A NEW GLOBAL PATTERN IS EMERGING WHICH WILL DICTATE HOW STRATEGIES ARE PLANNED

 ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES ARE KEY DRIVERS IN WHAT IS A TRANSFORMING GLOBAL STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURE.

 

This will necessitate a revision of existing power projection, trade, and intelligence priorities, structures, and doctrine to meet the emerging realities. But they are not yet set in stone.

Oswald Spengler http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Decline_of_the_West gave ample warning, in The Decline of the West (which he wrote mainly during World War I), that Western civilization was even then reaching some of its natural limits. He demonstrated that ROMAN and later Western civilization (which emerged from the classical era of GREEK culture) had pursued — as civilizations do as they emerge from cultures — a process of expansionism and materialism. It is a process which has an organic lifespan.

Those who thought that Spengler was defining the “decline of the West” in terms of the coming few years would have missed his historical perspective. However, the process he described took the path he predicted, in which continued expansionism in material and spatial (and therefore population) terms would occur alongside the evolutionary maturing of political structures.

So, then, is “the West” now in that process of “decline” which the title of his book suggested would occur? And if so, then what are the ramifications of that in strategic terms?

Clearly, in the 20th Century, the expansionist nature of “the West” came to embrace — in some senses — nations which were not Western, such as JAPAN, even the REPUBLIC OF KOREA, and other geographic outliers, such as SOUTH AMERICA and AUSTRALASIA. In these areas, as in all civilizations, and as Spengler noted, the driving force is material and geographic/territorial growth and future acquisition. It is about the future. Hence, the failure (or decline, or collapse) of a society or individual is, ipso facto, measured in material and spatial terms. 

THE WEST HAD, BY 2012, ACCEPTED THAT IT WAS IN AN EXISTENTIAL CRISIS OF IDENTITY

What is significant is that modern civilization — as opposed to Classical culture — defines its being in quantitative terms. Geographic quantification has some fairly enduring qualities. Most other measurements, excepting measurement of finite numbers of lives extant, are highly subjective, including measures of wealth, happiness, security, and so on.

So to measure “growth” and “decline” in most equations it is necessary to use a civilization’s own standards of measure. “Gross domestic product” (GDP) is one such measure. And this is done in terms of a currency or currencies which are equally psychological reflections of the societies and the civilization which has dominance. Presently, GDP calculations and comparisons are mostly based on the perceived (or psychological) value of the UNITED STATES dollar, given that the US has had the power to determine the language and terms of debate and engagement. 

In geo-spatial and economic terms, however, “the West” — by the West’s own definitions — is facing transformation and, in many respects, “decline” in Spenglerian terms. Can this be reversed?
But, in essence, the answer is: if realistic grand strategic objectives of a society can be articulated, and operational strategies defined and managed, then goals can be achieved. Absent that fundamental framework — which includes the specific defining of where a society wishes to be, and understanding the context in which it wishes to achieve that status — then it will persist in a path of decline determined by the maturing and breakdown of its structures. Of course, the defining word in that process is “realistic”, itself a subjective interpretation.

The West had, by 2012, accepted that it was in an existential crisis of identity, and that its future was to be determined in comparison with the PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC). Possibly in collaboration with, or subject to, in some respects to the PRC. But the PRC itself — indeed CHINA, not the modern state iteration of the People’s Republic — began to move from a cultural identity to a “civilizational” identity only with the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. At that point, it was enabled to move into that expansionist (in material terms) and quantitative approach to social organization. In many respects, this new CHINESE civilization mirrors that of “the West”, and is therefore measurable against it in the West’s own terms. And the PRC, as the iteration distinct from “classical CHINA”, has proven adept at playing the quantitative process as well as any Western state. This includes the presentation of quantitative “data” in ways which build internal confidence, international respect, and strategic power. By mid-2012, the PRC was doing a clearly more productive job of this than were most Western states, with significant ramifications for levels of social confidence, optimism, and national cohesion. 

“WEDDING BELLS” ARE RINGING BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA (FOR RUSSIAN-CONTROLLED ENERGY SUPPLIES) AND GERMANY AND THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA (FOR THE PRC MARKETS)

A continuation of these subjective trends would see, logically, a continuation of an evolving global power structure giving greater place to the PRC and its alliance partners, and less to the West. Nonetheless, even by current standards of measurement, the PRC and, say, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION (RF) (at 2011 GDP indicators in US dollars), had an economic base of $9.156-trillion, and a combined population of approximately 1.5-billion; while a core of the West (even if we looked solely at the US, JAPAN, GERMANY, FRANCE, the UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, SPAIN, AUSTRALIA, and the REPUBLIC OF KOREA) had an economic base of $35.449-trillion, and a combined population of approximately 803-million.

The disparities, then, in per capita asset value (which can, to some degree, be interpreted as wealth), are overwhelmingly, overpoweringly, in the West’s favor. Granted, these headline statistics do not comprise the entire framework of either the RUSSO-CHINESE bloc or the West. And neither bloc is cohesive or coordinated. Granted, too, the momentum of strategic dynamics is with the PRC-RUSSIAN FEDERATION bloc, and with the concept of relatively viable EURASIAN internal communications and distribution networks. This latter consideration, in fact, may be the most significant element in the “balance” which is emerging between East and West (if the old terms can be applied to the new situation). The EURASIAN heartland is transforming the focus of much of CONTINENTAL EUROPE, as well as CENTRAL ASIA; they see the Pacific to the Atlantic infrastructure and resource/market linkages as vital, stable, and the basis of a new geopolitical framework. This is perhaps the most significant factor, along the lines of the old song “wedding bells are breaking up that old gang of mine”. The new wedding bells are, for example, between GERMANY and RUSSIA (for Russian-controlled energy supplies) and GERMANY and the PRC (for the PRC markets). And, for the time being, as GERMANY goes, so goes CONTINENTAL EUROPE. 

INDIA MUST OPT TO TRAVEL WITH THE MARITIME POWERS (US, UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, INDIA, ETC.) IF IT IS TO ESCAPE SUBORDINATION TO THE PRC

So painting a picture of “East” and “West” is no longer simple. I refrained from adding INDIA’S economy and population into the equation of the balance between the West and the PRC-RF because — as during the Cold War — INDIA is politically undecided in this regard. From a geo-strategic standpoint, however, INDIA must opt to travel with the maritime powers (US, UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, INDIA, etc.) if it is to escape subordination to the PRC. 

Background Information:
http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2012/04/africa-forgotten-and-underestimated.html

But even with regard to the traditional maritime power network, which is built to a large extent around the old BRITISH and IBERIAN global trading and colonial structures, the US itself has failed to make a decision as to where it should stand. There is the residual expectation in Washington that “the West” will or would align behind the US, but there is also an emerging perspective that the US should retire to a relatively isolationist stance which would gradually cease to interfere in, or give orders to, the rest of the world in the name of proselytizing democracy. 

Background Information:

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2012/10/usa-raising-stakes-in-asia.html

US POLITICS OBSTRUCT NATURAL RESOURCES EXPLOITATION POTENTIAL

And the US could, indeed, succeed in remaining aloof and alone. It is on the verge of resuming strategic energy independence. However, the very political attitudes which stop Washington from energizing its strategic partnerships with its traditional allies of the Anglosphere are the very political attitudes which stand in the way of allowing policies to change to allow the domestic US exploitation of its oil, gas, shale (oil and gas), coal, and bio-fuel potential.

There is evidence that if the Administration of Pres. Barack Obama was re-elected it would, not having to play to its electoral base for a further term in office, allow some relaxation of domestic energy resources, and allow for new domestic fossil fuel refining. This would ensure that the US need not place such high priority on the security of its energy-supplying partner states. 

THE US NEED TO PROJECT POWER INTO THE MIDDLE EAST SUBSIDES, AS WELL AS AFRICA, AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

It is this new fossil fuel framework which is, as much as anything, determining the new geopolitical shape of the world, and which would determine future economic frameworks and the needs of future military forces. If, as is developing, the US does not need the PERSIAN GULF/ARABIAN Peninsula oil and gas (and if EUROPE also needs it less), then the US need to project power into the MIDDLE EAST subsides. Similarly, its need to project power into AFRICA, or the SOUTH CHINA SEA. This has a major bearing on the cost, shape, and doctrine of US military policy. 

Background Information:

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2012/09/chinas-winning-strategy-in-africa.html

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2012/07/africa-and-usa.html

If, too, Maghreb http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maghreb and EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN energy resources can supply much of WESTERN EUROPE, then the EUROPEAN UNION zone equally becomes less dependent on the RUSSIAN-dominated supply chain. This eventuality would be resisted by RUSSIA in new strategic initiatives, including the manipulation of RUSSIAN-controlled energy supplies — by price — to ensure that an ongoing EURO-RUSSIAN dependency relationship is sustained.

What we are close to seeing is, however, a CONTINENTAL EUROPE which looks Eastward and Southward (toward Central and EAST ASIA and the MEDITERRANEAN); a US which looks Westward (toward ASIA and the PACIFIC); and an ASIA which remains preoccupied with itself to a large degree, and which is open to opportunity.

For JAPAN, significantly, there is a strong opportunity to re-think its strategic dependencies. Its concern over growing PRC ability to dominate and interdict inbound energy supply lines can now, foreseeably, be countered by developing fossil fuel imports from CANADA and the US Alaskan territory.

All this could re-align how new global alliances would be shaped. JAPAN would be relieved of enormous pressure. AUSTRALIA would be slightly more isolated unless the maritime powers resume their historical alliance. AFRICA would be primarily left to the PRC, INDIA, and EUROPE. THE MIDDLE EAST and its sea lanes would be less significant as a fulcrum of concern. But all states would still need to consider what they want from the new world, and how they would get it .

Analysis by Gregory R. Copley

USA - RAISING THE STAKES IN ASIA

AMERICA’S SO-CALLED “PIVOT TO ASIA”

Depending on one’s ideological bent, AMERICA’S so-called “pivot to ASIA” could be interpreted in varying ways. However, one thing that is increasingly clear is that the Obama administration is intent on re-asserting AMERICA’S strategic centrality in the ASIA-PACIFIC. This was very explicit in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 2011 piece for Foreign Policy, entitled “AMERICA’S PACIFIC Century.”

The U.S. pivot to ASIA is motivated and shaped by both economic and military-strategic factors. Essentially, it is still an ongoing process that will depend on the cooperation of regional allies as well as the evolving patterns of SINO-AMERICAN relations.

AMERICA’S GROWING MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION COULD BACKFIRE

While the proponents of the pivot argue that it enhances regional security, it is in reality precipitating a much more explicit SINO-AMERICAN rivalry, thus undermining the prospects of an amicable and pluralistic regional order. Ultimately, AMERICA’S growing military presence in the region could backfire, giving birth to what it dearly seeks to prevent: as it tightens the noose around CHINA, the pivot could become a self-fulfilling prophecy by encouraging Beijing to take more drastic and aggressive counter-measures.

China’s growing naval assertiveness in adjacent disputed waters is already an indication of this ominous trend.

THE ANATOMY OF THE PIVOT

There are two dimensions to AMERICA’S pivot to ASIA. 

First, it is a logical “rebalancing” of AMERICA’S global strategic-military commitments in light of a sober recognition of the country’s overextension in the EURASIAN region. This rebalancing gained its initial momentum with the U.S. withdrawal from IRAQ in 2011 and the planned withdrawal from AFGHANISTAN in 2014. It explains why the UNITED STATES played a “supporting role” rather than occupying the center stage during the LIBYAN military campaign early last year. It also explains AMERICA’S hesitance to take drastic actions against the SYRIAN regime, while mainly focusing on a diplomatic resolution of the IRANIAN nuclear conundrum.

Second, it is a response to the growing importance of the ASIA-PACIFIC region in both economic and strategic-military terms in the 21^st century. As the region transforms into the center of global economic output and productivity, AMERICA’S embattled economy is in desperate need of growing export markets and trading partners to rejuvenate its shaky foundations.

U.S. ECONOMIC PRESENCE IN BOOMING ASIAN MARKETS

In this sense, it is essentially a continuation, or resuscitation, of earlier attempts by the Clinton administration to enhance the U.S. economic presence in booming ASIAN markets. After all, the region hosts industrial giants such as JAPAN and CHINA; “newly industrializing countries” (NICs) such as SOUTH KOREA, HONG KONG, THAILAND, SINGAPORE, and TAIWAN; booming emerging markets such as INDONESIA, INDIA, VIETNAM, and the PHILIPPINES; and vast investment opportunities in places such as BANGLADESH and MYANMAR.

Obviously, it is the strategic-security dimension of AMERICA’S pivot that is most controversial. While the Clinton administration pushed for the accommodation of CHINA as a “strategic partner” and witnessed the drawdown of the U.S. military presence in the PHILIPPINES, the Obama administration is instead increasingly concerned with “constrainment” of CHINA—preventing the emergence of CHINA as a strategic competitor through the deployment of diplomatic, economic, and military assets.  

THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN DEEPENING ITS STRATEGIC PRESENCE IN THE REGION, EXPANDING ITS BASES IN AUSTRALIA,

re-asserting its commitment to forward-deployment bases in JAPAN and SOUTH KOREA, upgrading facilities in Guam, re-concentrating U.S. naval firepower (i.e. aircraft carriers), and extending its rotational presence across SOUTHEAST ASIA. Looking at the Pentagon’s 2012 Defense Strategic Review, CHINA (along with IRAN) is clearly identified as a key challenge to U.S. global supremacy in the 21^st century.

AN UNFOLDING PROJECT

The pivot is more of an evolving strategic disposition than a fixed and concrete element of a broader “grand strategy” for the 21^st century. It is a reflection of a UNITED STATES that is catching up with the march of history after almost a decade of strategic fiasco by the Bush administration.

Washington has realized that its global war on terror (GWOT) has brought it close to the brink of fiscal collapse and strategic overextension, allowing countries like CHINA (and even RUSSIA) to gain significant ground in ASIA. Thus, the Obama administration is simply trying to re-assert AMERICA’S century-old foothold in the region, while hedging its bets against a rapidly rising CHINA.   

But we no longer live in a world where a group of powerful countries can treat the globe like a chessboard. In an era of “smart power,” the UNITED STATES is at best a stage master, influencing events on the ground without explicitly dictating the terms of action or unilaterally determining the course of history. Thus AMERICA’S pivot to ASIA is an ongoing project that will require the growing cooperation of its allies to succeed.

Fundamentally, it is an evolving strategy that will greatly depend on two inter-related developments: the U.S.-CHINA relationship and Beijing’s military posturing in the WESTERN PACIFIC.

MORE REACTIVE THAN PROACTIVE 

AMERICA’S pivot to ASIA is an evolutionary process, especially in the strategic-security realm, primarily because it is a reaction to CHINA’S growing military assertiveness in recent years.

However, this view represents only half of the story, since the pivot is characterized by a constellation of dynamic “threat perceptions” straddling CHINA, on one hand, and the UNITED STATES and its allies on the other. To put it simply, CHINA is as much as an architect of the so-called pivot as the UNITED STATES.

The more aggressive CHINA is in expanding its naval capabilities and asserting its territorial claims, the more determined is the UNITED STATES to re-assert and deepen its foothold in the region. From CHINA’S point of view, the U.S. pivot is a provocative process, which in turn fuels Beijing’s growing assertiveness, especially in territorial disputes in adjacent waters.

Major Sea Lanes

Additionally, U.S. allies—from the PHILIPPINES to VIETNAM and JAPAN—are playing their own strategic games, simultaneously testing AMERICA’S commitment to regional (or bilateral) security and CHINA’S ability to exercise self-restraint. Of course, on the other side of the fence you have CHINA’S quasi-satellite states in INDOCHINA—namely LAOS and CAMBODIA, and to a certain degree MYANMAR (although MYANMAR has begun to distance itself from CHINA since the onset of its liberalization process).

Outside this theater of strategic jostling, states such as INDONESIA—the informal leader of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)—are most interested in preventing a brewing SINO-AMERICAN rivalry from turning into a direct confrontation, desperately trying to manage a region splintering along conflicting allegiances and competing national interests.

TAKING ON CHINA 

Since 2009, CHINA has stepped up its military operations in the region’s seas, intimidating neighboring countries—and key U.S. allies—like VIETNAM, the PHILIPPINES, and JAPAN. But encouraged by AMERICA’S growing focus on ASIA, U.S. allies have also become much more confident in asserting their territorial claims against Beijing. A confident Beijing, in light of AMERICA’S growing economic woes in the aftermath of the 2008 Great Recession, has also spared few punches to assert its antiquated and notorious “nine-dash line” doctrine, which grants CHINA, albeit symbolically, “inherent sovereignty” over practically everything in the energy-rich SOUTH CHINA SEA (SCS) basin.

In 2010, in response to CHINA’S growing belligerence in the disputed territories, the Obama administration—also encouraged by regional allies—found an opportunity to carve out its place as a direct stakeholder in the ongoing conflict. By committing itself to maritime security and the freedom of navigation in the SCS, the UNITED STATES has practically declared its pivot to ASIA as a form of deterrence against CHINESE-sponsored aggression. 

INCREASING THE CHANCES OF CONFLICT

Mindful of their tight economic relations with CHINA, AMERICA’S regional allies have touted the pivot as an attempt to improve regional security, tackle “non-traditional security” (NTS) issues (e.g., piracy, terrorism, human trafficking, etc.), and enhance the minimum deterrence capability of less powerful countries like the PHILIPPINES.

Crucially, there has been hardly any explicit reference to CHINA as a motivating factor behind growing security cooperation between the UNITED STATES and its regional allies. This is obviously an attempt to allay CHINA’S anxieties about the emergence of a U.S.-led, regional effort to contain its rapid rise.

However, facts on the ground put lie to such caution: VIETNAM and the PHILIPPINEs are clearly seeking AMERICAN military assistance in the form of greater rotational presence, joint military exercises, arms sales, and increased military aid. JAPAN—facing renewed clashes with Beijing over disputed territories in EAST CHINA SEA—has sought the UNITED STATES’ explicit reiteration of its commitment to their Mutual Defense Treaty. Both sides of the simmering conflict are fully aware that CHINA’S rise is at the center of the pivot.

Ironically, the whole pivot phenomenon is encouraging all stakeholders to take bolder positions vis-à-vis regional territorial conflicts. Amidst their own leadership transition phase, CHINESE leaders are intent on shoring up domestic popular support by taking a tougher stance towards neighboring countries. They have been using a combination of paramilitary elements (fishing boats and surveillance vessels), diplomatic-economic intimidation, and threat of force to assert their territorial claims.

AMERICA’S allies are meanwhile invoking the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2002 ASEAN-CHINA Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the SOUTH CHINA SEA to place further pressure on CHINA and establish a more binding regional Code of Conduct (COC) to constrain its behavior.

ASEAN itself, supposedly a pan-regional mediator and an anchor of regional cooperation and security, has been the casualty of this brewing conflict. Cambodia, ASEAN’s current chair, spared no effort to prove its loyalty to its main economic partner—CHINA—by blocking the inclusion of the SINO-FILIPINO conflict over the Scarborough Shoal in the final communiqué of the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting. The fate of the provisional guidelines for a more binding regional COC is also in limbo.

The incident was a sobering reminder of how hopes for a peaceful resolution of territorial disputes in the SCS are being undermined amidst growing assertiveness among the parties, all against the backdrop of an intensifying U.S. pivot to the region.

The growing U.S. military presence may have boosted the morale of allies such as the PHILIPPINES, but it is also shifting the focus away from diplomacy and dialogue towards brinkmanship and competitive alliance-building. 

By Richard Javad Heydarian, via FPIF