ACTS AS PIVOT FOR “CHANGE OF DIRECTION” FOR MIDDLE
EAST
Executive Summary:
- Impact from QATAR’S aggressive interventionist politics in SYRIA and LIBYA, under what has come to be known as the “QATARI foreign legion”
- SAUDI ARABIA versus QATAR
- It’s all about energy
- Why QATAR and TURKEY are (were) in favor of toppling the Assad regime in SYRIA
- QATAR’S failed foreign intervention politics
- USA urged QATAR and TURKEY to support the Muslim brotherhood in order to create political change in the region
- BRITAIN’S backtracking regarding its SYRIAN stance
- USA to “allow” IRAN to win, an option which both SAUDI ARABIA and the USA would be reluctant to embrace, given their commitment to Sunni Muslim dominance over IRAN and Shi’ism.
- TURKEY under increasing pressure
- Transfer of power in QATAR a face-saving way of “re-shaping” QATAR’S adventurist foreign intervention politics
- Power transfer, an opportunity for USA to rethink its geostrategic policies in the region?
By Gregory R. Copley via Oilprice
The
change of leadership in QATAR served as a signal of a subtle, but profound,
change of direction in the greater Middle East. Of significance, however, is
that it indicated that the outgoing Emir of QATAR would spend more of his time
and wealth managing — with his wife — his “international interests”, leaving
the management of the State of QATAR to the incoming Emir, his son.
It
is, with this event and others, the start of a new era which was begun by the
gradual decline in US influence in the region after 1979 (and particularly
after 2008), and confirmed by the transitions in leaderships which took place
in the so-called “Arab Spring” period, compounded by subsequent elections in PAKISTAN
and IRAN. The changes are not yet complete.
Sheikh
Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani’s abdication as Emir of QATAR on June 25, 2013, had
been quietly anticipated and QATAR’S allies were discreetly informed in
advance. It was no surprise, and was believed to have been dictated largely
because of health concerns by the 61-year-old monarch, but it was also dictated
by the process of preparing Crown Prince Tamin bin Hamad al-Thani for the post.
It also meant that the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, would
have to retire, so close were he and Sheikh Hamad in the development of QATAR’S
economic and strategic policies.
IMPACT FROM QATAR’S AGGRESSIVE INTERVENTIONIST POLITICS IN
SYRIA AND LIBYA, UNDER WHAT HAS COME TO BE KNOWN AS THE “QATARI FOREIGN LEGION”
However,
the transfer of power to Sheikh Tamin, 33, inevitably would mean a
transformation in Qatar’s adventurist strategic policy, even though it was Sheikh
Tamin and his mother — Sheikha Moza, the second wife of the outgoing Emir,
Sheikh Hamad — who were the great proponents of the aggressive policy of
support for radical Islamist combatants to help overthrow LIBYAN leader
Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi and SYRIAN Pres. Bashar al-Assad. The question is, however,
what that “transformation” will entail. It was, by late June 2013, by no means
clear that Sheikh Tamin would be more moderate than his father.
In
any event, it has been intimated that the now-former Emir, Sheikh Hamad, would
be able, with Sheikha Moza, to devote more time to managing QATAR’S international
activities, ranging from the discreet support of interventionist activities by
what has come to be known as the “Qatari Foreign Legion” to international aid
issues.
The
support by QATAR for the anti-Qadhafi rebellion was not in itself surprising,
but the manner of it seemed uncharacteristic of the moderate approach which
Sheikh Hamad seemed to have taken in the years building up to that event.
SAUDI ARABIA VERSUS QATAR
QATAR went in to the LIBYAN conflict by aggressively backing
and arming a salafist and Ikhwani (Muslim Brothers) force which was
antithetical to the traditionally moderate, pro-modernist Sanussiyah Muslims in
the Cyrenaica province of LIBYA: the people who had begun the uprising against
Qadhafi’s coup. They had acted against Qadhafi to restore the 1952 Constitution. And
Sheikh Hamad was very much aware of that, given that his early encouragement
into the development of QATAR’S gas fields — against the strenuous opposition
of SAUDI ARABIA, which was “anti-gas/pro-petroleum” — came from LIBYAN
then-exiled Prince Idris al-Senussi, who had briefed Sheikh Hamad and then-Foreign
Minister Hamad bin Jassim extensively on the differences between Senussi and
Saudi Wahhabi approaches to Islam.
It
is true that Sheikh Hamad and Hamad bin Jassim ultimately fell out with Prince
Idris after the money began accumulating in QATAR, transforming its position,
and there was a reluctance to recognize Idris’s rôle in the gas revolution
which QATAR began. But was that enough to cause QATAR to back such a radical,
jihadist intervention in LIBYA when it could have just as easily supported the
moderate, local Cyrenaican Senussiyahs who had initiated the revolt — the
counter-coup — against Qadhafi?
Ultimately,
however, the QATARI “foreign legion” in LIBYA came under control, more or less
(but not before its allies attacked the US Consulate-General in Benghazi,
killing the US Ambassador and others on September 11, 2012), and the Senussiyah
faction won control, electorally, of LIBYAN politics, and retained control of
Cyrenaica.
Neither
was the momentum of QATARI support continued after the LIBYA episode to the
anti-Bashar jihadists in SYRIA explicable in relation to Sheikh Hamad’s long
history of moderation. True, Sheikh Tamin’s and Sheikha Moza’s ostensible
passion for these causes may have played a rôle, but there was still much more
to it than that.
IT’S ALL ABOUT ENERGY
One
contributory strand to the event was the plan, rejected by Syrian Pres. Bashar
al-Assad on advice from his key ally, IRAN, by QATAR to build a gas pipeline
across from QATAR and via SAUDI ARABIA and SYRIA, to reach the EUROPEAN market.
Background Information:
IRAN - IRAQ - SYRIA GAS PIPELINE AGREEMENT A “WIN WIN” SITUATION, BUT NOT FOR QATAR AND TURKEY
IRAN - IRAQ - SYRIA GAS PIPELINE AGREEMENT A “WIN WIN” SITUATION, BUT NOT FOR QATAR AND TURKEY
IS THE TRANS ARABIAN PIPELINE
“TAPLINE” THE ANSWER TO FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE SYRIAN UPRISING? At http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.co.at/2011/12/syria-cause-and-effect.html
ENORMOUS
GAS FINDINGS AND PROSPECTS OF OIL FINDINGS COMPLICATE TURKEYS STANCE IN THE
REGION. At http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com/2012/02/eastern-mediterranean-sea.html
REGIME CHANGE IN SYRIA WOULD
DIMINISH RUSSIA’S IMPORTANCE AS GAS EXPORTER AS WELL AS NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN SEA http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.co.at/2012/01/syrias-destiny-sealed.html
and
WHY QATAR AND TURKEY ARE (WERE) IN FAVOR OF TOPPLING THE
ASSAD REGIME IN SYRIA
IRAN
wanted to develop its own pipeline through SYRIA and IRAQ to reach the same EUROPEAN
market (when embargoes against IRAN are eventually lifted). Those familiar with
this situation in Doha indicated that the QATARI leadership’s response to this
rejection was to support the removal of Bashar, and in this they found a ready
ally in TURKISH Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Background Information:
Geopolitical Analysis and
Monitoring published an article from Oil Price, dated February 2013 regarding QATAR’S
competing gas pipeline project, connecting QATAR and TURKEY, versus the SYRIAN,
IRAQI and IRANIAN gas pipeline project.
IRAN-IRAQ: PIPELINE TO SYRIA UPS ANTE IN
PROXY WAR WITH QATAR
IRAQ’S
agreement to allow IRAN to build a pipeline through its territory and on to
SYRIA is in direct competition with QATAR’S similar designs for a SYRIA
pipeline that would connect to TURKEY. This pipeline is another proxy in the
SYRIAN conflict theater and Iran’s response to its loss of ground here. It is
also a sign of IRAN’S growing foothold in IRAQ. QATAR will respond in kind.
The IRAQI Cabinet green lighted IRAN’S $10 billion pipeline project, which will supply gas from the South Pars field (which is the largest in the world, and which, as mentioned above, it shares with QATAR) to SYRIA and beyond to other export markets. There is talk of extending the pipeline to LEBANON.
The first part of the pipeline—some 225 kilometers—through IRAQ will reportedly be completed in June 2013. The pipeline will connect the southern IRANIAN port of Assolouyeh to IRAQ and then to SYRIA—for now. It will have a 110 million cubic meter/day capacity. The plan is to give IRAQ 20 million cubic meters/day of IRANIAN gas for its power plants, with 20-25 million cubic meters per day going to the SYRIAN port of Tartus.
The IRAQI Cabinet green lighted IRAN’S $10 billion pipeline project, which will supply gas from the South Pars field (which is the largest in the world, and which, as mentioned above, it shares with QATAR) to SYRIA and beyond to other export markets. There is talk of extending the pipeline to LEBANON.
The first part of the pipeline—some 225 kilometers—through IRAQ will reportedly be completed in June 2013. The pipeline will connect the southern IRANIAN port of Assolouyeh to IRAQ and then to SYRIA—for now. It will have a 110 million cubic meter/day capacity. The plan is to give IRAQ 20 million cubic meters/day of IRANIAN gas for its power plants, with 20-25 million cubic meters per day going to the SYRIAN port of Tartus.
Read entire
analysis at: http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.co.at/2013/02/syria-assad-winning-war.html
Background Information:
THE QATARI PROJECT
QATAR
AT ODDS WITH RUSSIA, OVER ITS STANCE ON SYRIA? OR IS IT ABOUT DOMINATING THE
GAS ENERGY MARKETS?
http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.co.at/2013/04/qatars-great-power-games.html
DRAWING SYMPATHY FROM ARAB
COUNTRIES http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com/2011/09/turkeys-middle-east-chess-game.html
But,
again, there was more to it than this.
Why
would QATAR so deliberately pick up the gauntlet and challenge the great power
of the PERSIAN GULF, IRAN, by threatening to destabilize SYRIA?
Part
of it lies in the competitiveness felt between QATAR and SAUDI ARABIA, and
particularly between Qatari Emir Hamad and SAUDI national security chief Prince
Bandar, (See http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.co.at/2012/07/saudi-arabian-intelligence-headquarters.html)
even though the two share ownership in the al-Jazeera broadcasting service
based in Doha. QATAR has large outstanding territorial claims against SAUDI
ARABIA, because the creation of the Kingdom of SAUDI ARABIA subsumed
substantial tracts of land, abutting the present SAUDI-QATARI border, occupied
by QATARI tribes. As well, the now-departing Emir felt that SAUDI approaches to
reclaiming some sense of strategic viability compared with Shi’a IRAN were
weak, vacillating, and dangerous, and Sheikh Hamad felt the need to build a
sense of unity among the Sunni Arabs to enable them to withstand IRAN.
FAILED FOREIGN
INTERVENTION POLITICS
Significantly,
incoming Emir Sheikh Tamin has become engaged in rebuilding SAUDI-QATARI relations,
despite his apparent zeal for the LIBYA and SYRIA adventures. SAUDI ARABIA and QATAR
have backed different factions of the opposition to Bashar in SYRIA, but both,
by late June 2013, had to face the reality that they had failed in both SYRIA
and LIBYA. The SYRIAN Administration of Bashar al-Assad had, to all intents,
won the “civil war” that outside monies had triggered in SYRIA. Moreover, US
Pres. Barack Obama had ventured too late in the SYRIAN conflict to propose US
arming of SYRIAN opposition groups to overthrow Bashar, and it had been clear
that the Government in Doha — the outgoing Emir and Prime Minister Hamad bin
Jassim — had very strong support (or urging) from Pres. Obama to undertake the
courses they had taken on LIBYA and SYRIA.
USA URGED QATAR AND TURKEY TO SUPPORT THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
IN ORDER TO CREATE POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE REGION
Pres. Obama had wanted his allies, QATAR and TURKEY, to
support the Ikhwan (Muslim Brothers) as the main instruments of change in the
region. Even SAUDI ARABIA, which supports neo-salafist and Wahhabist jihadists,
was concerned that the White House was going too far, and even felt some common
cause with ISRAEL to quietly resist the US President’s radical approach to
ending the rule of Pres. Bashar. And, by late June 2013, it seemed that even
Prime Minister Erdogan in TURKEY — suffering from impotence in his ability to
overthrow Bashar, a conflict he had helped initiate — was now ready to begin
quietly extracting himself from the SYRIA dispute. TURKEY, by late June 2013,
was telling the US that it would no longer be able to act as a conduit
territory for the shipment of arms to the SYRIAN rebels.
TURKEY
had, since the overthrow of Qadhafi, worked very closely with the US Government
— including US Ambassador to LIBYA J. Christopher Stevens, who had been killed
on September 11, 2012 in Benghazi — to ship arms out of LIBYA to the SYRIAN
rebels, discreetly embarking them on TURKISH-controlled ships out of Benghazi
to SYRIA, either directly or via LEBANON or TURKEY.
BRITAIN’S BACKTRACKING REGARDING SYRIA
In
BRITAIN, Prime Minister David Cameron, who had keenly supported the Obama White
House on “arming the SYRIAN rebels”, was apparently told by his Foreign
Secretary, William Hague, that Parliament would not back him on this, and Mr
Cameron had to back down.
Pres.
Obama, then, was isolated on this, but still needed to demonstrate (for
domestic US political purposes) a determined and successful MIDDLE EAST initiative
to distract from mounting political difficulties at home, where a variety of
scandals were damaging both his political standing and his ability to win the
coming mid-term Congressional elections, where he had hoped to regain control
of the House of Representatives.
USA TO “ALLOW” IRAN TO WIN, AN OPTION WHICH BOTH SAUDI
ARABIA AND THE USA WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO EMBRACE, GIVEN THEIR COMMITMENT TO
SUNNI MUSLIM DOMINANCE OVER IRAN AND SHI’ISM.
ISRAEL,
SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, and other states were gradually backing away from the SYRIAN
dispute. Now, QATAR’S new Emir, keen to rebuild relations with SAUDI ARABIA,
also had the opportunity to scale back efforts in SYRIA. The question was,
then, whether Pres. Obama — who had been counting on at least some signs of
success and virility in the MIDDLE EAST to rebuild media support at home —
would be able to let go of the SYRIAN war and “allow” IRAN to win. This is an
option which both SAUDI ARABIA and Pres. Obama would be reluctant to embrace,
given their commitment to Sunni Muslim dominance over IRAN and Shi’ism.
TURKEY UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE
Certainly,
the politically embattled Islamist (Sunni) TURKISH Prime Minister, facing
continuing domestic unrest and the now-unmasked threats from IRAN to stir up
massive unrest in TURKEY (through the KURDS, Shi’a, ‘Alawites, and others) if TURKEY
did not desist from attempting to destroy Bashar in SYRIA, knew he had to pull
back from his full policy of support for the SYRIAN rebels. Ironically, the TURKISH-
and QATARI-sponsored “civil war” in SYRIA had created a massive exodus of SYRIAN
refugees into JORDAN, TURKEY, GREECE, and other states. The best that the US
Obama Administration could do was to blame the humanitarian crisis on Pres. ASSAD of SYRIA.
See also: TURKISH LEADERSHIP DEMORALIZED http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.co.at/2013/07/turkish-leadership-demoralized.html
TRANSFER OF POWER IN QATAR A FACE-SAVING WAY OF “RE-SHAPING”
QATAR’S ADVENTURIST FOREIGN INTERVENTION POLITICS
But
at the end of the day, the transfer of power in QATAR to Sheikh Tamin — and the
voluntary retirement, reportedly to London, of former Prime Minister Hamad bin
Jassim — was a face-saving way of “re-shaping” QATAR’S adventurism. Given the
lack of responsiveness to Pres. Obama of EGYPT’S Ikhwani Administration of former
Pres. Mohammad Morsi, it was becoming clear that the whole policy of supporting
the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood, Wahhabism) in EGYPT, TURKEY, LIBYA, and SYRIA,
was running out of steam. Whether this message would resonate with an activist
Sheikh Hamad in retirement, however, is still unclear.
Background Information:
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND EGYPT http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.co.at/2011/11/middle-east.html
POWER TRANSFER, AN OPPORTUNITY FOR USA TO RETHINK ITS
GEOSTRATEGIC POLICIES IN THE REGION?
But
this trend would enable the US finally be in a position where it could begin a
meaningful dialog with IRAN, with the earlier (unsuccessful) policy of “carrot
and stick” now being reduced to the state when the stick was seen to be
ineffective? Certainly, it seems that former Emir Sheikh Hamad may attempt to
counsel Pres. Obama against any rapprochement with IRAN. And IRAN itself may
not yet be ready to negotiate with the White House. Why, indeed, should it do
so when it has been strengthening its strategic position (albeit while the
US-led economic embargo of IRAN is biting its citizens), and the US position in
the region, along with that of its major ally, TURKEY, is weakening.
IRAN,
too, had a new President — Hassan Rohani — who could be used as a perceived
instrument of change to enable matters to move to a new form of stability.
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