FEARS OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM
By Ruslan Pukhov
Many in the West believe that RUSSIA’S
support for SYRIA stems from Moscow’s desire to profit from selling arms to
Bashar al-Assad’s government and maintain its naval facility at the SYRIAN port
of Tartus. But these speculations are superficial and misguided. The real
reason that RUSSIA is resisting strong international action against the Assad
regime is that it fears the spread of Islamic radicalism and the erosion of its
superpower status in a world where Western nations are increasingly undertaking
unilateral military interventions.
SYRIA IS AMONG RUSSIA’S SIGNIFICANT CUSTOMERS, BUT BY NO
MEANS ONE OF THE KEY BUYERS OF RUSSIAN ARMS
Since 2005, RUSSIAN defense
contracts with SYRIA have amounted to only about $5.5 billion — mostly to
modernize SYRIA’S air force and air defenses. And although SYRIA had been making
its scheduled payments in a fairly timely manner, many contracts were delayed
by RUSSIA for political reasons. A contract for four MiG-31E fighter planes was
annulled altogether. And recently it became known that RUSSIA had actually
halted the planned delivery of S-300 mobile antiaircraft missile systems to SYRIA.
SYRIA is among RUSSIA’S significant
customers, but it is by no means one of the key buyers of RUSSIAN arms —
accounting for just 5 percent of RUSSIA’S global arms sales in 2011. Indeed, RUSSIA
has long refrained from supplying Damascus with the most powerful weapons
systems so as to avoid angering ISRAEL and the West — sometimes to the
detriment of RUSSIA’S commercial and political ties with SYRIA.
To put it plainly, arms sales to SYRIA
today do not have any significance for RUSSIA from either a commercial or a
military-technological standpoint, and SYRIA isn’t an especially important
partner in military-technological cooperation.
Indeed, RUSSIA could quite easily
resell weapons ordered by the SYRIANS (especially the most expensive items,
like fighter jets and missile systems) to third parties, thus minimizing its
losses. And even if the Assad government survives, it will be much weaker and
is unlikely to be able to continue buying RUSSIAN arms.
The RUSSIAN Navy’s logistical
support facility at Tartus is similarly unimportant. It essentially amounts to
two floating moorings, a couple of warehouses, a barracks and a few buildings.
On shore, there are no more than 50 seamen. For the Navy, the facility in
Tartus has more symbolic than practical significance. It can’t serve as a
support base for deploying naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea, and even
visits by RUSSIAN military ships are carried out more for demonstrative
purposes than out of any real need to replenish supplies.
RUSSIA’S current SYRIA policy
basically boils down to supporting the Assad government and preventing a
foreign intervention aimed at overthrowing it, as happened in Libya.
Comment
by GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS AND MONITORING:
PAYBACK TIME FOR BEING
LEFT OUT OF THE LIBYAN EQUATION
As
mentioned numerous times on this Blog, RUSSIA and CHINA felt that they were
left out of the equation regarding the LIBYAN operation instigated by the USA,
FRANCE and BRITAIN. CHINA and RUSSIA invested heavily in LIBYA prior to the
toppling of the LIBYAN regime, only to find out that they were kept completely out
of the picture regarding the true intentions the Western coalition force had in
mind with LIBYA once the regime was removed.
Subsequently RUSSIA and CHINA
learned their lesson and thus would not make the same mistake regarding SYRIA,
permitting LIBYAN style intervention by WESTERN and GULF STATES coalition
forces. No matter that SYRIA lacks oil reserves or other natural resources
worth fighting over, their veto was more of a symbolic gesture telling Western
and Gulf States coalition forces: that’s how far you can go this time around,
but no further.
RUSSIANS believe that the collapse
of the Assad government would be tantamount to the loss of RUSSIA’S last client
and ally in the MIDDLE EAST and the final elimination of traces of former
Soviet prowess there — illusory as those traces may be. They believe that
Western intervention in SYRIA (which RUSSIA cannot counter militarily) would be
an intentional profanation of one of the few remaining symbols of RUSSIA’S
status as a great world power.
ARAB REVOLUTIONS DESTABILIZED THE REGION AND CLEARED THE ROAD
TO POWER FOR FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM
Such attitudes are further
buttressed by widespread pessimism about the eventual outcome of the Arab
Spring, and the SYRIAN revolution in particular. Most RUSSIAN observers believe
that Arab revolutions have completely destabilized the region and cleared the
road to power for the Islamists. In Moscow, secular authoritarian governments
are seen as the sole realistic alternative to Islamic dominance.
The continuing struggles in Arab
countries are seen as a battle by those who wear neckties against those who do
not wear them. Russians have long suffered from terrorism and extremism at the
hands of Islamists in the northern CAUCASUS, and they are therefore firmly on
the side of those who wear neckties.
To people in Moscow, Mr. Assad
appears not so much as “a bad dictator” but as a secular leader struggling with
an uprising of Islamists. The active support from SAUDI ARABIA, QATAR and TURKEY’S
Islamist government for rebels in SYRIA only heightens suspicions in RUSSIA
about the Islamist nature of the current opposition in SYRIA and rebels
throughout the MIDDLE EAST.
Comment
by GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS AND MONITORING
It
is interesting to note that Russia in particularly sees Turkey as part of the
Islamist movement in the region. Relations between the two countries have been
strained for some time now, mainly because of gas supplies and other energy
issues which could alter the geo-strategic landscape of the region.
VIOLATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN
LIBYA ARE SEEN AS ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS FOR RUSSIA’S CURRENT STANCE ON SYRIA
Finally, RUSSIANS are angry about
the West’s propensity for unilateral interventionism — not to mention the
blatantly broad interpretation of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations
Security Council, and the direct violations of those resolutions in LIBYA.
According to this view, the West,
led by AMERICA, demonstrated its cynicism, perfidy and a typical policy of
double standards. That’s why all the Western moralizing and calls for
intervention in SYRIA are perceived by RUSSIAN public as yet another
manifestation of cynical hypocrisy.
PRESERVING HIS OWN POWER IS ALSO ON MR. PUTIN’S MIND AS HIS
AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT BEGINS TO WOBBLE
There is no doubt that preserving
his own power is also on Mr. Putin’s mind as his authoritarian government
begins to wobble in the face of growing protests that enjoy political approval
and support from the West. He cannot but sympathize with Mr. Assad as a fellow
autocratic ruler struggling with outside interference in domestic affairs.
But ideological solidarity is a
secondary factor at best. Mr. Putin is capitalizing on traditional RUSSIAN
suspicions of the WEST, and his support for Mr. Assad is based on the firm
conviction that an Islamist-led revolution in SYRIA, especially one that
receives support through the intervention of Western and Arab states, will
seriously harm RUSSIA’S long-term interests.
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