On
Tuesday, 20 March 2012, prior to the downing of the Turkish jet by Syria, GEOPOLITICAL
ANALYSIS AND MONITORING wrote:
SYRIA WILL NOT HESITATE
TO ATTACK TURKEY
...........In his conversation with ANNAN, TURKEY was the only foe ASSAD named specifically as his first target for a pre-emptive missile assault. He stressed he would have no qualms about attacking TURKEY.............
TURKEY AND SYRIA: AN UNDECLARED STATE OF WAR
By Halil M KARAYELI
After SYRIA’S downing of a TURKISH
aircraft over the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, the question is not so much why SYRIA
shot it down as why the two neighbors have become embroiled in a confrontation
in the first place; more precisely why the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in TURKEY
decided to commit itself to bringing about regime change in SYRIA, by which it
assumed significant risks. That choice speaks of the impact that sectarian
reflexes is increasingly having on Ankara’s
foreign policy. What beckons enticingly for TURKEY’S ruling Sunni conservatives is a pro-TURKISH “Sunni crescent”, stretching from Gaza over SYRIA to northern IRAQ.
However, TURKEY courts danger by assuming the role as a leading Sunni power in the sectarian
confrontation in the MIDDLE EAST.
See also:
TESTING THE CAPABILITY OF SYRIA’S AIR DEFENSE?
With the downing of an (allegedly)
unarmed TURKISH RF-4E reconnaissance aircraft which had flown into SYRIAN
airspace on Friday, June 21 by SYRIA, the year-long confrontation between TURKEY
and SYRIA has escalated. There are several questions regarding the
circumstances around the downing of the aircraft that remain to be determined:
What was the exact mission of the plane, was its violation of SYRIAN airspace
really a mistake, as TURKEY claims, or was it intentional? Was the aircraft
shot down while in SYRIAN airspace or as it was flying out, as TURKEY claims?
The exact circumstances will in all probability remain disputed by the two
sides. However, it can be assumed that the SYRIAN regime’s intention was to
retaliate against TURKEY — which is militarily, logistically and politically
supporting the uprising in the country — while simultaneously sending a message
to the rebels.
Comment by
Geopolitical Analysis and Monitoring
TURKEYS AIRSPACE VIOLATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS
TURKISH jets entering
neighboring countries airspace is not a new phenomenon. On countless occasions TURKISH
fighter jets enter HELLENIC airspace, provoking mock dogfights with the GREEK
air force and vise versa, actions which have led the two countries more than
once to the brink of war as well as loss of aircrafts and crews. Not to mention
the numerous occasions when TURKISH jets entered CYPRUS airspace to provoke the
CYPRIOT National Guard and GREEK air
force based in Paphos. In the mid
nineties, TURKISH jets overflying the UNFICP
(United Nations Forces in Cyprus) Headquarters and the capital Nicosia, in protest of GREECE stationing
F16 fighter aircraft in Paphos caused
uproar among CYPRIOTS, as it triggered memories of the 1974 TURKISH invasion of
CYPRUS. The low level flight pattern of the two jets was timed to coincide with
the weekly UNFICYP security meeting in order to cause maximum impact. Thus it
comes of no surprise that TURKEY in most likelihood entered SYRIAN airspace
intentionally, only this time around the country provoked was not a NATO member
(as are TURKEY and GREECE) and thus retaliated.
See also:
KURDISH EQUATION
Presumably, SYRIA’S Baath regime
wanted to demonstrate that the country upon which the rebels rely is not
invulnerable; indeed, SYRIA is suspected of having renewed its support to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the KURDISH
guerilla group that has fought TURKEY since 1984, and which SYRIA had sheltered
until the end of the 1990s; last week the KURDISH rebels attacked an army
outpost in southeastern TURKEY, an attack which left eight soldiers dead, in
yet another reminder of TURKEY’S vulnerability.
FROM FRIEND TO FOE, WHAT CAUSED THE SHIFT IN TURKEYS SYRIA
STRATEGY?
The crucial question that begs for
an answer after the downing over the eastern MEDITERRANEAN that has brought the
two countries to the brink, if not of open war, to a more dangerous level of confrontation,
is not so much why SYRIA shot down the TURKISH aircraft as why the two
countries have become embroiled in a confrontation in the first place. Why has TURKEY’S
AKP government, which had nurtured a
close relation with the regime of Bashar al-Assad for almost a decade, decided
to commit itself — in concert with SAUDI ARABIA and QATAR — to bring about
regime change in SYRIA, by which it assumed significant risks?
See also:
When TURKEY took the lead in the
endeavor to bring about regime change in Damascus, it also invited the kind of
acts of retaliation like the downing of the RF-4E jet. The incident has in turn
raised the stakes further, leaving TURKEY with no other option but to respond
in a way that demonstrates that the country is not a paper tiger. TURKEY’S response
must necessarily be in line with its pretentions and rhetoric. Recently,
observing that a “new MIDDLE EAST is about to be born”, TURKISH foreign
minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated before the TURKISH parliament that “We will be
the owner, pioneer and the servant of this new MIDDLE EAST”. The TURKISH
government can ill afford not to act in a way that matches such rhetoric.
Comment by
Geopolitical Analysis and Monitoring
NEO OTTOMAN EMPIRE
TURKEY follows similar
“Neo Ottoman Empire” ambitions in
the BALKANS where it managed to outplay the EU by supporting the Muslim
community in BOSNIA and KOSOVO, both ideological as well as economically, thus
gaining large support and recognition especially from the young Sunni Muslim generation who lack future
perspectives due to the economic situation in their country and the reluctance
of the EU of accept them in the Union. These circumstances make it an easy task
for TURKEY’S ruling Sunni conservatives
to achieve the pro-TURKISH “Sunni
crescent”, stretching not only from BOSNIA across the south eastern BALKAN region,
but also from Gaza over SYRIA to northern IRAQ.
The partnership with SYRIA was the
show-case of TURKEY’S new opening to the MIDDLE EAST, its southern hinterland,
or its “strategic depth”, in the words of foreign minister Davutoğlu, the
author of TURKEY’S once much vaunted “zero
problems with neighbors” foreign policy doctrine; that doctrine is by now
defunct, with TURKEY instead counting zero friends among its neighbors, save
for the KURDISTAN regional government of Massoud Barzani in northern IRAQ.
TURKEY is not only embroiled in a confrontation with SYRIA, but is also in
conflict with the Shiite regime in IRAQ,
while the historic, geopolitical rivalry between TURKEY and IRAN has resumed —
being played out notably in SYRIA and IRAQ — after a brief interlude during
which the AKP-ruled TURKEY had
appeared to be “drifting eastward”, siding as it did with Iran against its
Western partners over the IRANIAN nuclear issue.
See also:
Before the “zero problems with
neighbors” doctrine was abandoned, TURKEY had successfully courted SYRIA,
significantly expanding its trade with the country that also served as a
gateway for TURKEY to other parts of the MIDDLE EAST; meanwhile the political
cooperation between the two neighbors was institutionalized, with a framework
for regular meetings of cabinet ministers having been established. Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his spouse even vacationed together with the SYRIAN
president Bashar Assad and his first lady.
WE WILL BE THE OWNER, PIONEER AND THE SERVANT OF THIS NEW
MIDDLE EAST
What precipitated the TURKISH break
with its erstwhile friend was the outbreak of the “Arab Spring”; when the wave
of revolt reached SYRIA in March 2011, Turkey called on the SYRIAN regime to
reform and search for a democratic solution. When the Baath regime chose not to
heed Ankara’s advice, the TURKISH government angrily responded by calling for
the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad.
TURKEY had also been quick to invite
EGYPTIAN president Hosni Mubarak to step down, while it took TURKEY much longer
to find its bearings in LIBYA, where it only belatedly joined the coalition
that had assembled to oust Colonel Qaddafi; as it were, TURKEY had been
reluctant to jeopardize its significant economic interests in Qaddafi’s LIBYA.
In SYRIA, by contrast, TURKEY did not hesitate to abandon a partner in which it
had invested heavily. That was basically because ideological considerations
carried the day, superseding short term economic interests. However, TURKEY had
not so much suddenly embraced any democratic idealism, as it had seized an
opportunity to promote a sectarian cause.
See also:
Comment by
Geopolitical Analysis and Monitoring
IGNORANCE - OR A CALCULATED MOVE?
The way TURKEY abandoned
its longstanding partner SYRIA, bears strong resemblance to the USA who
abandoned their protégée in EGYPT. In both cases one has to ask what really
causes such, to some extent, irrational moves which will have profound impacts
on the future geopolitical landscapes of the region and indeed the world. Could
it be pure ignorance or a calculated move?
SECTARIANISM - “SUNNI CRESCENT”
TURKEY became an advocate of regime
change in SYRIA when the outbreak of the Sunni
revolt against the Alawite
regime introduced sectarian considerations into its geopolitical equation; what
had not mattered until then between the two business partners — the Sunni-Alawite divide — acquired
preeminence with the revolt. To hold on to an Alawite regime that deployed indiscriminate violence against the Sunni population could obviously not be
an option for TURKEY’S ruling Sunni party.
Yet, arguably, the TURKISH government got carried away by its own sectarian
reflexes when it committed itself to regime change in SYRIA by adopting the
cause of the Sunni rebels without
any reservation. By doing that, TURKEY neglected, or rather chose not to take
into consideration, that the uprising against the regime is also a civil war;
Ankara has never attempted to give the impression that it in equal measure
embraces the cause of the Alawites,
Christians and Kurds. In fact,
the SYRIAN policy of the AKP government mirrors its internal policies; the
party has done little to accommodate the aspirations of TURKEY’S Alevi minority, (See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alevi
) and is suppressing the KURDISH movement that demands the same things that the
Kurds in SYRIA do.
See also:
What beckons enticingly for TURKEY’S
ruling Sunni conservatives is a pro-TURKISH
“Sunni crescent”, stretching from
Gaza over SYRIA to northern IRAQ: The AKP’s relation with Hamas, the rulers of Gaza, is longstanding, and the Muslim Brotherhood in SYRIA is expected
to be indebted to TURKEY if and when it settles into power, while the KURDS in
northern IRAQ form a Sunni alliance
with TURKEY against the Shiite power
of Tehran and its proxy in Baghdad. However, TURKEY courts danger by assuming the
role as a leading Sunni power in the
sectarian confrontation in the MIDDLE EAST.
See also:
Indeed, Ankara is apprehensive about
getting embroiled alone in SYRIA as a Sunni
power, which is why it wants any intervention to be taken together with its
Western allies, precisely in order to avoid the sectarian dimension of its SYRIAN
entanglement becoming too pronounced. Shouldering the cause of the Sunnis and playing the Sunni card to project power is a
double-edged sword. There is a very real risk of a SYRIAN contamination on
already uneasy Sunni-Alevi relations
in TURKEY; and by arming and supporting the Sunnis against them, TURKEY has earned the lasting hostility of the
Alawites, which will not only
restrict TURKEY’S capacity to help manage what threatens to be a chaotic
post-Assad SYRIA, but which could also have dangerous cross-border
consequences.
See also:
WE ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE SYRIAN PEOPLE –
ARMING THE OPPOSITION
By committing itself to regime
change in SYRIA, TURKEY has assumed significant risks. When SYRIA retaliates,
as it did when it shot down the TURKISH aircraft, TURKEY cannot fail to
respond; otherwise TURKEY and Prime Minister Erdoğan would appear unacceptably
weak. However, safeguarding TURKEY’S and its rulers’ prestige and living up to
the pretention of being the “the owner and pioneer” of the new MIDDLE EAST risks
inviting a dangerous escalation of the SYRIAN conflict. TURKEY’S main weapon
consists of giving more support to the armed opposition in SYRIA, something
which foreign minister Davutoğlu hinted at when he assured that the “we are
determined to continue to support the SYRIAN people”, which means giving more
arms to the Sunni rebels, and which
can only further exacerbate sectarian tensions.
Even though SYRIA has demonstrated
that it has the ability to inflict damage on its principal adversary in the undeclared
war, the prospects for the SYRIAN regime do not look bright. But neither do the
prospects for stability and freedom in a post-Assad SYRIA, as sectarian
divisions have been mobilized and exacerbated.
Comment by Geopolitical Analysis and
Monitoring
UNLIKE IN EGYPT AND LIBYA, THE SYRIA’S ASSAD
REGIME WILL LEAVE WITH AN IMPACT, IF TOPPLED…….
One should not
underestimate SYRIA threat of using its bio chemical weapons arsenal if pushed
into the corner. This could also have devastating consequences for TURKEY. The fact that SYRIA possesses these Bio
chemical weapons is probably the main reason foreign intervention by western
powers is put on hold, for it would affect the entire region.
See also:
Concurrently, TURKEY’S attempt to
bring about regime change in SYRIA invites other powers to exploit its own
internal divisions and vulnerabilities; TURKEY is vulnerable not only on its KURDISH
flank, but also on account of its dependency on RUSSIA and IRAN — SYRIA’S champions
— for its energy supplies.
In
regards to TURKEYS dependency on RUSSIA for its energy supply, also read: TURKEY
Falls out with RUSSIA. Also Published on this blog
TURKEY AS A “MODEL” FOR BUDDING, MUSLIM DEMOCRACIES IN THE
MIDDLE EAST SERVES TO UNDERPIN TURKISH SOFT POWER IN THE REGION
Ultimately, TURKEY’S ability to play
a constructive role in the SYRIAN crisis, and to project power, depends on
having its own house in order. The narrative of TURKEY as a “model” for
budding, Muslim democracies in the MIDDLE
EAST serves to underpin TURKISH soft power in the region, and the AKP embodies the victory of a popular
majority over military tutelage. But the critical question is to what extent the
TURKEY of AKP also represents a
model of societal reconciliation. Without a new, democratic constitution that
makes room for the aspirations of all of the country’s communities — seculars,
conservatives, KURDS and Alevis — TURKEY
will not only remain vulnerable but also unable to provide any useful guidance
for others in a region torn apart by sectarian divisions.
See also:
This article was first published in
the Turkey Analyst, (www.turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. ©
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center,
2012.
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