IS
IT TIME FOR ACTIVE DETERRENCE?
By Anthony Rusonik via
Geopoliticalmonitor
For those interested enough to dive
deeper- beyond the tweets, the public relations campaigns, and the moral
indignation that muddies the waters of clear analysis- there are
some lessons to be learned from the most recent round in the ISRAEL-Gaza
conflict.
The first lesson, of course, is that this is indeed just the most recent round.
The ceasefire is sure to be inconclusive
and no political impasse will be broken.
On the diplomatic level, Hamas
remains in power, continues to reject ISRAEL’S right to exist, and retains
significant –albeit not unlimited—support within the ARAB world, TURKEY and
IRAN. Regional dynamics are unchanged. International dynamics are
unchanged, with the US and other Western powers committed to unenthusiastic but
consistent expressions of ISRAEL’S right to self-defense. ISRAEL itself remains
unchanged in its approach to the Palestinian question.
At the simplest level,
Jerusalem is eager to restore the status quo ante: no Gaza rockets, no ISRAELI
retaliation. Questions of a greater détente with Gaza that might lead to an
easing of the blockade are seldom raised, as Hamas rejectionism seems to make
such considerations impossible from Jerusalem’s point-of-view.
WEST BANK PALESTINIANS, ALTHOUGH AGGRIEVED, DID NOT ENGAGE
If there are political notes to
taken from this, then the first point of interest is that the West Bank
Palestinians, although aggrieved, did not engage. A second point is that Egypt
is still the foundation for a stable Middle East. Despite his Muslim
Brotherhood associations and the anti-Western and anti-ISRAEL sentiment of
his people, President Morsi remains a clear-headed and pragmatic statesman for EGYPT.
Both Hamas and ISRAEL turned to Morsi to broker a cease-fire, and EGYPT remains
the sole party with influence on both combatants. TURKEY’S reckless
rhetoric, on the other hand, put Prime Minister Erdogan on the outside, even
though the TURKS and the ISRAELIS–despite Ravi Marmara– have natural shared
interests in both a stable Gaza and, of course, containment of the conflict in SYRIA.
GREATER DIVIDE BETWEEN HAMAS AND FATAH?
So, again, there is little reason to expect significant political or diplomatic
change from the current conflict. In the interim, at most we may see a
greater divide between Hamas and Fatah, where the latter is determined to
pursue its UN bid for Palestinian statehood, while the former wants no part of
the recognition this would bestow upon ISRAEL. In turn, ISRAEL may at most
offer a state with provisional borders, a move it had pondered even
before the current round of hostilities.
VICTORY FOR ISRAEL ON A FRONT THAT MAY PROVE DECISIVE- AND
DETERMINE FUTURE STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS- BY ISRAEL
Despite all appearances of continued political deadlock, however, the present
conflict is nonetheless a watershed. It represents a victory for ISRAEL on a
front that may prove decisive- and determine future strategic directions- if
the ISRAELIS opt to pursue it. This is of course the fact that the Iron Dome anti-missile
system exceeded all expectations.
ISRAEL’S AIR FORCE, THE KEY TO POLITICAL SUCCESS?
The six batteries deployed by the Air Force wing of the IDF
(it is of some note perhaps that ground forces do not operate the systems) have
scored a 90% success rate.
This is impressive not just because of the short distance and limited
interception window for the Raphael systems, but also because of the
electronic brains of the unit that allow it to predict whether a missile is
headed for a population centre or an empty field, in which case the system
allows it to fall and saves the ammunition ($40,000 a shot) for the next
attack.
This tactical success has enormous strategic and thus diplomatic potential for ISRAEL
in particular and for modern warfare in general. This saves ISRAEL battlefield
casualties, reduces the prospect of innocent civilian deaths in Gaza as a
result and, therefore, ensures that ISRAEL’S precarious diplomatic position is
not further eroded.
IRON DOME SUCCESS: THE INITIATOR FOR IDF
STRATEGIC AND DOCTRINAL SHIFT?
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This is just the immediate tactical
benefit to ISRAEL. As argued in Haaretz (March 2011, February 2012)
and Geopolitical Monitor (August 2012), Iron Dome is just the
tactical piece in a comprehensive anti-ballistic missile blanket that offers ISRAEL
the potential for a complete strategic and doctrinal shift from its traditional
emphasis on pre-emption and air power to an “active deterrent” posture that
befits a more established state and superior military vexed by diplomatic
isolation.
From the inception of the state in 1948 through the 1967 Six-Day-War and the
1973 Yom Kippur conflict, ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE doctrine has trumpeted
preemption as the means to reduce the disadvantage of the country’s small
geographical size and leverage its superior air force. ISRAEL’S defense
establishment again argued for preemption in 1973, but was overruled by a
political echelon that chose passive deterrence to win diplomatic favor with
the UNITED STATES. The cost to absorb the first blows from EGYPT and SYRIA
was high for ISRAEL. The scale of initial losses led the cabinet to hint at a
nuclear response that triggered an AMERICAN airlift of material and diplomatic
engagement.
The failure of “The Concept” in 1973 renewed ISRAEL’S
determination to take the battle to the enemy’s home front and still
prevails in ISRAELI military doctrine, rooted in the national psyche.
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| Route taken by IAF during 1981 Iraqi Nuclear Reactor attack |
Hence, ISRAEL’S determination to hit IRAN before it acquires nuclear weapons.
Hence, ISRAEL’S focus on F-35 fighter jets, bunker-buster bombs, aerial
re-fueling capabilities, and frustrated attempts to gain tacit SAUDI or TURKISH
approval for aerial attack routes.
Comment by Geopolitical Analysis and Monitoring: Worthwhile to mention is that SAUDI ARABIA and
ISRAEL, though not officially, do foster economic as well as political ties
which are utilized when deemed necessary for either strategic or economic
reasons. One example is the use of SAUDI airspace during the raid on IRAQ’S Nuclear
reactor in 1981. Furthermore, in the unlikely event of a preemptive strike on IRAN,
TURKEY would most probably heed to US demand, granting ISRAELI jets to transition
TURKISH airspace.
For better or worst
and
Even if ISRAEL succeeds at enormous
financial cost with the prospect of heavy losses of its best pilots, the
setback to IRAN’S program will be short-term at best. IRANIAN retaliation,
perhaps supported by Hezbollah and even yet again Hamas, seems a realistic
prospect. Diplomatic isolation is complete in this scenario.
Geopolitical Analysis and Monitoring, on many occasions has stated that ISRAEL’S “determination”
to strike IRAN is nothing more than tactics in order to obtain negotiation
leverage over the USA on future weapons deals and geo strategic as well as geo
political concessions. ISRAEL never has or will seriously consider conducting a
preemptive strike on IRAN. All propaganda rhetoric’s by ISRAELI politicians, regarding
such strike are cleverly designed to maintain the upper hand on Geo political
strategies in the region.
RESTRUCTURE ITS STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, ALLOWING THE COUNTRY’S
LEADERS TO BETTER PROTECT THE HOME FRONT BY REDUCING THE IMPERATIVE FOR
PREEMPTION…………..
Yet, this grim path is not
inevitable. Iron Dome is just the tactical layer of a comprehensive
anti-ballistic defense system that is in fact premised on the Arrow-II
program. Developed in earnest after US Patriot systems provided
some protection from Saddam Hussein’s SCUDs in 1991, the Arrow system is
designed to counter long-range threats posed by the Shahab missiles IRAN has
developed with NORTH KOREAN support to replace the older SCUD technology.
David’s Sling is ISRAEL’S middle-tier ABM, designed to intercept mid-range
projectiles form Hezbollah.
Supported by ISRAEL’S own nuclear weapon arsenal, advanced Jericho delivery
systems, and assured second-strike capabilities provided by Dolphin
class submarines, ISRAEL’S anti-ballistic systems add up to the
potential for a powerful “active” deterrent.
It is reasonable to consider that should ISRAEL restructure its strategic
doctrine to leverage and prioritize its impressive ABM investments that
the country’s leaders could better protect the home front, reduce the
imperative for preemption, and thus provide ISRAEL with better regional and
international diplomatic options as befits a more established state.
LEANER, BUT MORE ELITE IDF CORE
As with other WESTERN militaries,
the country could then focus on a leaner yet more elite core of personnel and
materiel, as opposed to the burden of reliance on reserves. A few
squadrons of F-35s configured for air defense, supported by ground forces and a
navy re-positioned for equivalent roles might better prepare ISRAEL for the
threats the states now faces and in the diplomatic context in which it
must maneuver.
There is no doubt that, if little
else is gained by either party in the present conflict between ISRAEL
and Gaza, that the ISRAELIS have scored a dramatic victory on the
battlefield with Iron Dome. The full
potential of such a victory is at hand if the country’s statesmen and defense
establishment can evolve the old doctrine– once so successful and now of
dubious benefit– and embrace a new approach.
Those concerns included continued restrictions on civil rights, curtailment
of freedom of expression, assembly and association. It also revolves around the
treatment that the TURKISH government has shown to the KURDS and CHRISTIAN minorities,
including journalists.
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