WHY THE SAHEL IS CRUCIAL TO EUROPE'S
NEIGHBORHOOD – AND ITS SECURITY STRATEGY
The
ongoing crises in SYRIA and EGYPT have marginalized the conflict in MALI in the
WESTERN media. But the FRENCH-led military intervention in that country is
facing a complex and challenging transitional period. UNITED NATIONS Special
Envoy for the SAHEL Romano Prodi recently warned the international community to
“not forget the SAHEL, or you will have more MALIS if you do.” That is a
prospect that EUROPEAN countries — including FRANCE — will certainly not
relish, yet they lack the political will or the capacity to ensure a favorable
outcome. Transatlantic actors now, more than ever, need to rethink their
cooperation in the region and strengthen their alliances with local powers.
FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN MALI ALSO REVEALED THE
RELUCTANCE OF COUNTRIES TO SHARE THE BURDEN FOR PROVIDING SECURITY IN THE SAHEL
The
two main challenges facing the transatlantic partners are their ability to
assume responsibility for regional security and their securing local support
for their efforts. Despite receiving official backing from allies on both sides
of the Atlantic, the FRENCH military intervention in MALI also revealed the
reluctance of countries to share the burden for providing security in the SAHEL.
The problem stems mostly from the divergence of perceptions within EUROPE on
the relevance of the SAHEL to its immediate security concerns.
See
also: QUEST FOR
AFRICA at:http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.co.at/2012/12/usa-china-and-africa.html
SAHEL: NEW SAFE HAVENS FOR TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME
IN THE REGION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A THREAT TO ALL EUROPEAN NATIONAL INTERESTS
The
first step should therefore be to redefine the scope of EUROPE’S neighborhood
strategy in order to include the SAHEL area as a whole. For obvious historical
reasons, FRANCE will continue to be more involved in the stability of this part
of AFRICA than other countries, but the development of new safe havens for
terrorism and transnational crime in the region should be considered a threat
to all EUROPEAN national interests, just as instability in the CAUCASUS should
concern WESTERN EUROPEAN countries. At this point, FRANCE has neither the
political will nor the capacity to assert sole leadership in a vast region
stretching from SENEGAL to the HORN OF AFRICA. A U.S. interpretation of FRENCH
assertion in region as a reason for its disengagement would therefore be a
miscalculation. Once a common EUROPEAN vision is built, the path for a
genuine transatlantic approach to security in the SAHEL and a division of labor
can then be charted, with the UNITED STATES possibly assuming responsibility
for technical and logistical support and for training. The training of AFRICAN
troops should eventually become the centerpiece of transatlantic operations in
the region, keeping in mind the lessons learned from the previous failed
experience in MALI pre-2012.
Background Information:
USA INCREASES ITS PRESENCE IN AFRICA
"THE RISING CONTINENT", WHILE EUROPE KEEPS ON UNDERESTIMATING IT. At:
http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2012/07/africa-and-usa.html
and http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2012/09/chinas-winning-strategy-in-africa.html
COOPERATION WITH AFRICAN NATIONS SHOULD GO BEYOND THE SCOPE
OF SIMPLE MILITARY INTERVENTIONS AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS
That
objective goes hand-in-hand with the second challenge: establishing strong and
durable security partnerships with local partners in order to ensure the
operability of a transatlantic strategy in the region. The gradual diminishing
of power-projection capabilities in EUROPE and the UNITED STATES has reinforced
the necessity of establishing strong regional partnerships in the context of
the struggle against terrorism. Although some transatlantic actors have
recently strengthened their defense partnerships with countries in the region —
for instance, FRANCE with CAMEROON, the IVORY COAST, DJIBOUTI, GABON, SENEGAL,
the CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, and TOGO, and the U.K. with ALGERIA — this
type of cooperation should go beyond the scope of simple military
interventions, as the struggle against transnational crime and terrorism in the
region will inevitably involve EUROPE’S long-term engagement. During U.S.
President Barack Obama’s visit to his country, SENEGALESE President Macky Sall
outlined the expectations of leaders in AFRICAN and EUROPE for stronger
triangular cooperation in support of counterterrorism efforts in clear terms.
Background Information:
SEVEN ECONOMIES IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ARE EXPECTED TO BE AMONG THE TEN FASTEST GROWING ECONOMIES
IN THE WORLD. At:
 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa: 2013 GDP Growth Forecasts |
The
cooperation between the FRENCH and CHADIAN military in MALI serves as a model
here, having proved to be both effective on the ground and recognized as
legitimate by international institutions. But security partnerships
between EUROPEAN and AFRICAN states need to go beyond the establishment of
military bases, and should aim to address the main weakness of EUROPEAN
militaries today: a lack of effective cooperation in intelligence and
surveillance in this sparsely-populated region. The recent U.S.-FRENCH negotiations
over the purchase of 16 Reaper drones for surveillance have highlighted EUROPEAN
shortcomings in this domain. In this context, developing coordinated operations
with AFRICAN armed forces is crucial in ensuring that these new capabilities will
be used efficiently.
Although
unintentional, the U.S. re-balance to ASIA has made the issue of transatlantic
cooperation in the SAHEL resurface to the top of the agenda, as EUROPEAN
capitals question the real extent of U.S. “strategic retrenchment,” both
globally and in the region. In parallel, the evolution of the SAHEL should also
be used in EUROPE to highlight the necessity of reassessing its security
strategy, and undertake a true assessment of the capabilities that are attached
to it.
By
Martin Michelot and Martin Quencez via Stratrisks
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