By
Claudio Gallo
Jeremy Salt is a professor of History and Politics of the Middle East at
Bilkent University, Ankara. His book The Unmaking of the Middle East is
a brilliant history of the last hundred years in the region, not affected by
"orientalist" cliches. We asked Professor Salt to explain the present
transformation of the Middle East, including the Kurdish knot. The Kurds in
Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey now can't stop talking about the emergence of a
Great Kurdistan.
Claudio Gallo:
Syria's President Bashar al-Assad gave a free hand
to northern Syria Kurds. May this become a real casus belli with Turkey?
Jeremy Salt:
It may be going too far - to conclude that Assad
gave a free hand to the Kurds in Syria. It is more likely that in the
complete turmoil spreading across the country, he could not stop them from
taking control of Kurdish areas close to the Turkish border. He certainly would
not want to open up a front against the Kurds while trying to suppress the armed
groups.
Whether this becomes a
casus belli depends on how the Turkish government
chooses to read the situation. But it is alarmed at the possibility of a
Kurdish enclave being established in Northern Syria, strengthening the prospect
of a "Greater Kurdistan" being created in the future. These
complications should have been foreseen but apparently were not when Turkey
decided to confront the Syrian government more than a year ago.
CG:
Ankara is keeping a direct connection with the Iraqi Kurd
administration, bypassing Baghdad. What in your opinion is the goal of Turkish
diplomacy?
JS:
It is very difficult to read Turkish diplomacy at the moment
or to understand what the present regional policy is intended to achieve. If we
look at Turkish policy until the beginning of 2012, we can see that "soft
power" and "zero problems" [as pushed for by Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu] had worked. Turkey had a strong working relationship with all
of its eastern neighbors. As a result of the decision to work for "regime
change" in Syria all this has been turned upside down.
The US and the Gulf states may be grateful for the central role Turkey is
playing in the campaign to dislodge the Syrian government but the costs for
Turkey have been great. Apart from the complete rupture with Damascus, the
relationship with Iran and Iraq has been undermined. Turkey has also put itself
at odds with Russia.
Again, all of this should have been foreseen a year ago as the inevitable
outcome of confronting the government in Damascus, which has a strong strategic
relationship with Iran and which gives port facilities to the Russian fleet and
has had a strong relationship with Russia/the USSR for the past half century.
Iraq has been opposed to Turkish policy in Syria from the beginning. This is
partly because Iraq is still suffering the consequences of armed Western
intervention in 2003 and partly because of the way Turkey has developed its
relationship with the Kurdish governorate in the north at the expense of its
relationship with the Iraqi capital.
Turkey has a strong trading relationship with the Iraqi north and one has to
assume that its position is dictated by trade, oil and the strategic importance
of the Kurdish north to the Western-Gulf state alliance confronting Syria and Iran.
It must be remembered that more than 60% of Iraqis are Shi'ite. The sectarian
element in Iraqi politics has been brought to the surface by virtually daily
attacks on the Shi'ite and by the charges laid against the Sunni Muslim vice
president, Tareq al-Hashimi, of organizing an anti-Shi'ite "death
squad". Hashimi is now out of the country, with the Turkish Prime
Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, among those who have risen to his defense.
CG:
Is independence in the agenda of the president of the Kurdish
region, Massoud Barzani?
JS:
The Kurdish governorate of Iraq is already independent in all
but name. It maintains a strong army - officially described as security forces
- and increasingly goes its own way whatever the government in Baghdad thinks
or wants. So a declaration of independence is probably only a matter of timing
once it is judged that the circumstances are right.
Barzani has never made any secret of his view that a large slab of eastern
Anatolia is "Western Kurdistan". The incorporation of all this
territory in a Kurdish state would be his ultimate objective. This makes
Turkey's dealings with the Kurdish north at the expense of its relationship
with the central government of Iraq even harder to understand.
Ultimately the Kurds will put their own interests first, a point that was
underlined when Barzani recently brokered a meeting of Syrian Kurds and pushed
them into reconciliation. As the Syrian Kurds include a faction close to the
PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] the Turkish prime minister was infuriated.
Turkey is now very alarmed by the awakening of the Syrian Kurds.
CG:
May the possible fall of Assad's Syria be the starting point
for the creation of a Kurdish state?
JS:
The repercussions of the collapse of the Syrian state would
be so severe that no one could now predict what might come out of the ruins.
Such a collapse is not on the agenda for the moment, and it is probable that
even the enemies of the Syrian government don't want it because of the
uncontrollable spillover effect.
They might want a compliant government in place but they do not want chaos that
will threaten their own interests across the region. A Kurdish state-in-being
was able to arise in Iraq because of the invasion and occupation of 2003. This
is not likely to be repeated in Syria.
CG:
Is Iran playing the Kurdish card against Turkey?
JS:
These states are always playing one card or another against
each other. This is what is called diplomacy. Both Iran and Turkey have a
Kurdish problem that governments inside and outside the region can exploit, as
they have exploited it in the past. For both these countries, exploiting the
Kurdish issue always carries the risk of blowback.
I see no evidence that Iran is at present using the Kurdish card against
Turkey, unless there is something I have missed. The greater danger arises from
northern Iraq, where both the PKK and its Iranian Kurdish counterpart maintain
bases of operations. It is from Iraq and not Iran that Kurdish militants -
terrorists according to the Turkish government - have traditionally operated
against Turkey.
CG:
It seems that we are back to the "unmaking" of the
Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century. Do you think that the
parallel is correct?
JS:
What we are witnessing behind the immediate scenes of horror
in Syria is the most comprehensive attempt to reshape the Middle East since
World War I. The Sykes-Picot treaty of 1916 set out the geostrategic parameters
of the modern Middle East but the model no longer works for the imperial/post-imperial
powers and their regional allies.
We have been through several phases but until now the nation-state has
withstood the stress to which it has been subjected. These include the Suez War
of 1956, the Western-backed Israeli attack on Egypt and Syria in 1967 and
Israel's attempt to set up a puppet government in Lebanon. The center of
attention is what used to be called the "fertile crescent", what is
now Iraq and what is now Syria, Lebanon and Israel/Palestine.
This entire region lends itself to ethno-religious breakdown if the
"West" can get its foot through the door.
The invasion of Iraq was followed by the destruction of Iraq as a unitary
state. The constitution written in Washington - much as the constitutions of
Iraq and Egypt in the 1920s and 1930s were written in London - turned a secular
state into a state with a sectarian religious basis. It created a weak central
government and fostered the growth of an increasingly powerful Kurdish
governorate in the north. By submitting the future of Kirkuk to a referendum
(yet to be held) it encouraged the demographic war that has been taking place
as the Kurds seek to build up their numbers in and around this city.
Syria lends itself to the same process of ethno-religious separation if the
country can be collapsed and there is opposition to a Western-installed
government. In 1918, the imperial powers divided the Middle East in a certain
way that suited their interests at the time. They are now remapping it again -
and again to suit their interests. It is not coincidental that this program
dovetails with Israel's own long-term strategic planning.
Russia and China are fully aware of what is going on, which is why the present
situation can be seen as a 21st century extension of the "Eastern
question" or of the "Great Game" between Russia and Britain.
Certainly the outcome of the struggle for Syria will shape the future of the
Middle East for a long time to come. However they see themselves, the local
actors are pawns in this game.
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