SECTARIANISM OR REALPOLITIK?
“They are witnessing the ISLAMIC awakening and
feel profoundly imperiled by the spreading idea of political ISLAM and the rule
of ISLAM.”
“The project of political
ISLAM has failed, and there should be no mixing between political and religious
work.”
These two contradictory
remarks were made in the wake of the ARAB “revolutions,” not by two rival MIDDLE
EASTERN leaders, but by two longtime allies in the region. The first statement
is from IRAN’S leader AYATOLLAH ALI KHAMENEI, who has described the ARAB
uprisings as an “ISLAMIC Awakening.” The second came from SYRIAN President BASHAR
AL-ASSAD, who has called political ISLAM a “plague” and asserts that SYRIA is
“the last stronghold of secularism” in the region. The conflicting statements
run against the grain of the dominant narrative that describes DAMASCUS-TEHRAN partnership
as sectarian and its raison d’état the creation of a “SHI‘A crescent.” In the
past four years, the mainstream media and pundits have had a tendency to
overplay the split between the SUNNI and SHI‘A to explain the sanguinary war in SYRIA. In
doing so, they have reduced the manifold crisis and the complexity of the DAMASCUS-TEHRAN
relationship to a simplified narrative of SUNNI-SHI‘I sectarianism.
MAINSTREAM
MEDIA DOWNPLAY THE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN DAMASCUS AND
TEHRAN
As a key feature of the
modern MIDDLE EAST, the SYRIAN-IRANIAN axis has been an important factor in
shaping the geopolitics of the region in the past three decades. The
partnership between a pan-ARAB secular state and a PERSIAN ISLAMIC Republic—and
the longevity of this alliance—has always triggered the curiosity of observers,
to which a plethora of academic and journalistic writing attests. Some
observers, especially critics of the alliance, tend to trace the roots of the
relationship to the reign of the SHI‘I clergy in IRAN and the ALAWITE in SYRIA
and simply conclude that religious affinity has been inherent in the formation
and continuation of the partnership. This sectarian narrative, so prevalent in
the mainstream media, downplays significant political disagreements between DAMASCUS
and TEHRAN and overlooks the irony of the paradox in their ideological
foundations—a factor which has indeed been vital for perpetuating the alliance.
Background Information: ALAWITES
IT IS GENERALLY
BELIEVED THAT AMONG THE ARAB REGIMES SYRIA IS THE MOST IMPLACABLE ENEMY OF
ISRAEL
http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2012/10/the-alawites-and-israel.html
Bashar al-Assad receiving a big shiny golden “Allah” from Ali Larijani,
the speaker of Iran’s Parliament after a meeting at the
Presidential Palace in Damascus, Dec. 2014
|
Contrary to notions of
post-revolution IRAN’S foreign policy as fanatic and purely religiously driven,
the ISLAMIC Republic’s partnership with BA‘THIST SYRIA was not constructed on a
spiritual basis to spread SHI‘A ideology. Rather it was primarily aimed at
reaching out to the SUNNI movements in the ARAB EAST, a policy that was in line
with TEHRAN’S overall strategy to present itself as the heart of MUSLIM
revolutionary struggles and a champion of resistance for both SUNNI and SHI‘I movements.
To export the revolution, the clergy in TEHRAN established ties with HAMAs, the
ISLAMIC JIHAD in PALESTINE and EGYPT and the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, including its
SYRIAN branch, as well as SUNNI clerical factions in LEBANON. This alliance
lent a very credible SUNNI dimension to the ISLAMIC Republic’s policy.
THE
UNIFICATION OF ISLAM’S TWO SECTS HAS BEEN CENTRAL TO POST-REVOLUTION IRAN’S
FOREIGN POLICY.
IRAN’S leaders advocated
this kind of MUSLIM unity and issued fatwas that banned the fomenting of
disagreements harmful to “the brotherhood of Muslims.” Through specific support
for the PALESTINIAN cause and symbolic initiatives such as the declaration of
the Week of Unity between the SHI‘A and SUNNI, IRAN has sought to create a united
ISLAMIC front against the common enemies of the umma, i.e. the MUSLIM
community. This approach in IRAN’S regional policy has continued under the
current leader of IRAN, who has repeatedly stated that “IRAN does not seek to PERSIANIZE ARABS or convert other MUSLIMS to SHI‘ISM.
IRAN is after … reviving the ISLAMIC umma.”
SAUDI
ARABIA AND QATAR CONSTANTLY PROJECT A PROVOCATIVE SECTARIAN IMAGE OF TEHRAN’S
INVOLVEMENT IN THE REGION
The ISLAMIC Republic’s
effort to shed its image as a SHI‘I entity and assume an Islamic universalist
discourse should be seen in the historical context of IRAN’S ethnic and
religious isolation in the region. Historically, IRAN’S identification with the
SHI‘A has been an obstacle to claiming a universalist ISLAMIC mantle and gave
its regional rivals a pretext for depicting it as heretical PERSIAN entity. IRAN’S
regional rivals have been able to undermine TEHRAN’S endeavor to overcome these
ethnic and cultural barriers to its regional influence by highlighting IRAN’S
SHI‘I and PERSIAN characteristics. This partly explains why media affiliated
with SAUDI ARABIA and QATAR constantly project a provocative sectarian image of
Tehran’s involvement in the region to both demonize the clergy and mobilize SUNNI
public opinion.
Background Information: QATAR
QATAR AND THE SYRIAN CHAOS
QATAR AT ODDS WITH RUSSIA OVER ITS STANCE ON SYRIA? OR IS IT
ABOUT DOMINATING THE GAS ENERGY MARKETS?
THE QATARI PROJECT: “DESTROYING SAUDI ARABIA”?
QATAR RUNS COVERT DESERT TRAINING CAMP FOR ‘MODERATE’ SYRIAN
REBELS
QATAR, IT’S ALL ABOUT ENERGY
FOR
TEHRAN, THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF SYRIA IS ITS GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION AT THE
HEART OF THE ARAB EAST AND ITS HISTORIC ROLE AS A BASTION FOR PAN-ARABISM.
This
ideological weight was significant during the IRAQ-IRAN war when HAFEZ
AL-ASSAD’S support blunted SADDAM HUSSEIN’S anti-IRANIAN propaganda and
prevented the conflict from becoming an all-ARAB war against PERSIANS.
SYRIA is an essential link to the frontline of the struggle with ISRAEL and an entry point into the PALESTINIAN and LEBANESE arenas. For IRAN, an unfriendly regime or a power vacuum in DAMASCUS, resulting in the spread of extremists to neighboring countries, would jeopardize IRAN’S allies in both LEBANON and IRAQ.
SYRIA is an essential link to the frontline of the struggle with ISRAEL and an entry point into the PALESTINIAN and LEBANESE arenas. For IRAN, an unfriendly regime or a power vacuum in DAMASCUS, resulting in the spread of extremists to neighboring countries, would jeopardize IRAN’S allies in both LEBANON and IRAQ.
The partnership between a divine state in IRAN and a secular BAʿTHIST
SYRIA is in the first place a product of these historical and geostrategic
factors.
THE
IRONY OF THIS ALLIANCE IS THAT THE TWO STATES ESPOUSE CONTRADICTORY IDEOLOGIES.
At odds with prevailing
views, it is not religious affinity but ideological disagreement that has been
a crucial factor in the longevity of the SYRIAN–IRANIAN axis. As JUBIN GOODARZI
argues in his book about SYRIA–IRAN relations, “in the MIDDLE EAST, the record
clearly shows that states sharing a common ideology compete for the mantle of
leadership rather than form durable alliances.” An example of this is that
despite the structural and ideological similarities between ASSAD’S and SADDAM
HUSSEIN’S regimes, the unity plans between the two BAATHIST parties in the
1970s ended in failure and animosity partly because each claimed to be the
legitimate leader of BA‘THIST PAN-ARABISM.
The ideological paradox,
however, did exact a toll on the SYRIA–IRAN relationship in the formative years
of the alliance. In the 1980s, the former SYRIAN President HAFEZ AL-ASSAD was
concerned with the export of the ISLAMIC Revolution and connections between IRAN
and his MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD opposition. While IRAN’S relationship with the SYRIAN
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD remained limited, the clergy’s support for radical SUNNI
factions and HEZBOLLAH, an alternative to the pro-SYRIAN secular Amal, led to
major tensions between DAMASCUS and TEHRAN in LEBANON. Likewise, the IRANIAN
clergy were upset with anti-Islamic practices of the ruling BA‘THISTS. Around
the same time that the ayatollahs in IRAN imposed an ISLAMIC dress code on
women, the BA‘THISTS in SYRIA sought to enforce the unveiling of women and to
target any public ISLAMIC symbols that could bear a trace of the MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD. The IRANIAN diplomats in SYRIA were appalled by the BA‘THIST’S
extreme policies, such as harassing ordinary people merely for their Islamic
look. At one point SYRIAN security forces even arrested an IRANIAN diplomat and
his chadur-clad wife in a DAMASCUS street and took them into custody believing
that they were MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD supporters.
ASSAD:
POLITICAL ISLAM HAS FAILED
Even though the current
turmoil has made DAMASCUS heavily reliant on TEHRAN, political and ideological
contradictions are still apparent in their foreign policy. President BASHAR
AL-ASSAD calls political ISLAM “a plague that hit the ISLAMIC world” and has
proclaimed that “the project of political ISLAM has failed.” This is in stark
contrast to the ISLAMIC Republic’s promulgation of political ISLAM in the
region. From the very beginning of the ARAB uprisings, IRAN’S leader called
them an ISLAMIC Awakening and declared that this “unique historical moment”
would usher in ISLAMIST governments in place of pro-WEST authoritarian regimes.
But for ASSAD, “ARAB uprisings have only brought chaos.”
INTRIGUING
ASPECTS OF THE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE “ODD COUPLE”- SYRIA AND IRAN
The paradox of the
alliance between the IRANIAN clergy and secular BA‘THISTS of SYRIA is one of
the most intriguing aspects of the partnership between the “odd couple.” The
alliance’s survival to this day despite various internal contradictions and
regional differences remains an exceptional phenomenon in the history of the
modern MIDDLE EAST. The DAMASCUS-TEHRAN relationship should be primarily
analyzed in this context and not by the two states’ common SHI‘I roots.
Recognizing the complexity of the historical and geopolitical factors behind
the alliance would provide insights into building a common ground with IRAN
over solving regional problems, including the conflict in SYRIA.
By Mohammad Ataie, who is
an Iranian journalist and a PhD student in History at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst.