilities, as means to subsequently recruit them. The same policy has been used by different radical Islamic movements all over the world.

Extremist recruiters, who are likely to be a few years older, take the young people under their care, organizing bonding activities like camping trips and sporting events. The recruiter gradually isolates the recruits from their families and steps into the role of mentor. In this newfound clique, young recruits find the social integration and spiritual space they have yearned for, as radical indoctrination intensifies, and bonds tighten around a shared worldview.

DRUG ADDICTS, THE PRIME TARGET FOR INDOCTRINATION AND RECRUITMENT TACTICS

Radical religious groups are also offering health and social services to former drug users and petty criminals. The weak mental and physical condition of the addicts makes them easy targets for indoctrination and recruiting. In addition, former drug users are familiar with illegal activities and once recruited these individuals may be used to support the organization, through criminal activity. For these reasons petty criminals inside jails all around Europe are also recruited. The FBIH (Federation) houses numerous drug rehabilitation centers, funded by SAUDI ARABIAN as well as IRANIAN NGOs who use “spiritual rehabilitation techniques” to “cure” their patients.

WAHHABISM IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Sarajevo US Embassy shooter identified as Wahhabi Islamist, 28 Oct 2011

WAHHABISM AT THE DOORSTEPS OF EUROPE  

Part One

Wahhabism in BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (BIH) is an alien, small, but according to some sources growing tendency within BIH. It is relatively successful in recruiting young ‘converts’ from within the BIH moderate Muslim tradition circles. Wahhabism identifies mainstream BOSNIAN Muslims as false Muslims and even as enemies. It has some potential to result in growing, and even violent confrontation with moderate Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This could have serious ramifications for BIH in its efforts to maintain a pluralistic society, as well as complicate the International War on terrorism, by providing an ever safer environment for transient terrorists. If the Wahhabi reportedly growth tendency is not effectively stopped and reversed by the indigenous Muslim structures, the challenge of Wahhabism in BIH will have serious implications for the rest of EUROPE.

For most INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (IC) personnel, dealing with any kind of Islamic issue is something they still are trying to get used to. Part of the local media, often biased by nationalistic or/and political interests, have tried to present the problem of Wahhabism in BIH as a growing tendency that is a threat to safety and security not only in the country but also in the rest of EUROPE. These media have used a discourse very similar to that used at the beginning of the 90’s, changing the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ by ‘Wahhabism’. On the other hand, media close to the BOSNIAK establishment have tried to ‘hide’ any evidence of the Wahhabi presence in BIH, or at least to play down the importance of the phenomenon.

Most of the information gathered until now is based on the regurgitation of media or biased spread of rumours without further confirmation, as well as personal experiences and witness accounts. A serious analysis must try to define who is a real follower of Wahhabism, in order to avoid misinterpretations. Only then can proper proposals be developed for stopping the ‘reported’ growing tendency, and reversing it.

This is an analysis of Wahhabism in BIH, intended to represent original thinking about the real picture of the Islamic community in the country and not a ‘regurgitation of open-source wisdom’.

FOREIGN MUSLIM COUNTRY SUPPORT THROUGH NGOS 

Islamic Community Center in Sarajevo

During and just after the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BIH) the relationship between the BOSNIAK part of the new state of BIH and the Muslim world were elevated to an unprecedented level. The financial support coming from foreign Muslim countries undermined the power of the well-organized and structured BOSNIAN Islamic community. The Islamic revival that began in YUGOSLAVIA in the 70’s decade, which was developed in the framework of the local Muslim institutions and tradition, turned during and after the war to a more politicized revitalization influenced by foreign elements as the Arab fighters and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) from the MIDDLE EAST.

The Official Islamic community has been taking control of Islam in BIH since the end of the 1992-95 war. However, the Islamic Community has recognized the presence of religious organizations outside its control, and that one of these organizations is an obstacle for the legitimate activities of the wider Islamic Community.

Besides efforts on behalf of the Islamic Community to counter Wahhabi influence, ordinary believers are very often staunch opponents of Wahhabism and that might be the really insurmountable obstacle in front of Wahhabism in BIH. Since the end of the war the largely secular and European attitude among the BOSNIAKS has caused friction with foreign Islamic extremists. Different reports on incidents involving moderate and radical Muslims have shown that Wahhabi communities are willing to use coercive methods to spread their radical ideas. Traditional Muslims have also demonstrated that they can use radical methods to counter the spread of the Wahhabi movement in BIH.

Assessments show that, despite their efforts, the Wahhabi movement does not have many supporters in BIH. The general population is afraid of their fundamentalist approach towards religion. BIH Muslims want to maintain the local traditional and moderate version of Islam. This could change however the minute the already fragile economic situation in BIH changes for the worst and the young generation of BIH has nowhere to turn to. Recruitment techniques by radical Islamic elements are cleverly orchestrated through a complex network system that allows luring moderate young Muslims into becoming part of their organizations by offering scholarships, money and work.

ELEMENTS OF THE LOCAL MEDIA PORTRAY THE PROBLEM OF WAHHABISM IN BIH AS A GROWING THREAT AGAINST THE SAFETY AND SECURITY WITHIN BIH AND PERHAPS WITHIN THE REST OF EUROPE.

While the predominance of traditional ‘BOSNIAK’ Islam is widespread, the Wahhabi movement has established itself in some areas of BIH. Some radical groups have been determined in their efforts to publicly confront the role of the BIH official Islamic Community and its control over Islamic religion in BIH, using their radical Wahhabi interpretation of the Koran. Their actions have drawn the attention of both local and international media and security services.

An element of the local media, that often shows nationalist or political bias, has tried to show the problem of Wahhabism in BIH as a growing threat against the safety and security within BIH and perhaps within the rest of EUROPE. This media element has used a theme that is similar to that used at the beginning of the 1990’s, in changing the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ to ‘Wahhabism’. To counter this, media close to the BOSNIAK establishment, have tried to ‘hide’ any evidence of the Wahhabi presence in BIH or, at least, to downplay the significant of their influence.

ISLAM IN BIH: SHORT HISTORICAL REVIEW

THE OTTOMAN PERIOD

Islam in BIH was introduced by the Ottoman Empire. From 1463 to 1878 this empire ruled the area. So, the history of Islam in BOSNIA is intimately connected to the history of Islam in the Ottoman Empire. The State within the Ottoman Empire, like other Muslim empires before, was organized according to the principle of organic unity of religious and political authority. They did however introduce an unprecedented hierarchy of Muslims scholars or Ulama. Muftis, Mudarris and Imams, together with judges, Qadis, and Friday prayer preachers, or Khatibs, were under state jurisdiction and they were very often state officials. Because this rigid organisation, there was little autonomy in interpretation and practice of Islam in BOSNIA.

The Ottoman troops also brought the Sunni Islam and the official legal school to the Ottoman Empire: the Hanafi School of Jurisprudence. The Hanafi is one of the four Sunni legal schools. It is the largest one and it is followed by approximately 30 percent of Muslims worldwide. This school is predominant in TURKEY, northern EGYPT, LEVANT, and amongst the Muslim communities of the BALKANS, CENTRAL and SOUTH ASIA, CHINA, RUSSIA and UKRAINE. Hanafi School has been considered by many authors as the most open-minded School. Early Hanafism was associated with the partisans of Ra’y (translation: Opinion). Other schools, however, especially Hanbalism, that wanted to base everything on formal reports about the prophetic Sunna, grew out of the party of Hadith. This has been cast as ‘rationalism vs. traditionalism’. According to the Hanafi School, the Iytihad, or individual reasoning, is often a used source of the Sharia, or Islamic Law, together with customs or 'Urf, hence a degree of flexibility in interpretation.

THE HABSBURG PERIOD

In July 1878 the Congress of EUROPEAN powers held in Berlin, gave Habsburg monarchy the right to occupy and administer BOSNIA. The BOSNIAk resisted the occupying Habsburg forces but their three-month resistance was eventually crushed in October 1878.

The relations between religion and state in the Habsburg monarchy were based upon the concept of ‘recognized religious communities’ which was adopted in 1874. According to this concept, the state guarantees freedom of conscience, belief and private manifestations of religious beliefs and practice.

The Habsburg government introduced this concept in BOSNIA. Six religious communities were given the status of ‘recognized religions’: Islamic, Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Evangelic and Judaic. The status of Islam dramatically changed. Instead of being the basic principle of social cohesion as it was in the Ottoman times, it now became one of several ‘recognized religions’ within a non-Muslim state. The BOSNIAKS became a religious minority instead of being a part of the ruling elite.

This change brought about a new challenge to the BOSNIAKS: to build up a system of the administration of Islamic affairs that would not be identical with the organization of the state. Christians and Jews in BOSNIA were in comparative advantage. Under the Ottomans they already had a separate communal organization, which enabled them to easily adapt to the Habsburg regime. Relying upon Ottoman heritage and responding to new challenges during the first two decades of Habsburg rule, the BOSNIAKS built a new administration of Islamic affairs. This system included religious hierarchy or 'ilmyya, religious education or maarif, endowments or waqf and sharia courts for religious issues.

The system was gradually built through the struggle over the prerogatives for the appointment of key officials, allocation of funding and the running of institutions. The struggle ended on 15 April 1909 when the Habsburg monarch approved the Statute for autonomous administration of Islamic endowments and educational affairs.

The basic features of the administration of Islamic affairs envisaged in the Statute of 1909 were the creation of a council of ulama headed by the Rais Ul Ulama and the introduction of autonomy and elections into the administration of endowments and religious schools.

THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA

In 1918 the Habsburg monarchy disintegrated and BOSNIA was incorporated in a new South Slav state, initially called the KINGDOM OF SERBS, CROATS AND SLOVENES and later renamed as the Kingdom of YUGOSLAVIA. The administration of Islamic affairs in BOSNIA, as developed in the Habsburg times, continued to function. The Muslims in other parts of YUGOSLAVIA had a separate religious administration.

This state of affairs lasted until 1930, when the new regime of the Yugoslav King Aleksandar Karađorđević decided to introduce a unified administration of religious affairs for all Muslims in the country and virtually took over the control of that administration, according to his ideology of ‘Yugoslav Unitarism’, which viewed different South Slav ethnic groups as one nation and attended to eliminate any organization alongside ethnic criteria.

The state control over the Yugoslav Islamic Community was, to some extent, relaxed in 1936, when a BOSNIAK-based political party, the YUGOSLAV Muslim Organization, joined a coalition government in Belgrade. The relaxation of state control over the community did not mean the return of autonomy from 1909. Rather, a new type of influence was introduced, that of a Muslim political party.

According to the 1936 Yugoslav Islamic Community Constitution, the seat of Rais Ul Ulema, which had been moved during the previous period to Belgrade, returned to Sarajevo.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE TITO PERIOD

The World War Two broke out in 1939 and the Nazis and their collaborationists occupied BOSNIA, together with other parts of YUGOSLAVIA. The leadership of the Yugoslav Islamic Community stuck to the policy of keeping the existing administration of Islamic affairs intact until the war ended.

The end of the war in 1945 was accompanied by the change of state organization and political regime in the country. The Unitarian concept of YUGOSLAVIA was replaced by that of federation, kingdom by republic and parliamentarian democracy by socialist ‘people’s democracy’. These changes greatly affected the position of Islam, as well as other religions, and the organization of the Islamic community.

The socialist regime proclaimed ‘the separation of church from state’ and the principle that ‘religion is a private affair of the citizens’. These principles of secular state were interpreted in socialist practice as subjugation of religious communities to state as ‘allies of the capitalists’ and the persecution of those known to be believers.

The change affected in the social, political and legal positions of religion in BOSNIA affected all segments of the administration of Islamic affairs. First, Sharia courts were abolished (5 March 1946) and the Islamic law lost its binding legal force for the Muslims.

Second, in 1952 the government closed all elementary religious maktabs and left only one secondary school, the ‘Gazi Husrevbeg’ Madrasa in Sarajevo, to prepare future imams and khatibs. Religious instruction to the ordinary believers could be given only during weekends in mosques and even that legal possibility was restricted by the policy of the local authorities.

Third, waqf property was largely expropriated and nationalized between 1945 and 1958. During the late 1960s, the socialist regime in YUGOSLAVIA became more liberal. Consequently, more space for activities was given to religious communities. At the same time, the Federal Constitution of YUGOSLAVIA of 1968 gave more power to federal units. These developments found their reflection in the Constitution of the Islamic Community of 5 November 1968.

By Juan Carlos Antúnez

THE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DOSSIER

Read interesting information about the country at the doorsteps of Europe and its multicultural and subsequent political problems

BOSNIA SUFFERS FROM UNRESOLVED ISSUES SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH SPARKED YUGOSLAVIA’S COLLAPSE

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2012/07/bosnia-suffers-from-unresolved-issues.html

BOSNIAS ETHNIC RIFT - THE KEY HINDRANCE TO ECO POLITICAL ADVANCE

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2012/07/ethnic-rift-key-hindrance-to-bosnias.html

BOSNIA 2012

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2012/07/bosnia-2012.html
 

BOSNIA, EUROPEAN UNIONS STEPCHILD  

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2011/07/bosnia-european-unions-stepchild.html

BOSNIA, CURSED BY EUROPEAN UNION

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2011/08/bosnia-cursed-by-european-union-eu.html

SUNNI VERSUS SHIA: THE MIDDLE EAST’S NEW STRATEGIC CONFLICT

 Of course, conflicts between Sunni and Shia Muslims are not at all new, but the fact that this is becoming a central feature on the regional strategic level is a dramatic shift. After all, as long as there were secular-style regimes preaching an all-inclusive Arab nationalist identity, differences between religious communities were subordinated. Once there are Islamist regimes, theology becomes central again, as it was centuries ago.

However, no one should misunderstand the situation. This is fundamentally a struggle for political power and wealth. When Sunni and Shia states or movements battle, they are acting as political entities not pursuing old theological disputes.

The growing power and influence of IRAN’S Islamist regime posed a tremendous problem for Arab Sunni Islamists. They generally did not like IRAN because it was Persian and Shia, yet it was the only Islamist game in town. Thus, Arab Sunni Islamist Hamas became an IRANIAN client. The IRAN-IRAQ war reflected these antagonisms, as best seen in IRAQI propaganda. Yet IRAQ’S regime was also able to keep the Shia majority there under control.

Saddam Hussein’s removal by a U.S.-led international intervention opened up the question of confessional relations in IRAQ. The Arab Shia were inevitably going to win any election, given their three-to-one advantage over the Sunni and the Kurds opting out for what is, in effect though not name, their own state in the north. Despite the terrorist, anti-AMERICAN, and al-Qaida elements of the Sunni insurgency, it was essentially a last-ditch attempt by the Sunnis to reclaim power. It failed and while violence continues, the main Sunni emphasis will be on negotiating the best possible division of power.

THE “ARAB SPRING” WAS AN OVERWHELMINGLY SUNNI AFFAIR

In LEBANON, the Shia triumphed too, led by Hizballah and aided by SYRIA and IRAN. But all of this was prelude to the year 2011. The “Arab Spring” was an overwhelmingly Sunni affair, their own equivalent in some ways of IRAN’S 1979 revolution. Only in BAHRAIN, where they were repressed, did the Shia take the offensive.

EGYPT, TUNISIA, and LIBYA all had Sunni insurgencies against Sunni Arab governments. The situation in SYRIA is far more complex with an Alawite non-Muslim regime that pretends to be Shia Muslim and is allied with IRAN, opposed by a variety of rebels. Nevertheless, in this context, the upheaval is a Sunni-led (though far from just Islamist) revolt against a “Shia” regime.

Here’s the bottom line: Sunni Arab Islamists no longer need IRAN or even Turkey because they now have their own power. What is likely to emerge is at least a loose Sunni Arab and largely Islamist-flavored bloc consisting of EGYPT, the Gaza Strip, LIBYA, and TUNISIA along with the Muslim Brotherhood elements in JORDAN and SYRIA.

DIVIDED ENTITIES

The key element here is the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that doesn’t like Shia Muslims in general and IRAN in particular. Little events, like Brotherhood guru Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s support for the Sunni regime in BAHRAIN against the Shia opposition, show the direction of their thinking. The even more radical Salafists Wahhabi— a term now used for the small revolutionary Islamist groups, are even more anti-Shia. One factor here is the continued unwillingness of the majority of Arab states to welcome Shia-ruled IRAQ into their ranks. IRAQ is not going to become a satellite of IRAN. It certainly feels more comfortable in a Shia bloc but will probably continue to be relatively uninvolved in regional affairs.

Note, too, that to a large extent this situation leaves the Palestinian Authority as an orphan. While it can depend on very general Arab, IRANIAN, and TURKISH support, the Islamists prefer to back Hamas, especially the ever-stronger Sunni Islamists. This, of course, encourages the Palestinian Authority’s (Fatah’s) alliance with Hamas while also weakening its leverage toward that Islamist partner. (And that means a continued disinterest in negotiating with Israel, much less reaching a negotiated solution with it.)

Thus, despite appearances, 2011 was a defeat for IRAN and TURKEY because Sunni Arab Islamists are far less receptive to Tehran’s influence and view it as a rival, while Arab Islamists don’t want leadership from TURKS either.

Can these blocs unite effectively against the UNITED STATES, the WEST or ISRAEL? In a word: No. Their power struggles for regional power and for control of individual states (BAHRAIN, LEBANON, SYRIA, and to a far lesser extent IRAQ) will keep them in conflict. Even on the anti-ISRAEL consensus each side will seek to exploit it for their own, often conflicting, interests.

By the same token, however, the hope for moderation is minimal. In a region when regimes and movements are competing to prove their militancy and loyalty to a radical interpretation of Islam, nobody is going to want to make peace with ISRAEL. And regimes will only work with the UNITED STATES if they feel that America can and will protect them, a rather forlorn hope with an Obama Administration eager to make friends with Islamists.

There is also another aspect to this SUNNI-SHIA rivalry, the formation of blocs, the competition in militancy, and the battle for control of individual states. The region will continue to waste lives, time, and resources in political strife as the lure of ideology and power rather than pragmatism and economic productivity. This is still rule even if the old regimes have fallen.

A different version of this article appeared in the Jerusalem Post.

BOSNIA 2012

CROATIAN VIEWS ON “ISLAMISATION” IN BOSNIA

The rise of radical Islam in BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA is going unchallenged by the authorities, the country’s Archbishop of Sarajevo Cardinal Vinko Puljic warned, highlighting the growth of extremism in the country during a visit to the international headquarters of Aid to the Church in Need.

The cardinal claimed that the growing process of ISLAMISATION in BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA is being funded by radicals in the MIDDLE EAST. Muslim centres, mosques and Medressas (Islamic schools) have been built around the country with petrodollars from SAUDI ARABIA as well as TURKEY and to some extend IRAN. 

The cardinal further stressed the spread of Wahhabism, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabi , which is the official religion of SAUDI ARABIA. The Archbishop of Sarajevo claimed that there are already 3-5,000 Wahhabis in BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA and the group is seeking to gain influence in society. 

Catholic,Orthodox Churches and Mosque

According to the Cardinal, nobody in the government has the courage to do anything to prevent this development. Unconfirmed church sources claim that more than 100,000 young BOSNIAN Muslims have encountered Wahhabi Islam through organizations such as Active Islamic Youth, Furqan, Muslim Youth Council, student organizations such as Demus and social networks. Cardinal Puljic added: “In recent years, at least 70 new mosques have been built in Sarajevo alone.”

KING FAHD MOSQUE, ALLEGEDLY A MAGNET FOR MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISTS

Reports state that SAUDI ARABIAN money funded the reconstruction of Sarajevo’s Husrev Begova Mosque which included the removal of internal mosaics in accordance with Wahhabi aesthetics.  Another new mosque, the King Fahd Mosque, which is the country’s largest Islamic place of worship, was described by one report as a magnet for Muslim fundamentalists.

While mosques are being built or repaired, Cardinal Puljic pointed out that building approval for churches can be delayed for years – adding that Church property confiscated under communism has still not been returned. According to the Cardinal the government seems to have no interest in giving Catholic Church property back to its rightful owners, where on the other hand most of Muslim property has been returned.

The Archbishop of Sarajevo claims that Catholics are systematically disadvantaged. He demands equal treatment for Catholics in employment, education and other spheres of life.

Despite these problems, the CROAT Catholic Church is seeking greater cooperation between different ethnic and religious groups. The Croat Catholic Church, who represents a minority, is determined to showcase a constructive force that wishes to make a contribution to the success of society.

BOSNIAS ETHNIC RIFT - THE KEY HINDRANCE TO ECO POLITICAL ADVANCE

 

INFLUENTIAL ISLAMIC COMMUNITY IN BOSNIA

See also related article: http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2012/07/bosnia-suffers-from-unresolved-issues.html

Mr Suljagic has been the minister for education for Sarajevo canton, by far the biggest of the ten cantons in the Federation. When he suggested that pupils should be allowed to opt out of religion classes without suffering a loss to their overall grades, he became the subject of a hate campaign. One death threat came in the form of a bullet delivered to his home with the message: “Leave Allah and his religion alone, or the hand of the faithful will strike you. 

Background Info. See:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnia_and_Herzegovina

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina

Mr Suljagic's most fervent critics his Reis-ulema Mustafa Ceric, head of the BOSNIAN ISLAMIC COMMUNITY. Background Info. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mustafa_Ceri%C4%87

In May last year, in a particularly biting speech to 30,000 faithful at Blagaj, Cerić attacked the Minister's proposals, warning that Muslims would take to the streets... affirming that “the schools are ours” and condemning “those who want to do in Sarajevo what had been done in Srebrenica”, that is genocide.

THE SCHOOL ARE OURS

Reis-ulema Mustafa Ceric

Indeed, schools and universities in the Federation are firmly under control of the ISLAMIC COMMUNITY and foreign NGOs, sponsored by both, SAUDI ARABIA as well as IRAN and TURKEY. Taking into account that BOSNIA has a rather young population in comparison to EUROPE, radical Islamic elements are increasing their recruiting activities, especially since the young generation of BOSNIAKS (Muslim Bosnians), unlike their parents and grandparents, see no future in EUROPE and thus tend to look for alternative identities. SAUDI ARABIA, TURKEY and IRAN provide scholarships to BOSNIAK students in order to study in MALAYSIA, Ankara, Riyadh and Tehran. Medressas (Islamic schools) are thriving in the Federation, fostering fundamentalism to an extend Bosnia has never seen before. Universities in the Federation house prayer rooms and Wahhabism is on the increase. Thus indeed, the education system in Bosnia is undermined by the ISLAMIC COMMUNITY.

Background Info: See: BOSNIA, EUROPEAN UNIONS STEPCHILD http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2011/07/bosnia-european-unions-stepchild.html and BOSNIA, CURSED BY EUROPEAN UNION

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2011/08/bosnia-cursed-by-european-union-eu.html

BOSNIA'S LASTING INCAPACITY TO CREATE IMPARTIAL POLITICAL STRUCTURES

Mr Suljagic has now been forced to resign when almost at the same time Mr Ceric received a prize in Rome for the “promotion of dialogue between religions.” Reflecting on this year’s Srebrenica anniversary one wonders what Mr Ceric's award says about modern BOSNIA:

From the end of the war to today, the question asked has been: how deep are the wounds left by that conflict? The version chosen by the international media has been that the causes of the war were ethnic, not the consequences. Twenty years later it seems to be the contrary. The resignation of Suljagić is a sign of BOSNIA'S lasting incapacity to create public structures characterized by inclusiveness, not division, for all its different citizens. The award to Cerić is perhaps a sign of our lasting incapacity to comprehend how much the internal dynamics of that country are important for the destiny of EUROPE. 

SOME BOSNIAK ELEMENTS TURNED TO EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES, WHICH RESULTED IN THE FORMATION OF RELIGIOUS “MUSLIM-ONLY” ENTITIES

BOSNIA should be a lesson: in a far less conducive environment, some BOSNIAK elements turned to extremist ideologies, which resulted in the formation of religious Muslim-only units, with emirs and imams, in what started out as a secular, multiethnic Army of the Republic of BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. Wartime atrocities committed by foreign and domestic mujahedeen created deep-seated fears and resentments that continue to be exploited by nationalist politicians.

Mr Suljagic was a translator for the UN during the war in Srebrenica, which helped him survive the massacres of July 1995.