BUILDING
A “COMMON EU VISION” FOR SAHEL SECURITY
By Martin
Michelot via PSE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SAFE HAVENS
FOR TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN THE SAHEL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A
THREAT TO ALL EUROPEAN NATIONAL INTERESTS
The
ongoing crises in SYRIA and EGYPT have marginalised the conflict in MALI in the
WESTERN media. But the FRENCH-led military intervention in that country is
facing a complex and challenging transitional period. The UNITED NATIONS Special
Envoy for the SAHEL, Romano Prodi, recently warned the international community
to “not forget the SAHEL, or you will have more MALIS if you do”. That is a
prospect that EUROPEAN countries – including FRANCE – will certainly not
relish, yet they lack the political will or the capacity to ensure a favourable
outcome. Transatlantic actors now, more than ever, need to rethink their
cooperation in the region and strengthen their alliances with local powers.
Related articles:
INSTABILITY IN THE SAHEL COULD PROMPT INCREASED MIGRATION
AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING WHICH IS BOUND TO SPILL OVER INTO EUROPE.
The
two main challenges facing the transatlantic partners are their ability to
assume responsibility for regional security and their securing local support
for their efforts. Despite receiving official backing from allies on both sides
of the Atlantic, the FRENCH military intervention in MALI revealed the reluctance
of countries to share the burden for providing security in the SAHEL. The
problem stems mostly from the divergence of perceptions within EUROPE on the
relevance of the SAHEL to its immediate security concerns.
REDEFINE THE SCOPE OF EUROPE’S NEIGHBORHOOD STRATEGY
The
first step should therefore be to redefine the scope of EUROPE’S neighborhood
strategy in order to include the SAHEL area as a whole. For obvious historical
reasons, FRANCE will continue to be more involved in the stability of this part
of AFRICA than other countries, but the development of new safe havens for
terrorism and transnational crime in the region should be considered a threat
to all EUROPEAN national interests, just as instability in the CAUCASUS should
concern western EUROPEAN countries. At this point, FRANCE has neither the
political will nor the capacity to assert sole leadership in a vast region
stretching from SENEGAL to the HORN OF AFRICA. A UNITED STATES interpretation
of FRENCH assertion in the region as a reason for its disengagement would
therefore be a miscalculation.
Background Information: CAUCASUS
GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE CASPIAN BASIN IS REACHING NEW
LEVELS AMID GROWING CONFLICT ZONES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.
IN AZERBAIJAN, EU
FOCUSES ON ENERGY INSTEAD OF DEMOCRACY
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
ARE LOSING OUT TO CHINA IN THEIR QUEST TO SOURCE NATURAL GAS FROM THE CENTRAL
ASIAN STATES.
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM IN THE REGION WILL
INEVITABLY INVOLVE EUROPE’S LONG-TERM ENGAGEMENT IN THE SAHEL.
Once
a common EUROPEAN vision is built, the path for a genuine transatlantic
approach to security in the SAHEL and a division of labour can then be charted,
with the US possibly assuming responsibility for technical and logistical
support and for training. The training of AFRICAN troops should eventually
become the centrepiece of transatlantic operations in the region, keeping in
mind the lessons learned from the previous failed experience in MALI pre-2012.
That
objective goes hand-in-hand with the second challenge: establishing strong and
durable security partnerships with local partners in order to ensure the
operability of a transatlantic strategy in the region. The gradual diminishing
of power-projection capabilities in EUROPE and the US has reinforced the
necessity of establishing strong regional partnerships in the context of the
struggle against terrorism. Although some transatlantic actors have recently
strengthened their defence partnerships with countries in the region – for
instance, FRANCE with CAMEROON, the IVORY COAST, DJIBOUTI, GABON, SENEGAL, the CENTRAL
AFRICAN REPUBLIC, and TOGO, and the UNITED KINGDOM with ALGERIA – this type of
cooperation should go beyond the scope of simple military interventions, as the
struggle against transnational crime and terrorism in the region will
inevitably involve EUROPE’S long-term engagement.
COOPERATION BETWEEN FRENCH AND CHADIAN MILITARY IN MALI
SERVES AS A SUCCESSFUL MODEL
During
US President Barack Obama’s visit to his country, SENEGALESE President Macky
Sall outlined the expectations of leaders in AFRICAN and EUROPE for stronger
triangular cooperation in support of counterterrorism efforts in clear terms.
The cooperation between the FRENCH and CHADIAN military in MALI serves as a
model here, having proved to be both effective on the ground and recognised as
legitimate by international institutions.
EU MILITARY WEAKNESS: LACK OF EFFECTIVE COOPERATION IN INTEL
AND SURVEILLANCE IN SHALE’S SPARSELY POPULATED REGION
But security partnerships between EUROPEAN and AFRICAN
states need to go beyond the establishment of military bases, and should aim to
address the main weakness of EUROPEAN militaries today: a lack of effective
cooperation in intelligence and surveillance in this sparsely-populated region.
The recent US-FRENCH negotiations
over the purchase of 16 Reaper drones for surveillance have highlighted EUROPEAN
shortcomings in this domain.
In
this context, developing coordinated operations with AFRICAN militaries is
crucial in ensuring that these new capabilities will be used
efficiently. Although unintentional, the US rebalance to ASIA has made the
issue of transatlantic cooperation in the SAHEL resurface to the top of the
agenda, as EUROPEAN capitals question the real extent of AMERICAN ‘strategic
retrenchment’, both globally and in the region. In parallel, the evolution of
the SAHEL should also be used in EUROPE to highlight the necessity of
reassessing its security strategy, and undertake a true assessment of the
capabilities that are attached to it.
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