BACKDOOR PLOTS: THE DARKNET AS A FIELD FOR TERRORISM
By Yotam Rosner ,
Aviad Mendelbaum , Sean London via INSS Insight
The global battle against terror has done serious damage to
al-Qaeda’s physical infrastructures, and thus to limit its exposure, al-Qaeda
has stepped up its activity in cyberspace. Activists have learned to exploit
internet technologies by using known networks to distribute material for
recruitment, training, and coordination of terrorist operations. The internet
has a visible side and a hidden side. The visible side includes sites that can
be found through an ordinary search, while the hidden side, called the darknet,
includes sites or networks that cannot be accessed by regular means. These
sites serve as a platform for internet users for whom anonymity is essential, since
darknet sites not only provide protection from unauthorized users but also
usually include encryption to prevent monitoring.
CLOSE ENCOUNTER OF THE THIRD KIND: DEEPNET, BLACKNET, OR DARKNET
In
August 2013, the US State Department published a travel warning, and in an
unprecedented step, closed over twenty embassies. As expected, following the AMERICAN
warning other Western countries such as GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, and GERMANY ordered
the closure of various embassies. Several days after, the alert was reported as
a response to the monitoring of a conference call among a team of terrorist
leaders, including al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri and the heads of its affiliate
organizations. It was gradually reported by anonymous intelligence sources that
the information was found in the possession of an al-Qaeda courier who had
recordings of the call. Minutes of the call were transmitted via the internet,
and there was also a seven-hour recording of the entire call. By tracking the
courier, the UNITED STATES succeeded in discovering the call, which apparently
took place in a part of the internet sometimes called deepnet, blacknet, or
darknet.
DIVERSION TO CYBERSPACE
The global battle against terror has
done serious damage to al-Qaeda’s physical infrastructures, and thus to limit
its exposure, al-Qaeda has stepped up its activity in cyberspace. Activists
have learned to exploit internet technologies by using known networks to
distribute material for recruitment, training, and coordination of terrorist
operations. In the late 1990s, there were several dozen websites connected to
terrorist organizations; in 2005, more than 4,000 such sites were documented.
The
internet has a visible side and a hidden side. The visible side includes sites
that can be found through an ordinary search, while the hidden side, called the
darknet, includes sites or networks that cannot be accessed by regular means.
These sites serve as a platform for internet users for whom anonymity is
essential, since darknet sites not only provide protection from unauthorized
users but also usually include encryption to prevent monitoring.
The
obscure regions of the darknet have allowed al-Qaeda to adapt itself to the
restrictions imposed by the international system and operate as a virtual
terror network. A study published in 2011 reported that the darknet has more
than 50,000 sites and 300 forums for terrorist organizations. Moreover, for
about a decade, open sources have reported that while global jihadi activists
exploit darknet for the purposes noted above, the network is mainly a platform
for direct communication among leaders and organization activists. Therefore,
that the darknet was used for a conversation among senior al-Qaeda officials is
not surprising, and in fact, al-Zawahiri, CEO of al-Qaeda Terrorism Inc.,
exploits the technology at his disposal in order to communicate regularly with
his senior “managers”.
THE ONION ROUTER
Many
of those on darknet use TOR (The Onion Router), a free download that enables
the user to remain anonymous. As noted on its homepage, TOR prevents monitoring
of websites that users visit, makes it impossible for websites to learn the
user’s physical location, and enables users to circumvent internet censorship.
Furthermore, TOR prevents identification of website managers who do not wish to
be identified.
Cyber
defense company CyberHat recently reported a security breach in Mozilla Firefox
versions 17 and 22 that resulted in the exposure of users’ identity; Mozilla
subsequently confirmed that there had in fact been a breach. In August it
became apparent that many other sites in the darknet had been hacked or
completely blocked. Several days later, Eric Eoin Marques, who had been exposed
as “the largest facilitator of child porn on the planet,” was arrested.
Apparently, this was a sting operation by the FBI intended to prevent the
distribution of child pornography online. According to David, “Whoever is
running this exploit can match any TOR user to his true internet address, and
therefore track down the TOR user.” This breach clearly caused significant harm
to TOR’s effectiveness as a provider of anonymity.
The
proximity of Marques’s arrest to that of the arrest of the al-Qaeda courier and
the centrality of the darknet in both cases raises the possibility that the two
were connected. According to this hypothesis, US authorities exploited the
breach of TOR in order to monitor al-Qaeda officials and the child
pornographers, and their exposure by David forced them to act against their
targets prematurely because they feared the targets would change their methods
of communication following exposure of the breach.
This hypothesis also
provides a possible explanation for the aggressive UAV attacks initiated by the
UNITED STATES in YEMEN around the time of the courier’s arrest, which led to
the deaths of thirty-four al-Qaeda activists. Nevertheless, researchers who
claimed that there was a connection between the State Department’s warning and
the extensive breach of TOR have in many cases backed down from their claims,
because the information that led to the exposure of the pornography network did
not match the source of the information that could have led to the monitoring
of the conference call, even though there are still those who claim that there
is a low probability of accidental contiguity between the two.
DARK FORCE
Reports
on the operation increased public awareness of the existence of the darknet and
led to a public discussion on the right to privacy vs. homeland security. Among
proponents of online privacy, the darknet looks romantic, a safe arena for
underground political discussion. In a world that mourns the death of privacy
at the hands of the NSA and the like, the darknet allowed opposition figures,
journalists, and separatists to publish information while evading censorship
and monitoring. It thus made it possible to diffuse facts and ideas that are
not compatible with the interests of authoritarian regimes. However, the recent
events have made the public aware that the darknet is not only a platform for
political discussions, but also an infrastructure for proliferation of weapons
and terrorism, along with drugs and child pornography. Furthermore, given the
increasing use of the darknet by jihadis and their ilk, it can now be described
as a clear and present danger to the security of citizens around the world.
Thus, there is a pressing need to create tools that will prevent terrorist
organizations (and criminal elements) from harnessing the darknet for their
needs.
In
recent years, impressive methods have been developed in the West for monitoring
content on the visible web, but there is almost no similar arsenal for the
darknet. In order to ensure that the necessary tools are developed for
monitoring the internet, it is essential to bring up the evidence indicating
that the darknet has been turned into a major infrastructure for global terror.
ISRAELI researchers are at the forefront of study of the internet, and
therefore, ISRAEL would do well to harness a significant portion of its talents
to confront the challenge of darknet.
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