AMERICA’S SO-CALLED “PIVOT TO ASIA”
Depending on one’s ideological bent,
AMERICA’S so-called “pivot to ASIA” could be interpreted in varying ways.
However, one thing that is increasingly clear is that the Obama administration
is intent on re-asserting AMERICA’S strategic centrality in the ASIA-PACIFIC.
This was very explicit in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 2011 piece for Foreign Policy, entitled “AMERICA’S
PACIFIC Century.”
The U.S. pivot to ASIA is motivated
and shaped by both economic and military-strategic factors. Essentially, it is
still an ongoing process that will depend on the cooperation of regional allies
as well as the evolving patterns of SINO-AMERICAN relations.
AMERICA’S GROWING MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION COULD
BACKFIRE
While the proponents of the pivot
argue that it enhances regional security, it is in reality precipitating a much
more explicit SINO-AMERICAN rivalry, thus undermining the prospects of an
amicable and pluralistic regional order. Ultimately, AMERICA’S growing military
presence in the region could backfire, giving birth to what it dearly seeks to
prevent: as it tightens the noose around CHINA, the pivot could become a
self-fulfilling prophecy by encouraging Beijing to take more drastic and
aggressive counter-measures.
China’s growing naval assertiveness
in adjacent disputed waters is already an indication of this ominous trend.
THE ANATOMY OF THE PIVOT
There are two dimensions to AMERICA’S
pivot to ASIA.
First, it is a logical “rebalancing”
of AMERICA’S global strategic-military commitments in light of a sober
recognition of the country’s overextension in the EURASIAN region. This
rebalancing gained its initial momentum with the U.S. withdrawal from IRAQ in
2011 and the planned withdrawal from AFGHANISTAN in 2014. It explains why the UNITED
STATES played a “supporting role” rather than occupying the center stage during
the LIBYAN military campaign early last year. It also explains AMERICA’S
hesitance to take drastic actions against the SYRIAN regime, while mainly
focusing on a diplomatic resolution of the IRANIAN nuclear conundrum.
Second, it is a response to the
growing importance of the ASIA-PACIFIC region in both economic and
strategic-military terms in the 21st century. As the region
transforms into the center of global economic output and productivity, AMERICA’S
embattled economy is in desperate need of growing export markets and trading
partners to rejuvenate its shaky foundations.
U.S. ECONOMIC PRESENCE IN BOOMING ASIAN MARKETS
In this sense, it is essentially a
continuation, or resuscitation, of earlier attempts by the Clinton administration
to enhance the U.S. economic presence in booming ASIAN markets. After all, the
region hosts industrial giants such as JAPAN and CHINA; “newly industrializing
countries” (NICs) such as SOUTH KOREA, HONG KONG, THAILAND, SINGAPORE, and TAIWAN;
booming emerging markets such as INDONESIA, INDIA, VIETNAM, and the PHILIPPINES;
and vast investment opportunities in places such as BANGLADESH and MYANMAR.
Obviously, it is the
strategic-security dimension of AMERICA’S pivot that is most controversial.
While the Clinton administration pushed for the accommodation of CHINA as a
“strategic partner” and witnessed the drawdown of the U.S. military presence in
the PHILIPPINES, the Obama administration is instead increasingly concerned
with “constrainment” of CHINA—preventing the emergence of CHINA as a strategic
competitor through the deployment of diplomatic, economic, and military assets.
THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN DEEPENING ITS STRATEGIC PRESENCE
IN THE REGION, EXPANDING ITS BASES IN AUSTRALIA,
re-asserting its commitment to
forward-deployment bases in JAPAN and SOUTH KOREA, upgrading facilities in
Guam, re-concentrating U.S. naval firepower (i.e.
aircraft carriers), and extending its rotational presence across SOUTHEAST ASIA.
Looking at the Pentagon’s 2012 Defense Strategic Review, CHINA (along with IRAN)
is clearly identified as a key challenge to U.S. global supremacy in the 21st
century.
AN UNFOLDING PROJECT
The pivot is more of an evolving
strategic disposition than a fixed and concrete element of a broader “grand
strategy” for the 21st century. It is a reflection of a UNITED
STATES that is catching up with the march of history after almost a decade of
strategic fiasco by the Bush administration.
Washington has realized that its
global war on terror (GWOT) has brought it close to the brink of fiscal
collapse and strategic overextension, allowing countries like CHINA (and even RUSSIA)
to gain significant ground in ASIA. Thus, the Obama administration is simply
trying to re-assert AMERICA’S century-old foothold in the region, while hedging
its bets against a rapidly rising CHINA.
But we no longer live in a world
where a group of powerful countries can treat the globe like a chessboard. In
an era of “smart power,” the UNITED STATES is at best a stage master,
influencing events on the ground without explicitly dictating the terms of
action or unilaterally determining the course of history. Thus AMERICA’S pivot
to ASIA is an ongoing project that will require the growing cooperation of its
allies to succeed.
Fundamentally, it is an evolving
strategy that will greatly depend on two inter-related developments: the U.S.-CHINA
relationship and Beijing’s military posturing in the WESTERN PACIFIC.
MORE REACTIVE THAN PROACTIVE
AMERICA’S pivot to ASIA is an
evolutionary process, especially in the strategic-security realm, primarily
because it is a reaction to CHINA’S growing military assertiveness in recent
years.
However, this view represents only
half of the story, since the pivot is characterized by a constellation of
dynamic “threat perceptions” straddling CHINA, on one hand, and the UNITED
STATES and its allies on the other. To put it simply, CHINA is as much as an
architect of the so-called pivot as the UNITED STATES.
The more aggressive CHINA is in
expanding its naval capabilities and asserting its territorial claims, the more
determined is the UNITED STATES to re-assert and deepen its foothold in the
region. From CHINA’S point of view, the U.S. pivot is a provocative process,
which in turn fuels Beijing’s growing assertiveness, especially in territorial
disputes in adjacent waters.
Major Sea Lanes |
Additionally, U.S. allies—from the PHILIPPINES
to VIETNAM and JAPAN—are playing their own strategic games, simultaneously
testing AMERICA’S commitment to regional (or bilateral) security and CHINA’S ability
to exercise self-restraint. Of course, on the other side of the fence you have CHINA’S
quasi-satellite states in INDOCHINA—namely LAOS and CAMBODIA, and to a certain
degree MYANMAR (although MYANMAR has begun to distance itself from CHINA since
the onset of its liberalization process).
Outside this theater of strategic
jostling, states such as INDONESIA—the informal leader of the ASSOCIATION OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)—are most interested in preventing a brewing SINO-AMERICAN
rivalry from turning into a direct confrontation, desperately trying to manage
a region splintering along conflicting allegiances and competing national
interests.
TAKING ON CHINA
Since 2009, CHINA has stepped up its
military operations in the region’s seas, intimidating neighboring
countries—and key U.S. allies—like VIETNAM, the PHILIPPINES, and JAPAN. But
encouraged by AMERICA’S growing focus on ASIA, U.S. allies have also become
much more confident in asserting their territorial claims against Beijing. A
confident Beijing, in light of AMERICA’S growing economic woes in the aftermath
of the 2008 Great Recession, has also spared few punches to assert its
antiquated and notorious “nine-dash
line” doctrine, which grants CHINA, albeit symbolically, “inherent
sovereignty” over practically everything in the energy-rich SOUTH CHINA SEA (SCS)
basin.
In 2010, in response to CHINA’S
growing belligerence in the disputed territories, the Obama administration—also
encouraged by regional allies—found an opportunity to carve out its place as a
direct stakeholder in the ongoing conflict. By committing itself to maritime
security and the freedom of navigation in the SCS, the UNITED STATES has
practically declared its pivot to ASIA as a form of deterrence against CHINESE-sponsored
aggression.
INCREASING THE CHANCES OF CONFLICT
Mindful of their tight economic
relations with CHINA, AMERICA’S regional allies have touted the pivot as an
attempt to improve regional security, tackle “non-traditional security” (NTS)
issues (e.g., piracy, terrorism, human trafficking, etc.), and enhance the
minimum deterrence capability of less powerful countries like the PHILIPPINES.
Crucially, there has been hardly any
explicit reference to CHINA as a motivating factor behind growing security
cooperation between the UNITED STATES and its regional allies. This is
obviously an attempt to allay CHINA’S anxieties about the emergence of a
U.S.-led, regional effort to contain its rapid rise.
However, facts on the ground put lie
to such caution: VIETNAM and the PHILIPPINEs are clearly seeking AMERICAN
military assistance in the form of greater rotational presence, joint military
exercises, arms sales, and increased military aid. JAPAN—facing renewed clashes
with Beijing over disputed territories in EAST CHINA SEA—has sought the UNITED
STATES’ explicit reiteration of its commitment to their Mutual Defense Treaty.
Both sides of the simmering conflict are fully aware that CHINA’S rise is at
the center of the pivot.
Ironically, the whole pivot
phenomenon is encouraging all stakeholders to take bolder positions vis-à-vis
regional territorial conflicts. Amidst their own leadership transition phase, CHINESE
leaders are intent on shoring up domestic popular support by taking a tougher
stance towards neighboring countries. They have been using a combination of
paramilitary elements (fishing boats and surveillance vessels),
diplomatic-economic intimidation, and threat of force to assert their
territorial claims.
AMERICA’S allies are meanwhile
invoking the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the
2002 ASEAN-CHINA Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the SOUTH CHINA SEA to
place further pressure on CHINA and establish a more binding regional Code of
Conduct (COC) to constrain its behavior.
ASEAN itself, supposedly a
pan-regional mediator and an anchor of regional cooperation and security, has
been the casualty of this brewing conflict. Cambodia, ASEAN’s current chair,
spared no effort to prove its loyalty to its main economic partner—CHINA—by
blocking the inclusion of the SINO-FILIPINO conflict over the Scarborough Shoal
in the final communiqué of the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting. The fate of the
provisional guidelines for a more binding regional COC is also in limbo.
The incident was a sobering reminder
of how hopes for a peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the SCS are
being undermined amidst growing assertiveness among the parties, all against
the backdrop of an intensifying U.S. pivot to the region.
The growing U.S. military presence
may have boosted the morale of allies such as the PHILIPPINES, but it is also shifting
the focus away from diplomacy and dialogue towards brinkmanship and competitive
alliance-building.
By Richard Javad Heydarian, via FPIF
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