INTO
THE MAELSTROM: THE SAUDI-LED MISADVENTURE IN YEMEN
Citing a request for
outside intervention by YEMEN’S deposed President ABD-RABU MANSOUR HADI, the
governments of SAUDI ARABIA, the UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, BAHRAIN, QATAR, KUWAIT,
and JORDAN have launched an aerial intervention against the so-called HOUTHI movement
in YEMEN. EGYPT has four warships en route to ADEN In southern YEMEN and has
expressed willingness to “send ground troops if necessary,” while TURKEY is
considering providing logistical support. SUDAN and PAKISTAN are also
reportedly joining the operation.
Background
Information: YEMEN
YEMEN FIGHTING
RISKS DEEPENING SECTARIAN DIVISIONS
YEMEN A CRITICAL
BUT FORGOTTEN FRONT
BAB EL-MANDAB:
STRATEGIC LINK BETWEEN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA, VIA THE RED
SEA AND THE SUEZ CANAL at: http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.co.at/2013/08/yemen.html
The HOUTHIS, also known
as ANSAR ALLAH in ARABIC, or GOD’S PARTISANS, are a ZAIDI SHIA movement that
began a rebellion in northern YEMEN in 2003–2004. In the chaos following the
Arab Spring revolutions and the internationally overseen removal of YEMEN’S
long-serving authoritarian ruler ALI ABDULLAH SALEH in 2012, the HOUTHIS
expanded their power base—apparently with IRANIAN support—to undermine the SAUDI-backed
HADI government.
In 2014, the HOUTHIS
linked up with allies of the SALEH family, which is still angling for a way to
recapture power, and rapidly pushed south, capturing the capital, SANAA. They
then moved on to ADEN, where HADI had fled before leaving the country by sea on
March 25 (it was announced that he arrived in RIYADH on March 26). Meanwhile, a
separate SALAFI-SUNNI insurgency led by AL-QAEDA in the ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)
continues to rage in the south and east of the country, with the
self-proclaimed ISLAMIC STATE having recently raised its own profile in YEMEN by
publicizing a string of gruesome massacres.
The intervention, dubbed OPERATION
DECISIVE STORM, includes all member states of the GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC)
except OMAN, but SAUDI ARABIA—long an influential actor in YEMENI politics—is
clearly the driving force behind it.
SAUDI
ARABIA’S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH TURKEY AND QATAR
The operation comes at a
critical juncture not only for YEMEN but also for SAUDI ARABIA and the region.
In January 2015 former SAUDI KING ABDULLAH BIN ABDULAZIZ passed away and was
succeeded by his half-brother King SALMAN BIN ABDULAZIZ. YEMEN has been King SALMAN’S
most immediate foreign policy challenge since he ascended the throne.
Background
Information: QATAR AND SAUDI ARABIA
THE QATARI
PROJECT: “DESTROYING SAUDI ARABIA”?
QATAR INVESTED
BILLIONS TO EXPAND ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
HOW MUCH AND TO
WHOM IS QATAR PAYING? THE ANSWER: WAHHABI ASSOCIATIONS AND MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
STRIVING FOR
BECOMING THE REGIONAL POWER PLAYER
At the diplomatic level, OPERATION
DECISIVE STORM is a notable success for the monarch. It is the first deployment
of the joint GCC military command set up in November 2014, and it is a product
of his careful rapprochement with TURKEY and QATAR. The fact that the UNITED
STATES has backed the operation is also significant and serves as further
confirmation that the mutual estrangement in the last years of King ABDULLAH’S rule
is fading away.
PROXY
WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA
The operation is also a
boost domestically for SALMAN’S line, particularly his son MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN,
whose appointment as minister of defense was initially met with skepticism due
to his youthful age and lack of experience. SAUDI media is now portraying MOHAMMED
as personally spearheading the anti-HOUTHI operation, with one article
exclaiming that “the sons of King SALMAN are at the forefront of DECISIVE STORM
both on land and in the air.” MOHAMMED’S brother KHALED BIN SALMAN is an air
force pilot.
Background
Information: SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN
SAUDI ARABIA’S
PROXY WAR
MIDDLE EAST UNDER
THREAT AS IRAN ENCOURAGES SHIITE UPRISING IN SAUDI ARABIA?
SAUDIS
HAVE LARGELY OVERSTATED IRANIAN INFLUENCE OVER THE HOUTHIS
On one level, what is now
playing out in YEMEN is a religiously inflected proxy war between IRAN and SAUDI
ARABIA, but that is not a sufficient explanation. In all probability, the SAUDIS
have largely overstated IRANIAN influence over the HOUTHIS. The portrayal of
what is happening in YEMEN as an IRANIAN takeover is meant to rally U.S. and GULF/ARAB
support for the SAUDI position in what is essentially a localized, power
struggle between the center and the periphery in YEMEN in which the SAUDIS had
placed their bet with the center.
Background
Information: SAUDI ARABIA
THE ENDLESS WAR:
SAUDI ARABIA GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST IRAN
That said, it remains
unclear what political end state is envisaged for this operation, which comes
months too late to preserve the power of SAUDI ARABIA’S traditional allies on
the ground in YEMEN. Pro-SAUDI factions, such as the tribal militias of the
powerful AL-AHMAR family, various SALAFI groups, and the government of ousted
president HADI, have all been decisively beaten by the HOUTHIS since their
southward advance began in earnest in mid-2014. While there is no shortage of
anti-HOUTHI groups and powerful remnants of these forces, and though such units
may still coalesce into a viable fighting force, they have not done so yet and
the obstacles are many.
GULF
COALITION AIRSTRIKES SHOULD NOT BE OVERESTIMATED
For the moment, and
perhaps the foreseeable future, SAUDI ARABIA lacks a strong ally on the ground
to exploit the aerial attacks, and such attacks may not be enough. History
shows that airstrikes without corresponding ground forces do not produce
decisive victories.
The capacity of GULF
airstrikes should also not be overstated. At the moment, the intervention
forces appear to be going after fixed targets that were identified in advance,
like air bases and command centers rather than mobile HOUTHI units, fighters in
urban areas, or supply lines. To engage targets of the more mobile type—which
would be far more useful in a battle of the kind now raging in YEMEN—would
require coordination with local allies on the ground and the use of spotters to
guide airstrikes.
It is hard to see the SAUDIS
deploying ground forces to eject the HOUTHIS, given the likelihood of a
quagmire without a clear exit. An exception may be a buffer zone on the SAUDI
ARABIA–YEMEN border, similar to SAUDI ARABIA’S inconclusive 2008–2009
intervention. While an intervention of this type could in fact apply
significant pressure on the HOUTHIS—given that their leadership and much of the
core armed cadre hails from the SAADA region on the SAUDI border—it would
require significant effort, and it would not in itself sort out the situation
further south in SANAA and ADEN.
MILITARY
VICTORY MAY NOT BE THE GOAL - TEMPERATE SAUDI APPROACH TO THE MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD HOWEVER COULD BE THE GOAL
The SAUDIS can aim to use
the air operation to gain greater leverage in negotiations for some sort of
power-sharing agreement. To this end, they are also rekindling their
relationship with the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD–affiliated faction of the ISLAH PARTY in
order to buy influence on the ground and reassemble anti-HOUTHI forces. This
also fits with the recent, more temperate SAUDI approach to the BROTHERHOOD
regionally.
The net effect of this
operation is ultimately dangerous for YEMEN’S future path. It will open up more
fissures on the ground, perhaps bolster the HOUTHIS’ popular support as
defenders of YEMENI sovereignty, and create more opportunities for AQAP and the
ISLAMIC STATE to flourish.
Adapted by Geopolitical
Analysis and Monitoring from the original article written by FREDERIC WEHREY
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