TO
TOPPLE THE THRONE - PRIME OBJECTIVE OF IS?
The meteoric rise of the ISLAMIC
STATE of IRAQ and SYRIA, which has since styled itself the ISLAMIC STATE in an
affirmation of its broader aspirations of dominion over a self-declared
caliphate beyond the territories where it exercises control, has aggravated the
MIDDLE EAST’S already treacherous geopolitical landscape. Having emerged out of
conflict and instability in Iraq and SYRIA, the ISLAMIC STATE has arguably
matched or otherwise exceeded the capabilities of fellow extremist groups such
as AL-QAEDA, its regional affiliates and other violent ISLAMIST organizations.
Background
Information:
SAUDI
ARABIA’S CONCERNS THAT THE KINGDOM MAY BE THE ISLAMIC STATE’S NEXT TARGET
ISLAMIC
STATE IS ON SAUDI ARABIA’S DOORSTEP
Despite its recent
setbacks—notably in SYRIA’S KURDISH-majority town of KOBANE (a.k.a. AYN AL-ARAB),
located in the northern ALEPPO province—the ISLAMIC STATE has demonstrated an
impressive ability to capture, control and consolidate its hold on territory
and sustain its insurgent and support cadres. It also operates a sophisticated
information and propaganda wing that exploits social media as a force
multiplier alongside its scorched earth campaign. It has also drawn support
from independent sympathizers and ideological allies throughout the broader MIDDLE
EAST and around globe—including among locally focused extremist factions in AFGHANISTAN,
ALGERIA, EGYPT, LIBYA, PAKISTAN and YEMEN. These attributes are reminiscent of AL-QAEDA’S
at the pinnacle of its influence.
However, they also reflect the simmering
competition between the ISLAMIC STATE and its AL-QAEDA precursor as well as the
latter’s regional affiliates such as JABHAT AL-NUSRA. The ISLAMIC STATE’S
increasingly strident discourse and threats also illustrate its rising
ambitions; in addition to confronting the incumbent regimes in IRAQ and SYRIA
and rival militants and insurgents, the ISLAMIC STATE has ambitious set of
goals that include challenging SAUDI ARABIA.
ISLAMIC
STATE IS APPLYING MORE AGGRESSIVE THREAT POSTURE TOWARD SAUDI ARABIA
The ISLAMIC STATE today
represents the latest and potentially most complex set of challenges to SAUDI
ARABIA, which had previously drawn the ire of AL-QAEDA and its regional
affiliate AL-QAEDA in the ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP). Due to the recent death of
King ABDULLAH BIN ABDULAZIZ AL-SAUD and the succession of King SALMAN BIN ABDULAZIZ
AL-SAUD, the ISLAMIC STATE’S rise also comes amid a period of heightened
domestic and regional uncertainty.
This article will examine the ISLAMIC
STATE’S escalating threats toward SAUDI ARABIA, which suggest, alongside other
recent trends, that the ISLAMIC STATE is employing a steadily more aggressive
threat posture toward SAUDI ARABIA that is likely to foreshadow future attacks
and intensifying pressures.
Background
Information: SAUDI ARABIA AND IS
SAUDI
ARABIA AFTER ABDULLAH
ISIS: SAUDI ARABIA - THE PUPPET MASTER OF
ISIS?
WHO
IS BEHIND THE CALIPHATE PROJECT?
The ISLAMIC STATE’S leader
(and self-style caliph) ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI singled out SAUDI ARABIA in an
audio statement titled “Even if the Disbelievers Despise Such,” released by the
group’s AL-FURQAN Media Foundation on November 13, 2014. In his statement, AL-BAGHDADI
extolled what he describes as the purported expansion of the ISLAMIC STATE to
the “lands of AL-HARAMEIN” (two holy places) in addition to YEMEN, EGYPT, LIBYA
and ALGERIA, through its acceptance of oaths of allegiance sworn by local
militants to the self-styled caliphate.
AL-BAGHDADI’S mention of AL-HARAMEIN
is notable in that it reflects the radical Islamist proclivity for avoiding any
reference to SAUDI ARABIA by name and, by implication, any indirect recognition
of the legitimacy of the SAUDI royal family, instead highlighting ISLAM’S two
holiest sites at MECCA and MEDINA. AL-BAGHDADI also proclaimed the appointment
of regional governors to represent the ISLAMIC STATE and called on followers in
SAUDI ARABIA and beyond to recognize and follow their leadership.
AL-BAGHDADI issued
a categorical call to arms: He referred to the SAUDI royal family as “the
serpent’s head” and the “stronghold of the disease,” and implored his SAUDI
subjects to attack the “AL-SALOUL” and “their soldiers.” The reference to AL-SALOUL
represents a derogatory distortion of the AL-SAUD family name; in ISLAMIC
tradition, the AL-SALOUL family guarded the then-pagan holy site of the KAABA
at MECCA during the pre-Islamic period.
He also implored his
followers to attack polytheists and rafidah (rejectionists), an inflammatory
label often assigned to SHI’A MUSLIMS by extreme SALAFISTS and other hardline SUNNI
ISLAMISTS, in an apparent reference to the kingdom’s substantial SHI’A minority
population. AL-BAGHDADI then issued an appeal for “patience” and reassured his
followers in the kingdom that the “vanguards of the ISLAMIC STATE are on their
way”.
“ISLAMIC
STATE’S FLAG WILL FLY OVER MECCA AND MEDINA.”
The subsequent release of
the fifth edition of DABIQ, the ISLAMIC STATE’S official magazine, in November
2014 by its affiliated AL-HAYAT Media Center, followed up AL-BAGHDADI’S earlier
de facto declaration of war against the House of SAUD. The cover of the
magazine is emblazoned with a photograph of the KAABA at MECCA, while the
foreword proclaims that the ISLAMIC STATE’S flag will “fly over MECCA and MEDINA.”
IS supporter in Mecca |
It is also emphasized that SAUDI militants should take up arms at home and
avoid traveling to battlefields abroad. A section devoted to SAUDI ARABIA exalts
the efforts of earlier generations of militants who resisted and attacked the
monarchy, including AL-QAEDA and its regional affiliate AQAP, while at the same
time lamenting their failure to achieve their objectives.
Background
Information:
FOMENTING
A SECTARIAN BACKLASH COULD PLAY RIGHT INTO THE HANDS OF IS
IS
APPARENTLY ALSO DECLARED WAR AGAINST THE GULF MONARCHIES (GCC)
Equally important, the ISLAMIC
STATE declares its opposition to SAUDI’S fellow PERSIAN GULF monarchies in an
apparent declaration of war against SAUDI ARABIA’S allies in the GULF
COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC). A section of the magazine dedicated to the group’s
activities in YEMEN emphasizes the proximity between SAUDI- and YEMEN-based ISLAMIC
STATE loyalists and their potential to cooperate in launching attacks in the ARABIAN
PENINSULA.
An incursion by militants
who had infiltrated SAUDI ARABIA’S northeastern town of ARAR, located in the
Northern Borders province that sits adjacent to IRAQ’S southern border, on
January 5 underlines the potential threat the ISLAMIC STATE poses to the
kingdom. While details surrounding the incident remain murky, a band of IRAQ-based
insurgents reportedly associated with the ISLAMIC STATE is said to have penetrated
SAUDI territory and engaged a SAUDI border police post.
Background
Information:
THE
QATARI PROJECT: “DESTROYING SAUDI ARABIA”?
The attackers are
reported to have employed small unit ambush tactics and a suicide bomber, who
detonated his explosives-laden vest while offering to surrender to a senior SAUDI
security officer, killing himself and the officer. The ensuing incident left
three border officers and four militants dead. The Northern Borders province is
located alongside IRAQ’S ANBAR province, a key locus of support for the ISLAMIC
STATE that is hotly contested between the ISLAMIC STATE and IRAQI security
forces. The SAUDI authorities have also linked the November 2014 murder of a DANISH
national in the capital RIYADH following the release of a video purportedly
recorded by the perpetrators who claimed responsibility for the attack. An
attack that targeted SHI’A worshippers, who had gathered to commemorate ASHURA,
in AL-HASA in the kingdom’s Eastern province has also been attributed to the ISLAMIC
STATE. SAUDI authorities are also reported to have disrupted numerous militant
cells linked to the ISLAMIC STATE.
GEOPOLITICS
OF THE PALACE
A consideration of SAUDI
ARABIA’S geopolitical significance is critical to appreciate the nature of the
threats the ISLAMIC STATE poses to the kingdom. In many respects, the factors
that have compelled the ISLAMIC STATE to confront SAUDI ARABIA echo those that
had originally induced AL-QAEDA to take on the monarchy. Much like other
entrenched authoritarian regimes in the MIDDLE EAST that have drawn AL-QAEDA’S
fury over the years, SAUDI ARABIA is despised by the ISLAMIC STATE for what it
sees as its pervasive corruption, strategic relationship with the UNITED STATES
and illegitimate position as the custodian of MECCA and MEDINA.
In this regard, the ISLAMIC
STATE, much like AL-QAEDA, views the SAUDI royal family as an agent of U.S.
imperialism that is bent on the domination and subjugation of the ARAB and ISLAMIC
world. Its status as the world’s largest exporter of oil, and second-largest
oil producer, adds another layer of complexity that is surely not lost on the ISLAMIC
STATE.
In this regard, AL-QAEDA’S earlier targeting of strategic energy
infrastructure, including its February 2006 operation against the ABQAIQ oil
refinery—one of the world’s largest—may provide valuable insights into the ISLAMIC
STATE’S tactical calculus with respect to prospective targets inside the
kingdom. The circumstances surrounding the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in MECCA
by militants, led by JUHAYMAN AL-OTAIBI, who were violently opposed to the SAUDI
monarchy, may also offer a glimpse into the ISLAMIC STATE’S plans for the
kingdom.
IS
OBJECTIVE IS TO SUCCEED WHERE IT’S AL-QAEDA PREDECESSOR PREVIOUSLY FAILED
IS and AL -QAEDA split |
For AL-QAEDA, the
prospect of toppling or otherwise destabilizing the throne represented the apex
of achievement in its broader struggle. The often-overlooked fact that a number
of AL-QAEDA notables, including its late founder and leader OSAMA BIN LADEN,
arose out of the domestic political opposition in SAUDI ARABIA, serves as a
testament to the hatred the SAUDI royal family has incurred within extreme ISLAMIST
circles. It is reasonable to assume that SAUDI ARABIA also figures prominently
in the ISLAMIC STATE’S vision for the wider region even as it is preoccupied
with its multiple front insurgent campaign in IRAQ and SYRIA. The ISLAMIC
STATE’S ongoing rivalry with AL-QAEDA and its regional affiliates has also
likely elevated the Kingdom’s importance as the ISLAMIC STATE may sense an
opportunity to succeed where its AL-QAEDA predecessor previously failed. SAUDI
ARABIA’S declared opposition to the ISLAMIC STATE, its support for rival SYRIAN
insurgent factions such as the ISLAMIC FRONT and others and its participation
in the U.S.-led coalition against the ISLAMIC STATE have likewise elevated its
stature as a target.
COUNTERMEASURES
SAUDI ARABIA has taken
numerous steps to mitigate the threat posed by the ISLAMIC STATE. In the realm
of ideas, it has attempted to rein in members of its religious establishment,
including over the solicitation of funds for aid and relief in SYRIA and
prohibiting outright any attempts by SAUDIS to join the conflict in SYRIA or
engage in other un-sanctioned activities abroad. In doing so, the Kingdom
leveraged the Council of Senior Scholars, the country’s highest religious body.
While these efforts predate the rise of the ISLAMIC STATE, they demonstrate
mounting concerns in the palace over events in SYRIA and their impact on the SAUDI
population.
WAHHABIST
AND SALAFIST IDEOLOGIES VERSUS IS “WORLDVIEWS”?
These efforts have
yielded mixed results, as some prominent clergy have deviated from the official
line on how to approach the situation in SYRIA. More importantly, SAUDI
volunteers also continue to stream into SYRIA and other battlefields in large
numbers to take up arms alongside various insurgent factions. There is a great
deal of sympathy among SAUDIS for the plight of SYRIANS and a deep antipathy
toward a secular BAATHIST regime that is viewed by many as heretical and
apostate.
An additional challenge is that the ultraconservative forms of WAHHABIST
and SALAFIST ideologies propagated by SAUDI ARABIA’S religious establishment—
in many respects, SAUDI ARABIA is the wellspring of these ideas—are hard to
distinguish from the worldviews being espoused by the ISLAMIC STATE. The ISLAMIC
STATE’S dramatic expansion has nevertheless provoked the Kingdom to engage with
its population in the ideological arena. Most recently, SAUDI ARABIA’S Grand
Mufti, SHAYKH ABD AL-AZIZ AL-ASHAYKH, has spearheaded a campaign that aims to
enlist media and educational institutions in combating the ISLAMIC STATE’S appeal.
Background
Information: WAHHABIS AND SAUDI ARABIA
THE
THEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL PACT BETWEEN THE SAUD CLAN AND THE WAHHABISTS
ANOTHER
BRICK IN THE WALL
Meanwhile, in the realm
of physical security, the kingdom has embarked on an ambitious project to
construct an approximately 600-mile-long security wall on sections of its
northern border with IRAQ. The wall is designed to prevent militants from
infiltrating SAUDI territory. The kingdom has resorted to a similar strategy in
an attempt to insulate itself from the expanding violence and instability that
has overtaken its southern neighbor YEMEN, building approximately
1,000-mile-long wall along its border with YEMEN. Meanwhile, SAUDI ARABIA’S security
forces have also continued to make mass arrests of suspected militants in an
apparent effort to disrupt suspected domestic extremist activities associated
with the ISLAMIC STATE and potentially other violent ISLAMIST organizations.
CONCLUSION
In contrast to the chaos
of IRAQ and SYRIA and other conflict-ridden zones in the broader MIDDLE EAST where
the ISLAMIC STATE has gained a foothold, SAUDI ARABIA, upon first glance,
represents an impermissible environment for staging and launching militant
activities. The ISLAMIC STATE’S particular brand of brutality has also
galvanized opposition to its expansion and influence, including among rival
militants wary of its tactics and other actions in IRAQ, SYRIA and elsewhere.
This is best illustrated by the losses it has incurred in recent months and the
growing divide between its community of supporters and those of rival
organizations. At the same time, there are no indications to suggest that these
setbacks will impact its ambitions to follow in the footsteps of its AL-QAEDA precursor
and lead a campaign to topple the SAUDI monarchy.
By: Chris Zambelis via The
Jamestown Foundation
More
Background Information on SAUDI ARABIA:
THE
QUIET WAR IN SAUDI ARABIA
SAUDI
KING WILL NOT GRANT ANY CONCESSIONS TO THE 8% SHIA POPULATION
SAUDI
ARABIAN INTELLIGENCE HEADQUARTERS BLASTED
SALAFI
ISLAMIZATION
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