QATAR CULTIVATES A NEW GLOBAL IMAGE
At face value, QATAR’S engagement
with the world is impressive. DOHA has not only cultivated a strong alliance
with the UNITED STATES as the host of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and
extended overtures to ISRAEL, but until recently the tiny emirate truly also
competed with its larger neighbor—the Kingdom of SAUDI ARABIA—for a dominant
role in the SUNNI ARAB world. A closer examination of QATARI foreign policy,
however, demonstrates that a number of DOHA’S initiatives have proven
unsuccessful, diminishing the ultra-rich PERSIAN GULF emirate’s global
presence.
Background Information:
QATAR WAS THE MOTHER WHOSE
MILK FED THE ISLAMIST GROUPS
THE QATARI PROJECT:
“DESTROYING SAUDI ARABIA”?
QATAR’S GREAT POWER GAMES
QATAR RUNS COVERT DESERT
TRAINING CAMP FOR ‘MODERATE’ SYRIAN REBELS
Until 2011, QATAR sought to use
soft power, particularly diplomacy, to increase its presence and establish the GULF
nation as a major actor on the international stage. However, after the ARAB
Spring erupted across the MIDDLE EAST and NORTH AFRICA (MENA), QATAR quickly
shifted its foreign policy strategy. Instead of focusing on soft power, DOHA
became increasingly involved in regional conflicts, most notably in LIBYA and SYRIA.
In the process, QATAR’S work to cultivate relations based on soft power was
quickly undone and DOHA’S status as an influential regional actor was
diminished.
At this juncture, a key question
remains unanswered. Where does QATAR go from here? It appears that the emirate
is seeking to re-cultivate its soft power influence. However, rather than
relying on diplomacy, the QATARIS seem to be using the culture of competitive
sports to promote their views. Branding is central and critical to QATAR’S long
term plan, and they are heavily investing in global sporting ventures to
promote their image before the world.
MEDIATION AND DIPLOMACY:
2003–2011
Despite QATAR’S tiny size—both
geographically and demographically—DOHA’S foreign policy earned the emirate
significant influence from 2003 until the ARAB Spring uprisings of 2011. Prior
to the SYRIAN crisis, QATAR’S strategy was to maintain positive relations with
all influential actors without committing to any one particular party. From
2003 onward, EMIR SHEIKH HAMAD formulated foreign policy in a manner that
garnered QATAR a reputation for being an “honest” peace broker.
This reputation was evident in
the peace that the former Emir of QATAR helped broker between the U.S., UK, and
LIBYA over the dismantling of the LIBYAN nuclear program. In 2008, DOHA played
a highly productive role in resolving LEBANON’S internal crisis, thereby
preventing another LEBANESE civil war from erupting. The QATARIS also exerted
their diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts and tensions in AFGHANISTAN,
DARFUR, Palestine, and the Horn of AFRICA.
Throughout this period, DOHA
relied heavily on AL-JAZEERA (QATAR’S state-run news network), currently
referred to as one of the major wings of QATARI public diplomacy. By 2006, the
network had added a twenty-four hour channel and diversified its reach by
broadcasting programs in TURKISH and even SWAHILI; by 2010 it was reported that
seventy-eight percent of the ARAB World relied upon AL-JAZEERA for
international news. Attracting such a wide and diverse audience played a
critical role in the cultivation of QATARI soft power throughout the 2000s. The
QATARI leadership was quick to realize that via AL-JAZEERA the emirate was able
to promote its values and ideas, as well as a positive image, throughout the
MENA region.
Furthermore, AL-JAZEERA enabled QATAR
to manipulate international events to advance DOHA’S interests. A key example
of this occurred in 2009. In a cable sent to DOHA, the U.S. Embassy claimed
that SHEIKH HAMAD told then-Senator JOHN KERRY about a bargain he had in place
with then-EGYPTIAN President HOSNI MUBARAK. AL-JAZEERA would not broadcast any
programs on EGYPT or its government, in exchange for a shift in CAIRO’S
position on ISRAEL-PALESTINE negotiations. Though MUBARAK is reported to have
said nothing in response, there is little doubt that AL-JAZEERA is not as
editorially independent as it claims.
DIRECT INVOLVEMENT: 2011-2012
In 2011, QATAR inexplicably
changed its strategy. Soft power was swapped out for direct military
involvement. In LIBYA, DOHA took an active role against MUAMMAR GADDAFI. Not
only did the emirate provide serious funding and an estimated twenty thousand
tons of weaponry, but it also trained and sent LIBYAN exiles and other militia
groups to fight. Doha also became deeply involved in SYRIA and EGYPT’S ARAB Spring
uprisings. Yet QATAR’S failure to advance its interests in these countries
significantly diminished DOHA’S credibility. QATAR’S soft power card suffered,
as did AL-JAZEERA’S reputation after it was heavily criticized for an alleged
editorial bias.
EGYPT is the clearest example of QATAR’S
fall from grace. According to many observers, QATAR used AL-JAZEERA to spread
its pro-MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD agenda. Following the EGYPTIAN coup d’état of July
3, 2013 which ousted MOHAMMED MORSI, a growing number of EGYPTIANS began
viewing AL-JAZEERA as little more than a promoter of QATARI interests. The
military takeover in CAIRO forced QATAR to withdraw from EGYPT, leaving its GULF
rival SAUDI ARABIA to capitalize on the situation and provide the junta with
USD 13 billion in aid, reasserting Riyadh’s position as a regional mediator.
THE WORLD CUP BID
In DECEMBER 2010, QATAR won the
bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, beating JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, and the U.S.
This was arguably the beginning of QATAR’S efforts to cultivate a new form of
soft power in which DOHA would promote itself as a global sporting destination.
However, since securing the bid,
QATARIS have been subjected to high levels of criticism. Voices accuse DOHA of
becoming the host of the World Cup in 2022 through corrupt maneuvers, as well
as failing to protect the human rights of its migrant work force. Consequently,
the domestic brand and image that DOHA sought to promote is not what the world
sees today.
While many commentators argue that the allegations have set back
any new ambitions of QATAR, DOHA’S reaction is telling. While QATAR’S
leadership has hit back against allegations surrounding the infamous MOHAMED BIN
HAMMAM, DOHA views the World Cup as simply one wing of QATAR’S overall
strategy. In part, this seems to be due to the smart and wide-ranging
investments that they have made since winning the bid. Although QATAR’S image
has been damaged, it is premature to conclude that this damage is permanent.
THE FUTURE
It appears that in recognition of
their dwindling regional influence, the QATARIS have embarked upon a new
strategy of cultivating soft power through sport and culture. Since 2010, the QATARIS
have invested massive amounts of wealth into a number of major sporting
companies and ventures. This strategy represents both a diversification of the
QATARI economy as well as a move to regain its lost international status. DOHA
is aware that the emirate’s natural gas reserves cannot last forever and QATAR is
already facing growing competition from the U.S. and AUSTRALIA. Bloomberg’s
energy desk believes that by 2018 AUSTRALIA will be the leading manufacturer of
Liquefied Natural Gas. At this juncture, DOHA views sports as a means to open
new doors into more financial deals and to re-cultivate international influence
following failed foreign policy strategies regarding the ARAB Spring.
In the near future sporting
culture will form an increasingly central part of QATAR’S international
strategy. In the aftermath of the controversy surrounding the FIFA World Cup
bid, it is vital that QATAR builds a successful international brand and this is
exactly what is happening. The QATARIS, recognizing the importance of branding
and have made strategic investments in this sector.
Only large, globally recognizable
brands will be found in the QATARI portfolio. Key examples include BARCELONA
and PARIS SAINT-GERMAIN, two of the best known and most successful football
teams which are now QATARI-owned. The spillover effects from these investments
may eventually translate to growing economic and political relationships with
the FRENCH and SPANISH governments. Beyond this, QATAR has also reportedly made
a USD 7 billion bid for a controlling stake in Formula 1 Racing. The emirate
has also invested in UK horse racing, DEUTSCHE BANK, and AMERICAN EXPRESS, just
to name a few strategic moves.
By engaging with projects across
the world, QATAR is positioning itself to regain influence on an international
scale with an entirely different strategy. By associating with global brands, DOHA
is embarking on a new course of creating relationships and developing
partnerships with key actors and institutions. Presently, QATAR’S influence is
markedly less than it was in 2010. Yet, the dream of establishing a dominant
global presence is not over. Qatar’s immense natural resource wealth will
secure a prosperous future for the GULF state. Ultimately, this prosperity will
ensure that the tiny emirate’s presence remains disproportionately large.
By Gulf State Analytics Akhil
Shah
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