New-Old Borders in the Middle East
By Yoel Guzansky and Erez Striem
Although the formal map of the Middle East has not
changed since the onset of the so-called Arab Spring (with the exception of
Sudan), the old borders do not reflect the reality on the ground. As a result
of the regional upheavals, tribal, sectarian, and ethnic identities have become
more pronounced than ever, which may well lead to a change in the borders drawn
by the colonial powers a century ago that have since been preserved by Arab
autocrats. The changes to date have occurred inside the existing borders, but
this may change. States are liable to disintegrate by going through stages of
federalization, agreed-upon separation, or autonomy. In general, the
international community is opposed to any changes in borders and the
dissolution of states, believing that any change of the status quo is liable to
destabilize the region and even the world. However, in the context of the
regional turmoil, the Arab peoples are seeking the freedom to live in political
settings that suit their respective identities.
Although the formal map of the Middle East has not changed
since the onset of the so-called Arab Spring (with the exception of Sudan), the
old borders do not reflect the reality on the ground. As a result of the
regional upheavals, tribal, sectarian, and ethnic identities have become more
pronounced than ever, which may well lead to a change in the borders drawn by
the colonial powers a century ago that have since been preserved by Arab
autocrats. The iron-fisted Arab rulers were an artificial glue of sorts,
holding together different, sometimes hostile sects in an attempt to form a
single nation state. Now, the de facto changes in the Middle East map could
cause far-reaching geopolitical shifts affecting alliance formations and even
the global energy market.
Syria, for example, encompasses different communal groups
and is currently divided into at least three political entities, each with its
own armed forces: (a) a corridor going from the south, through Damascus, Homs,
and Hama to the northern coast of the Mediterranean, controlled by the Assad
regime and the Alawites; (b) northern areas of the country and major cities
such as Idlib and Dir a-Zor controlled by various Sunni opposition forces, with
the battle over other cities – including Aleppo and Damascus – not yet decided;
and (c) the areas under Kurdish control. Sunni opposition forces are split
among those who advocate the establishment of a democratic, liberal state in
Syria, and those interested in the establishment of an Islamic emirate. Several
of these groups, including elements from outside of Syria, are already caught
in a violent struggle.
The Kurds in Syria are likely to try to establish an
independent political entity in the areas under their control. Unlike other
minorities in Syria, the Kurds (numbering about 3 million and in control of
most of Syria’s oil reserves) have suffered much persecution. The Kurdish
militias have exploited the chaos in the country and seized control of areas in
the northeast abandoned by the Syrian army. Senior Kurdish officials have
declared that the Kurds are interested in establishing an independent zone, and
the Kurdish National Council, a representative body comprised of most of the
Kurdish political parties, signed an agreement with the Syrian National Council
whereby the Kurds would enjoy some type of autonomy in the future united Syrian
state. But until Syria unites again it may be that Kurdish autonomy will be a
fait accompli. At the same time, this possibility is overshadowed by divisions
among the Kurdish organizations, some of which are supported by elements
outside of Syria.
The possible model of independent Kurdish autonomy in Syria
is anchored in the successful model of Kurdish autonomy on the other side of
the border, in Iraq. While the Kurds in Iraq continue to take an active part in
the country’s political process, Kurdistan is enjoying self-government in
almost every aspect of life. The district is run by an independent parliament,
and the Kurdish armed forces are separate from Iraq’s security establishment.
In recent months, and to Baghdad’s chagrin, Kurdistan has even started to sign
independent oil and gas discovery and production contracts with foreign energy
companies. The Kurdish zone enjoys the highest levels of security and economic
growth in Iraq and provides training and arms support to the Kurds in Syria.
Other parts of Iraq are also suffering from uncertainty.
Since the withdrawal of the US forces, the violent sectarian struggle has
intensified. The ongoing frustration of the Sunnis, who were cut out of the
country’s leadership, has been manifested in deadly attacks on Iraqi cities at
a frequency and intensity not seen since 2008. Islamist elements from Syria and
Iraq that have joined forces have increased the risk of a destructive civil
war. Iraqi nationalism is still dominant in Iraq and significant separatist
movements are not prevalent, but the notion of a federalized entity has gained
acceptance in recent years. In fact, the Iraqi constitution allows for
provinces to assume a certain amount of self-government. As early as 2011, four
Sunni provinces decided to begin a process that would culminate in their
autonomy, despite Baghdad’s disapproval. In recent years, many Sunni and
Shiites politicians have called for separation from the Iraqi state, following
the Kurdish model. Continued sectarian violence could result in a divided Iraq,
and ultimately in the dissolution of the Iraqi state, leading to a de facto
Sunni state, with the south of Iraq becoming a Shiite state under Iranian
patronage.
Libya too is disintegrating. The Libyan uprising was
primarily aimed at Qaddafi’s regime, but it also reflected Benghazi’s desire to
end to the dominance of the central government in Tripoli. Historically, the
borders of the Libyan state encompass three different ethnic groups in three
distinct regions: Tripolitania in the country’s northwest; Cyrenaica in the
east, which sees Benghazi as its capital and is home to most of the nation’s
oil reserves; and Fezzan in the southwest. Cyrenaicans feel that, similar to
the situation under Qaddafi, the current government in Tripoli is hoarding most
of the income from oil exports, even though some 80 percent of the country’s
energy resources are located in the east. Indeed, Cyrenaica has already started
its separation from the Libyan state and maintain an independent parliament,
and this past June, it declared its independence. Cyrenaicans have also shut
down activity in the oil fields and the Benghazi airport to protest government
policy; Libya’s three important seaports have been seized by armed militias
that obstruct operations, and militia fighters have taken control of several
oil and gas complexes. In October, Cyrenaica appointed a commander-in-chief for
its 20,000-strong defense forces, whose job will be to restore order to a
region suffering from extreme instability. For its part, Fezzan encompasses
many different tribal and geographical identities. The district, whose culture,
tribes, and identity are more Sahel than North African, declared independence
in September. The central government in Tripoli does not recognize the autonomy
of the different districts but lacks the power to impose its sovereignty.
Other nations lacking cohesive identity are similarly
vulnerable. In March 2013, Yemen embarked on a national dialogue in order to
arrive at an agreement over a new political order, but the situation in
practice does not allow for Sana’a to regain full control over all parts of the
state, and thus current ideas speak of a federal constellation. Some in South
Yemen insist on severing ties fully with the Yemeni state; in fact, the status
of the south is the biggest obstacle to the success of the national dialogue.
In the north, the Houthis, an insurgent Shiite group, have seized Sa’da
Province on the Saudi border, and are working to expand their control of
neighboring provinces while fighting Sunni salafis from Yemen and abroad.
Yemeni security forces are still fighting al-Qaeda for control of parts of the
south. Even if the national dialogue succeeds and Yemen embarks on a new course
as a united or federal state, there are enclaves that remain beyond Sana’a’s
effective control.
The disintegration of states represents at least a temporary
deterioration in Israel’s strategic situation because it is attended by
instability liable to trickle over into neighboring states. Terrorism, crime,
refugees, and weapons proliferation are only some of the implications of failed
states in Israel’s vicinity. But the changes also mean dissolution of the
regular armies that posed a threat in the past and present opportunities for
Israel to build relations with different minorities with the potential to seize
the reins of government in the future.
The changes to date have occurred inside the existing
borders, but this may not last. States are liable to disintegrate by going
through stages of federalization, agreed-upon separation, or autonomy.
Independent political entities that are not recognized either internationally
or by the central government may arise. There are also elements capable of
preventing the dissolution of states, e.g., assistance by external states
interested in stability, like in Yemen, or a shared interest, such as the oil
energy sources in Iraq. In general, the international community is opposed to
any changes in borders and the dissolution of states, believing that any change
of the status quo is liable to destabilize the region and even the world.
However, in the context of the regional turmoil, the Arab peoples are seeking
the freedom to live in political settings that suit their respective identities
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