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| Kosovo governmental building in Pristina |
KOSOVO’S TOUGH YEAR AHEAD
SOME KEY OBSERVATIONS
As
KOSOVO faces a tough year ahead, it is time to reflect upon the robustness of
its institutions, the persistence of VETËVENDOSJE, HASHIM THAÇI’S rise to the
presidency, the growing gulf between SERBS north and south of the IBAR, and the
“rose-tinted glasses” worn by many MEPS.
KOSOVO is in crisis – but its
institutions are actually proving to be quite robust
When writing about KOSOVO, there
is often a tendency for international commentators to focus on the negatives:
the high unemployment, the political instability and the ongoing ethnic
strife. What is not said often enough is
that the country’s institutions, which will only celebrate their eighth
birthday on 17th February, are proving themselves to be relatively robust.
A key facet of being a successful
state is that, when politicians throw visceral verbal barbs at one another and
extremist elements threaten the violent overthrow of constitutional order, the
country’s institutions hold steady – above politics and beyond interference.
ASSOCIATION
OF SERB MUNICIPALITIES – FEAR OF “REPUBLIKA SRBSKA” IN KOSOVO
Against a backdrop of violent
protests on the streets of PRISTINA at the implementation of the government’s
agreement with SERBIA over the establishment of the Association of SERB
Municipalities (ASM), which included the firebombing of government buildings on
PRISTINA’S Mother Theresa Boulevard and opposition MP’s deployment of teargas
canisters on the floor of Parliament in order to stifle debate, the
Constitutional Court has acted responsibly and proportionately.
While the issue of the ASM
remains a matter for intense debate – and the court continues to raise some
concerns about its compatibility with certain facets of KOSOVO’S constitution –
these have been raised in a mature manner that continues to give confidence to
both a perennially skeptical SERBIA and international community. This should be noted and celebrated.
VETËVENDOSJE
ARE NOT GOING AWAY
It is hard to imagine a EUROPEAN
state with a more cynical and calculating political party system than KOSOVO. The “establishment” political parties, the DEMOCRATIC
PARTY OF KOSOVO (PDK) and DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE OF KOSOVO (LDK), are controlled by
competing business, family and regional interests and give the distinct
impression of having little or no ideological basis whatsoever.
KOSOVO’S proportional
representation voting system means that, while not impossible, it is very
difficult for a government to be formed without the two parties cutting some
kind of a deal. This is precisely what
happened in December 2014 when, after six months of haggling, a deal was
reached that saw the “winner” of the election, the PDK’s HASHIM THAÇI surrender
the Prime Minister’s office to the LDK’s ISA MUSTAFA in exchange for their
support for his 2016 bid – a post that is awarded by Parliament. After cutting a deal with a small breakaway
party from the PDK and the numerous ethnic minority parties that are guaranteed
twenty seats in the National Assembly (ten for SERBS, four for ROMA, ASHKALI and
EGYPTIANS, three for BOSNIAKS, two for TURKS and one for GORANI), the PDK and
LDK shared the spoils of ministerial office.
It’s
not the fault of the LDK and PDK that the electoral system is structured in
such a way; but perceptions of cronyism and corruption are.
ENDEMIC
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS – THE CAUSE OF UNREST
Many international observers have
sought to paint the recent rise of the nationalist VETËVENDOSJE
(“self-determination”) as a response to anger at the KOSOVO government
“capitulating” to SERBIA on the issue of the creation of the Association of SERB
Municipalities, which has been painted as a back-door power-grab by BELGRADE,
the “surrender” of KOSOVAR land to MONTENEGRO during negotiations over the
demarcation of the state border and the formation of a special court to
prosecute ethnic ALBANIANS guilty of war crimes in the 1999 conflict. While it is clear that these issues have
provided the kindling and the spark for recent protests inside and outside
Parliament; they are not the fuel that has turned them into an inferno.
Instead, the responsibility lies
with the failure of the government to make real progress in tackling the
country’s endemic economic problems.
THE
YOUTH OF KOSOVO – A DOUBLE EDGED SWORD
“The young EUROPEANS,” is a
marketing line that is often used by the country – a hint at KOSOVO’S status as
the newest independent EUROPEAN state and the fact more than 50% of the
population is under the age of 18 – but this is very much a double-edged
sword. A young population can only be
expected to thrive where they find employment – and there is little to be
found. In the case of SPAIN and PORTUGAL,
many young people moved broad to find work during the recent economic crises to
face their countries – yet KOSOVARS often find themselves hemmed-in by
inflexible visa regimes. Instead, the hopefulness and energy of the
2008 independence movement has partly given way to despondence and distrust of
both the KOSOVO government and the promises of international organisations.
Riding on a wave of
anti-government and anti-corruption rhetoric, VETËVENDOSJE’S SHPEND AHMETI was
elected Mayor of PRISTINA at the end of 2014, unseating the now-Prime Minister ISA
MUSTAFA. For the LDK to lose the
mayoralty of the country’s largest, best educated and most cosmopolitan city
was a tremendous shock. It has not been
a bad experiment, though. While many
were suspicious of how AHMETI may behave in office, he has largely gotten to
grips with the city’s corrupt planning system and invested heavily in public
spaces. The city feels cleaner and more
prosperous.
The success of AHMETI’S spell in
City Hall has allowed VETËVENDOSJE, whose previous public image was largely
that of its leader ALBIN KURTI leading street protests and throwing rhetorical
flame-throwers at the political class, to take on an air of mild
respectability. This is, of course, not
helped by the spectacle of VETËVENDOSJE MPs deploying tear-gas canisters on the
floor of Parliament in order to stifle debate – but, as KURTI and AHMETI argue,
there is space in their party for a Yin and a Yang.
Background
Information:
ALBIN KURTI, the controversial founder of VETËVENDOSJE who
fosters ties to certain radical UCK entities that still are active today and
who envision a GREATER ALBANIA
As long as the economy remains
stable and the political system remains a den of cronyism, VETËVENDOSJE’S
progress towards the political mainstream will only continue.
HASHIM
THAÇI IS STILL LIKELY TO BECOME PRESIDENT
There have been some rumblings
recently that HASHIM THAÇI, the country’s former Prime Minister, and current
Foreign Minister, may be at risk of losing on his long-held ambition of
becoming President when the vote takes place later this year. Political observers however do not yet share
this view.
While he should be concerned by the
public declaration by a number of LDK MPs that they intend to renege upon their
party’s deal with the PDK to install MUSTAFA as Prime Minister in exchange for
supporting THAÇI for the presidency, the numbers continue to stack up in his
favour.
To secure the Presidency, he
requires the support of either two thirds of MPs or, after three rounds of
voting, a simple majority – 61 votes.
Assuming he can carry his own 34 MPs, two thirds of PDK members (18 MPs)
and three quarters of the minority representatives (15 MPs), he will take the
post with an absolute majority of 66 votes.
Fundamentally, the LDK have
little incentive to stop THAÇI becoming President. The job itself is very much ceremonial in
nature, unlike ISA MUSTAFA’S current, influential post as Prime Minister. If the party was to renege upon their deal
with THAÇI and the PDK, the most likely outcome would be fresh elections – a
high-risk political manoeuvre that could risk leaving the LDK empty-handed
afterwards.
Finally,
what is rarely said and never acknowledged by either THAÇI himself or the
ethnic minority parties is the ease with which they have been able to cooperate
with one another. As Prime
Minister, THAÇI worked relatively harmoniously with his SERB and TURKISH
Cabinet minister; apparently leaving them alone to run their own portfolios
without much interference. The ten SERBIAN
MPs, in particular, may not be particular THAÇI fans but it is hard to see them
backing a rival, VETËVENDOSJE-backed nominee.
THE
GULF BETWEEN SERBS NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE IBAR IS GROWING
On 21st January, the former
“leader” of the SERBIAN community in North KOSOVO – an area physically divided
from the rest of the country and home to vast ethnic SERB population – was
jailed for nine years for his involvement in war crimes during the 1999 war.
The ruling has been widely
greeted with derision in the north of the country, with street protests in the
ethnically divided city of NORTH MITROVICA and angry denunciations from leading
politicians in BELGRADE – some of whom have advocated the suspension of
dialogue with PRISTINA.
What has been notable, however,
is the relative silence of the SERBIAN community living south of the IBAR
River. While the sympathies of the SERBIAN
community outside of the north will undoubtedly still lie with IVANOVIĆ, there
is more than simply anecdotal evidence to suggest that these communities are
beginning to develop some kind of acceptance of and accommodation within the
Republic of KOSOVO system.
The 2013 local elections saw the
election of mayors in a number of newly-drawn, majority SERB-populated local
government areas south of the IBAR; namely, ŠTRPCE, KLOKOT-VRBOVAC, GRAČANICA,
NOVO BRDO, RANILUG and PARTEŠ. With the
drawing of these municipalities done in such a way as to ensure the election of
ethnic SERBS to the mayoralty, this has provided a formal mechanism by which SERBS
have had some latitude over local spending decisions within the KOSOVO
government framework. When completed,
the intention is that the Association of SERB Municipalities (ASM) will
reinforce the ability of ethnic SERB areas to pursue their own health,
education and cultural policies.
THERE
IS A DEGREE OF REALPOLITIK HERE.
Many ethnic SERBS south of the IBAR
still remain aggrieved about being separated from KOSOVO, yet have a basic
choice – participate in elections in areas specially drawn to elect SERBs or
see another community win the mayoralty with 200 votes; accept a degree of
self-governance within the KOSOVO state or risk seeing their concerns swamped
in a 95% ethnic ALBANIAN state.
The same concerns simply do not
exist north of the IBAR. In the city of NORTH
MITROVICA and surrounding towns of ZUBIN POTOK, LEPOSAVIĆ and ZVEČAN, SERBS make
up more than 90% of the population.
There is simply no inducement to engage with the Republic of KOSOVO
state, regardless of the efforts made by both the EUROPEAN UNION and PRISTINA
in this respect. In the minds of local SERBS,
the ASM will make little practical difference; largely because their present
governance arrangements afford more flexibility than the proposed changes.
For
all the talk of SERBIAN unity in some nationalist corners, ethnic SERBS are
probably the single most divided community in KOSOVO at present.
MEP'S
ARE GUILTY OF LOOKING AT KOSOVO WITH “ROSE-TINTED GLASSES”
Recently, the EUROPEAN Parliament
rubber-stamped the latest in a round of reports examining the progress that KOSOVO
is making towards EUROPEAN UNION accession.
Many Members of the EUROPEAN
Parliament – well-intentioned though they are – have allowed their innate
passion for EU expansion and sympathy towards the significant political, social
and economic challenges the country faces to cloud their perceptions of the
true situation in the country. If ever
the phrase “rose tinted glasses” was meant to be used; it was for a recent
debate.
While MEPs, led by the AUSTRIAN
Green ULRIKE LUNACEK, were right to praise the progress that has been made on
reaching theoretical agreements on the establishment Association of SERB
Municipalities, telecoms, vehicular insurance, mutual recognition of diplomas
and the “normalization” of the situation in the ethnically-divided city of MITROVICA,
little attention was actually paid to the implementation of these accords.
Yes, SERBIA has lifted its
preposterous objection to KOSOVO receiving its own international dialling code
and yes, KOSOVO has agreed that it will finally end its discriminatory policy
of rejecting diplomas from the SERB university in NORTH MITROVICA – but other
than that, progress has been relatively meagre.
EU
NEEDS TO RECOGNIZE THAT KOSOVO’S JUDICIAL AND COURTS SYSTEM ARE IN CRISIS
The report also makes a rather
opaque reference to the “progress has been made regarding the judiciary” and
problems that exist in relation to the “slow administration of justice and the
significant backlog of cases”. To
describe the administration of justice in KOSOVO as “slow” is as euphemistic as
describing Waiting for Godot as a play about an irksome traffic delay. The EU needs to recognize that KOSOVO’S
judicial and courts system are in crisis.
The last figures indicate that, in the first half of 2014, 693,975 cases
were in process in courts (in a country with a population of less than 2
million!), with 455,699 having been inherited from the previous year.
It would be unfair to blame the
Republic of KOSOVO for this. After all,
the legal system KOSOVO was handed when it declared independence in 2008 forces
judges to simultaneously adjudicate verdicts on the basis of the legal systems
of present-day KOSOVO and, in the case of historic offences, the now-defunct
legal codes of SERBIA and MONTENEGRO (2003-2006), the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA (1992-2003) and the SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (before
1992). Increased financial and
technical support is clearly required to help unlock this logjam.
Finally, the near-comical status KOSOVO’S
National Assembly has taken on in recent times was largely glossed over. While, as already mentioned, VETËVENDOSJE
MPs bear the sole responsibility for the violent and unacceptable scenes that
have been witnessed on the floor of the Parliament, it is not enough for a EUROPEAN
Parliament report examining the state of KOSOVO’S institutions to “call on all
political actors to resume political dialogue in order to break the deadlock
and find a viable solution that restores the normal functioning” of the
body.
The
EU is often relatively effective at adopting a “carrot and stick” approach to
states aspiring to membership. In this
case, the stick – such as an explicit rejection of the proposed visa-free
regime unless the political climate improves – seems strangely absent.
KOSOVO has made considerable
progress in recent years but the rose-tinted approach adopted by so many MEPs
is neither honest nor helpful in achieving real reforms on the ground. This needs to change.
Adapted by Geopolitical Analysis
and Monitoring from the article originally written
by Daniel Hamilton, who is a Senior Director at FTI Consulting.
