WHO IS BEHIND THE CALIPHATE PROJECT?

“GOING AFTER” THE ISLAMIC STATE

The Islamic State (IS) is portrayed as an Enemy of AMERICA and the WESTERN world. 

With the support of AMERICA’S indefectible BRITISH ally, President BARACK OBAMA has ordered a series of US bombing raids on IRAQ and more recently SYRIA allegedly with a view to defeating the rebel army of the Islamic State (IS).

“We will not waver in our determination to confront the Islamic State … If terrorists think we will weaken in the face of their threats they could not be more wrong.” (BARACK OBAMA and DAVID CAMERON, Strengthening the NATO alliance, op ed published in the LONDOn Times, September 4, 2014, emphasis added)

UNTIL RECENTLY THE REBELS OF THE ISLAMIC STATE WERE HERALDED AS SYRIA’S “OPPOSITION FREEDOM FIGHTERS” COMMITTED TO “RESTORING DEMOCRACY” AND UNSEATING THE SECULAR GOVERNMENT OF BASHAR AL ASSAD.

In a bitter irony,  until recently the rebels of the Islamic State, formerly known as the Islamic State of IRAQ and the LEVANT (ISIL) were heralded as SYRIA’S “opposition freedom fighters” committed to “restoring democracy” and unseating the secular government of BASHAR AL ASSAD.

WHO WAS BEHIND  THE JIHADIST INSURGENCY IN SYRIA?

Could it be that the rise of violent extremism around the world is the fault of “certain states” and “intelligence agencies” that have helped to create it and are failing to withstand it? Extremism is not a regional but a global issue - Certain states have helped to create it, and are now failing to withstand it. 

Those who ordered the bombing campaign are those who are behind the Caliphate Project.

The Islamic State (IS) militia, which is currently the alleged target of  a US-NATO bombing campaign under a “counter-terrorism” mandate, was and continues to be supported covertly by the United States and its allies.

TURKISH HIGH COMMAND HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN THE RECRUITMENT OF JIHADIST MERCENARIES FROM THE OUTSET OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS IN MARCH 2011.

In other words, the Islamic State (IS) is a creation of US intelligence with the support of BRITAIN’S MI6, PAKISTAN’S Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and SAUDI ARABIA’S General Intelligence Presidency (GIP), Ri’sat Al-Istikhbrt Al-’mah. Moreover, the TURKISH High Command has been involved in the recruitment of jihadist mercenaries from the outset of the Syrian crisis in March 2011.

Army of Pickup trucks that cant be stopped by tanks and jet-fighters?

In relation to the SYRIAN insurgency, the Islamic State  fighters together with the AL QAEDA affiliated jihadist forces of the AL NUSRAH Front are the foot soldiers of the WESTERN entities. They are covertly supported by USA and BRITAIN. Their  mandate is to wage a terrorist insurgency against the government of BASHAR AL-ASSAD. The atrocities committed by Islamic State fighters in IRAQ are similar to those committed in SYRIA.

As a result of mainstream media reporting, WESTERN public opinion is unaware that the Islamic State terrorists have from the very outset been supported by the UNITED STATES and its allies.

The killings of innocent civilians by the Islamic State terrorists in IRAQ and SYRIA are used to create a pretext and a justification for the USA and its allies to tighten control over western democracies in order to gain total control over private citizen in the name of security and war a gainst trerrorism.  The bombing raids ordered by OBAMA, however, are not intended to eliminate the Islamic State, which constitutes a US “intelligence asset”. 

THE ROLE OF SAUDI ARABIA AND QATAR

Amply documented, US-NATO support to the Islamic State is channeled covertly through AMERICA’S staunchest allies: QATAR and SAUDI ARABIA. Acknowledged by the WESTERN media, both RIYADH and DOHA acting in liaison and on behalf of WASHINGTON have played (and continue to play) a central role in the financing the Islamic State (IS) as well as the recruitment, training and religious indoctrination of terrorist mercenary forces deployed in SYRIA.

According to London’s Daily Express “They [the Islamic State terrorists] had money and arms supplied by QATAR and SAUDI ARABIA.”

Background Information: 

HOW MUCH AND TO WHOM IS QATAR PAYING?

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2013/03/saudi-arabia-and-qatar.html

“The most important source of ISIS financing to date has been support coming out of the Gulf states, primarily SAUDI ARABIA but also QATAR, KUWAIT and the UNITED ARAB EMIRATES,” (According to Dr. Günter Meyer, Director of the Center for Research into the Arabic World at University of Mainz, Germany,  Deutsche Welle)

Background Information: 

THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com.ar/2012/02/truth-nothing-but-truth.html

AL-QAIDA IS PRESENT IN SYRIA AND THUS CAUSING THE TURMOIL, WITH THE HELP OF SAUDI ARABIA AND QATAR

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com/2012/05/syria-switching-perception.html

This money was channeled to ISIS terrorists fighting against government forces in SYRIA:

“Through allies such as SAUDI ARABIA and QATAR, the West [has] supported militant rebel groups which have since mutated into ISIS and other AL QAEDA connected militias. ( Daily Telegraph, June 12, 2014)

IS CALIPHATE PROJECT “HAS BEEN BANKROLLED BY SAUDI ARABIA”:

…[M]eet SAUDI ARABIA’S latest monstrous contribution to world history: the Islamist Sunni caliphate of IRAQ and the LEVANT, conquerors of MOSUL and TIKRIT – and RAQQA in SYRIA – and possibly BAGHDAD, and the ultimate humiliators of BUSH and OBAMA.

From ALEPPO in northern SYRIA almost to the IRAQI-IRANIAN border, the jihadists of ISIS and sundry other groupuscules paid by the SAUDI WAHHABIS – and by KUWAITI oligarchs – now rule thousands of square miles. (Robert Fisk, The Independent,  June 12, 2014

In 2013, as part of its recruitment of terrorists, SAUDI ARABIA took the initiative of releasing prisoners on death row in SAUDI jails.

A secret memo revealed that the prisoners were being “recruited” to join jihadist militia (including AL NUSRAH and ISIS) to fight against government forces in SYRIA.

The prisoners had reportedly been offered a deal — stay and be executed or fight against ASSAD in SYRIA. As part of the deal the prisoners were offered a “pardon and a monthly stipend for their families, who were allowed to stay in the SUNNI ARAB kingdom”.

SAUDI officials apparently gave them a choice: decapitation or jihad? In total, inmates from YEMEN, PALESTINE, SAUDI ARABIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, JORDAN, SOMALIA, AFGHANISTAN, EGYPT, PAKISTAN, IRAQ, and KUWAIT chose to go and fight in SYRIA.

On September 11, 2014, coinciding with the commemoration of 9/11, the King of SAUDI ARABIA together with the Monarchs of the GULF STATES announced their unbending commitment to support OBAMA’S war against the Islamic State (IS), which has and continues to be funded by QATARI and SAUDI money as part of a carefully engineered intelligence operation.

Background Information: 

WHERE THE TRADITIONALLY POWERFUL COUNTRIES LIKE EGYPT, ALGERIA AND IRAQ PROVED HELPLESS AGAINST THE WEALTHY DWARF QATAR

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com/2013/04/qatars-great-power-games.html

SAUDI ARABIA and the GULF  STATES which actively contributed to the financing of the Islamic State, not to mention the recruitment, training of terrorists on behalf of WASHINGTON, pledged their unbending support for OBAMA’S military campaign to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State.

The statement of  support contained in the communiqué, commits the “leading Arab states to working with the U.S. to cut off the flow of foreign fighters and funds to the Islamic State.” It also confirms that members discussed  “a strategy to destroy the ISIL wherever it is, including in both IRAQ and SYRIA.”

SAUDI ARABIA HAS COME TO UNDERSTAND THE ISLAMIC STATE GROUP IS A SERIOUS THREAT TO THEIR COUNTRY 

as well– that it isn’t a mainstream SUNNI movement.One element of OBAMA’S IS plan seeks to undermine the ideological and religious claims that the Islamic State militants make to Islam.

The administration hopes RIYADH will use its influence among Islamic religious leaders. (Voice of America, September 11, 2014)

RECRUITING “MODERATE TERRORISTS” - A DIABOLIC PROJECT 

As part of the agreement, the House of SAUD is to “host a training facility for thousands of Syrian rebel fighters who are combating both the Islamic State and President BASHAR AL-ASSAD’S regime.” An absurd proposition.  Until September 9th, “officially” SAUDI ARABIA had been supporting the Islamic State against the government of BASHAR AL ASSAD and now it has been entrusted in recruiting jihadists to fight the Islamic State!! 

We are dealing with a diabolical project:  The architects of the Islamic State have informed the World that they are “going after” their own terrorists as part of a counter-terrorism operation.

While these actions are undertaken under the banner of the “Global War on Terrorism”, the US has no intention to target its IS own terror brigades which are integrated by WESTERN special forces and intelligence operatives. In fact the only meaningful and effective campaign against Islamic State terrorists is being waged by SYRIAN government forces.

Background Information: 

SYRIAN PARLIAMENTARY OBJECTIONS NECESSITATED THE CIA-AIDED 1949 COUP

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com/2011/12/syria-cause-and-effect.html

US, SAUDI and QATARI support and funding to the Islamic State will continue. The objective is not to destroy the Islamic State. What we are dealing with is a US sponsored process of destabilizing in the region. The campaign against the Islamic State is being used as a justification to bomb SYRIA and IRAQ.

The endgame is to destabilize IRAQ and SYRIA as a nation state and trigger its partition into three separate entities.

By Prof Michel Chossudovsky

via Global Research

IRAN - BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS

A SHIFTING MIDDLE EAST CHESSBOARD, WITH IRAN AT THE CENTER

One year since taking office, IRAN President HASSAN ROUHANI and his government are confronted with an extremely unstable geopolitical situation across the MIDDLE EAST.

TEHRAN had long been seen as the main beneficiary of the 2003 U.S. intervention in IRAQ, but it must now face unexpected difficulties in its neighboring country and former sworn enemy.

THE MILITARY SUCCESSES OF THE ISLAMIST RADICAL GROUP ISIS TOOK IRAN BY SURPRISE. 

The declaration of a “caliphate” in northern IRAQ and eastern SYRIA, territories mostly occupied by SUNNIS, was more bad news. With the threat from this terrorist SUNNI organization, very much anti-SHIA, TEHRAN is faced with both security risks within its borders and the fate of IRAQ.

The KURDISH issue is yet another obvious reason for worry in IRAN, which must beware of spillover among its own KURDISH population, as well as the very probable influence that the UNITED STATES and ISRAEL would have on the policy of an independent KURDISH state in northern IRAQ. Indeed, the creation of such a state would likely accelerate the overall disintegration of IRAQ, with which it shares 1,599 kilometers of border. This would be a catastrophe for IRAN.

"Balkanisation of SYRIA" 

Background Information: 

MANIFESTATION OF REGIONAL RIVALRY BETWEEN IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA COMING TO THE SURFACE IN LIGHT OF A RESURGENT IRAN

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com/2014/07/isis-in-iraq-sectarian-tsunami-or.html

THE IRANIANS' PRIMARY GOAL IS REGIME PRESERVATION

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com/2013/11/israelis-saudis-and-iranian-agreement.html

ISRAEL, TO SOME EXTENT, SHARES IRAN'S MISGIVINGS REGARDING THE THREAT OF A JIHADIST TAKEOVER IN SYRIA

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com/2013/05/iran-and-israel-improvement-in.html

Beyond IRAQ, the situation in the LEVANT remains very worrisome for the IRANIAN regime. In SYRIA, ROUHANI seems to have his hands tied and to be unable to change the course of his predecessor’s policies. For that reason, he continued to support SYRIAN President BASHAR AL-ASSAD and to offer the SYRIAN regime assistance in various forms.

SYRIA’S UNITY IS THREATENED

But despite this massive aid, the SYRIAN government can’t manage to reestablish itself. It is weakened, and the country’s economy has been heavily damaged. At the same time, the situation militarily is at a deadlock, and SYRIA’S unity is threatened, despite TEHRAN’S political, financial and military support. According to some sources, at least 60 members of the “Guardians of the Islamic Revolution,” a branch of IRAN’S military, have been killed in SYRIA since 2011.

TURKEY AND THE KURD'S

http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com/2013/03/turkey-and-kurds.html

The violence from SYRIA has spread to LEBANON, where IRANIAN interests have been targeted. TEHRAN’S ally there, HEZBOLLAH, is struggling on the ground in SYRIA, but also in LEBANON — as well as in public opinion across much of the ARAB world.

GAZA PUZZLE

At first sight, this summer’s crisis in Gaza might appear positive for the Islamic Republic, as it degraded ISRAEL’S image. For the first time, public opinion in IRAN was united around support for the PALESTINIANS.

Still, the situation has created whole new problems for TEHRAN. Now IRAN finds itself forced to compete with QATAR and TURKEY for influence over the PALESTINIAN movement, which is not at all to ASSAD’S liking. The SYRIAN president is indeed very critical of HAMAS, which he accuses of having betrayed him by supporting rebels. This could thus complicate the relationship between SYRIA and IRAN, and it is an issue that TEHRAN’S diplomacy is going to have to solve.

IRAN COULD FIND ITSELF BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS, WITH RADICAL SUNNIS SQUEEZING FROM BOTH AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ

To the east, another unpleasant surprise could be ahead in AFGHANISTAN after the AMERICAN troop withdrawal at the end of this year. The country’s future is still uncertain. To this day, there has been no political solution with the TALIBAN, and the possibility that they might take advantage of the Western withdrawal to try and retake power cannot be excluded. This would jeopardize the political and economic ties, which took many years to be built, between TEHRAN and Kabul.

Should the TALIBAN gain in strength, the Islamic Republic could find itself between Scylla and Charybdis, with radical SUNNIS squeezing from both AFGHANISTAN and IRAQ. It is a potentially very dangerous scenario for the ROUHANI administration, especially since there are SUNNI minorities living in the regions along the two borders.

But despite the recent development in IRAQ, in the Levant, in Gaza and the uncertainties in AFGHANISTAN, ROUHANI and his government have had some successes over the past year with TURKEY and some of the GULF’S EMIRATES.

Source: World Crunch

ONE WORLD, MANY CALIPHS: AN ASSESSMENT OF STRUGGLE BETWEEN AL QAEDA AND ISIS FOR SOUTH ASIA

By Aakash Tolan, via Eurasia Review

The concept of an Islamic caliphate undoubtedly has religious resonance across the Muslim world. However, much like any other religious society, different schools of thoughts exist within the Islamic fold as well. There are scholars who uphold the view of every Muslim to strive for the supremacy of Islam in his country by all means over “all other religions”, and there are others, such as the Pakistani Islamic scholar— Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, who argue that such concepts and actions were carried out in a particular context and time, not compulsively or religiously applicable today. However shall the concept of ‘Caliphate’ be assessed, it goes without saying that the idea to safeguard or establish one continues to inspire many impressionable young minds in the Muslim world till today.

If History tells us anything, as early as 1919, the Khilafat Movement, a pan-Islamic campaign launched to protect the erstwhile Caliph and the Ottoman Empire during the aftermath of World War I, saw many Muslims; particularly from South Asia participate in the cause against the British empire. Although, the then Turkish Caliphate and the ones that ISIS and Al Qaeda promise and uphold today may have little in common; nevertheless, South Asia still appears to be a fertile ground for radical Islamist organizations to fan sentiments and garner support.

The June 29, 2014 statement from ISIS, declaring Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as the Caliph of Islam, known also as Emir-ul-Momineen (Leader of the Faithful Muslims), received both support and disavowal from the Muslim world. In terms of support, in South Asia the following groups or individuals are reported to have sworn allegiance to the Islamic State:

In terms of disavowment, reports suggest that the general secretary of the All India Sunni Jameyathul Ulema— Shaikh Abu Bakr Ahmad, a Kerala based Islamic Cleric, said favouring the extremist organisations was antithetical to the Islamic Shariah. Furthermore, it has also been reported that renowned organizations such as Jamat-i-Islami (Hind) have also asked the Indian Muslim community to ensure that the younger generation are not lured into Jihad by possible sleeper cells of Jihadi organizations across the country.

However, one of most striking retaliatory, or rather competitive move comes from none other than the veteran global Jihadi organization— Al Qaeda.

To briefly put this into context, the title of Emir-ul-Momineen, or the Caliph, had so far been retained by Mullah Muhammad Omar, the leader of Afghan Taliban. Al-Qaeda’s slain leader Osama bin Laden and other Al-Qaeda affiliates in several countries offered their bai’yah (oath of fealty) to him. With Al Qaeda weakened by Osama Bin Laden’s death, US operations and affiliates such as Al Shabab also taking a back seat, the loosely networked organization was bound to receive a reality check from an expelled faction of Al-Baghdadi in Syria, that not only has brutally and successfully established a so called ‘Caliphate’ under a new emir, but also appears to have trumped in Jihadi propaganda and recruitment via Social Media.

Before proceeding further into South Asian Jihadi groups and their possible moves in the wake of the ‘Caliphate’ era, it is crucial to firstly outline a few prominent differences between Al Qaeda and ISIS so far.

Al Qaeda	ISIS
The concept of ‘Caliphate’ never materialized, only seems to be utilized to receive support from distant organizations in the Jihadi world	The Caliphate is an existential reality achieved, calling for Muslims to make Hijra, or a holy trip to the holy land for the final apocalyptic war between believers and non-beleivers
Jihadists are summoned to active Jihadi fronts, never as much to the centre of gravity. Even the newly established South Asian wing holds regional goals	Doctors, jurists and engineers to build the institutions of the caliphate are summoned. Invitations to Caliphate extend to the global Muslim community
Al-Qaeda kinetic operations target the “far enemy,” the West, relying on organizations within its umbrella to execute something grand	ISIS fights a more localized battle instead to deter competitors, ruling regimes and the west alike
Does not have resources, relies primarily on terrorist financing networks and donations	Conducts operations, such as bank-robbery, ransoms, installs institutionalized taxing to fund itself
Relies mostly on ‘West Vs Islam’ notion	Formation itself was based on Shia Vs Sunni sectarian clashes in Syria and Iraq
In the cyberspace, sermons of Zawahiri are formal in nature, primarily showcased against a simple background. It appears Al Qaeda’s online magazines such as- ‘Inspire’ and other special editions promote lone-wolf attacks in the west. Videos of US personnel bombarded or beheading on westerners are carried out by affiliates	ISIS is much more tech savvy. Use of Twitter, Facebook, including broadcast of real life video dairies of Jihadi recruits, training videos, beheading and mass killing videos are just some of the examples of their multi-pronged use of the cyberspace. The online audience is encouraged to move to the ‘Caliphate’ over grass root level activism, as mentioned in the ISIS online magazine- ‘Dabiq’
Female participation not emphasized as much	Al-Khanssaa Brigade, a female police force to enforce Shariah amongst the women has been set up by the ISIS

Given the above differences as a backdrop, the timing of Zawahiri’s call for a south Asian branch of the organization, like most commentators have already discussed, seems to be borne out of desperation. The question now is— what has this or will this desperation manifest into?

Given a multitude of views that have emerged in this regard already, the following is a discussion of possible likely avenues Al Qaeda has or would be exploring:

Possibility A: To mutually benefit the state that provides sanctuary

Claim: Analysts around the world have already laid the claim that Zawahiri’s video on 3 September where he outlines grievances of all regions in South Asia, but Pakistan, signifies a desperate Al Qaeda who may have struck a deal with ISI in fostering anti-India groups to ensure its safe haven on the Pakistani soil. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA analyst and head of President Barack Obama’s 2009 Afghanistan-Pakistan policy review, described the new group as focused exclusively on India, suggesting that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence is hand in glove with hiding the Al Qaeda top man Ayman al- Zawahiri, much like how once Osama Bin Laden was.

Vikram Sood, the former chief of the Research and Analysis Wing of India, went a step further, arguing that Al Qaeda’s new branch provides Islamabad the deniability it needs to continue supporting terror attacks in India. The presence of AQIS, Sood says, “absolves Pakistan of the charge that there is an Al Qaeda in Pakistan.” Tufail Ahmad, the renowned South Asia Jihadi media analyst from MEMRI further opines that the Al-Zawahiri’s video has another timeline in its sight, the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan by end-2014, and is therefore aligned with the Pakistani military’s strategic objective aimed at reacquiring control over Afghanistan through the Taliban as the US leaves. There is also the fact that Umar Khorasani splinter faction of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan seems to be supporting AQIS, which would make many think as though the splintering of TTP would indirectly benefit the Pakistani counter-terrorism agencies.

Counter-argument: None other than Al Qaeda seems to have clarified as per a SITE report on 9th of September about “media-led misperceptions” about the group’s scope, explaining that it is not limited to India, but includes the entirety of the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, it seems as though the newly formed South Asian wing’s first target happens to be Pakistan, claiming two terrorist attacks in its first week of operations already. The official spokesman for AQIS, Usama Mahmoud, released statements and photos on his Twitter feed offering details for both attacks. The following is a press release for one of the attacks which killed an army personnel recently:

Al Qaeda in India Press Release

Apart from this, it is important to point out that, although Al Qaeda may appear desperate to reclaim its fame, it probably would not run the risk of losing its luster as a pro-Shariah hardline Salafist group by aligning itself with the Pakistani state, like Lashkar-e-Taiba; especially when the global Jihadi trend suggests, the more ‘takfiri’ or anti-state and pro-Caliphate the group sounds, the more authentic it appears in the Jihadi world. To this end, reports and magazine publications such as ‘Azan’, published by the Taliban in Pakistan, suggest that regardless of whichever Taliban faction it may be, they are anti- state and anti-democracy, and very much aligned with the Al Qaeda. If this is the premise, it is even more hard to conclude that Al Qaeda would be anything, but a puppet to the state agencies and anti TTP.

To this end, even the US State Department in 2010 established that the TTP and Al Qaeda have a symbiotic relationship; TTP draws ideological guidance from the latter, while the former relies on TTP for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border. “This mutual cooperation gives TTP access to both al-Qa’ida’s global terrorist network and the operational experience of its members. Given the proximity of the two groups and the nature of their relationship, TTP is a force multiplier for al- Qa’ida” (US State Dept. 2010).

Furthermore, the intent of addressing Muslims of India and Burma does not appear to be a recent phenomenon, as inferred by many analysts based on Zawahiri’s 3rd September announcement. If Issue 3 of Taliban’s ‘Azan’ magazine published in 2013 (i.e. a year before even ISIS came with the concept of Caliphate) is examined, it very much contains the message to Indian Muslims by Al Qaeda militant Maulana Asim Umar, now the AQIS ‘Emir’, urging jihad. In other words, an anti-Indian stance of a Jihadi group should not be automatically equated to a pro-Pakistan or Pakistani supported stance of the group. TTP is against the state of Pakistan. Al Qaeda and its affiliate the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have also been involved in carrying out attacks against the state of Pakistan. But in addition to this, India and Kashmir have also been on their agenda from an early stage, while they were still carrying out attacks against the state of Pakistan. Moreover, If ISIS is any inspiration to the South Asian Jihadi groups; it probably would have taught them to be self-reliant to the most, while opposing any regimes or state governments that are deemed to be anti-Islamic and in their way of establishing a ‘Caliphate’. For this purpose, Pakistan seems to be equally or more of a target along with other South Asian countries.

With regards to Bruce Riedel’s assertion that Zawahiri too may be hiding in Pakistan, as was Osama bin laden, Pakistani analyst Arif Rafiq from the Middle East Institute argues,

“Granted, elements within Pakistani intelligence did reportedly give advance warning to al-Zawahiri in 2006 of an impending U.S. drone strike, saving his life, and Osama bin Laden was hiding around a mile away from Pakistan’s equivalent of West Point. Still, there are no indications that the advanced notice given to al-Zawahiri or the refuge bin Laden enjoyed in Abbottabad were approved by senior Pakistani officials. And these associations should not overshadow the way al Qaeda has actively fueled the Pakistani Taliban’s war against Islamabad — a conflict that has killed tens of thousands of Pakistani civilians and security personnel”

Conclusion

It is inadvisable to jump the gun just yet and point a finger in any particular direction. These are still the initial stages of the group. Only time would be able to tell whether the group can openly execute actions like ISIS, given the areas within which AQIS is supposedly operating or intends to conduct operations are not the least comparable to Syria or Iraq when it comes to security and stability. Moreover, times are such that Jihadi groups if they have to keep up their reputation would probably not be risking losing their name by associating with regimes or states deemed un-Islamic or apostate in nature.

Possibility B: The clash of Emirs

Claim: It appears that there is more than one ‘emir’ out there, especially in the South Asian Context.

The following are the widely-recognized title holders to whom many swear their ‘bai’yah’ to:

i. Mullah Omar from Afghan Taliban

ii. Shaykh Asim Umar from AQIS

iii. Caliph Ibrahim from ISIS, still receiving oath of allegiance from Jihadi groups across the world

There is a fourth ‘Emir’, which many haven’t acknowledged, who is Maulana Fazlullah, from TTP, and who apparently is also seeking ‘Bai’yah’ from Jihadi groups in Pakistan.

TTP’s Facebook page, “Umar Media- Malakand Division”, on 11th of September — that is a few days after AQIS was announced by Zawahiri — asked ‘Mujahideen’ to swear ‘Bai’yah’ to Maulana Fazlullah, the ‘Emir’ of TTP.

If there is any veracity to the reports that splintering of TTP would have benefited Al Qaeda in terms of receiving support from the Khorasani faction, then TTP’s up-staging of its own ‘Emir’ places its move a lot more into picture. If this is the case, then there are just about four ‘Emir’s in the region or perhaps eyeing for the region, some allied to one another, whilst others competing for recruits and territory.

For Pakistan, a divided TTP, as mentioned earlier, may seem to be positive news. However, creation of more than one group, all aimed at establishing an ‘Emirate’ or a ‘Caliphate’ only signals more trouble. Essentially, if ISIS is the example from which the ‘Emirs’ draw their inspiration, then one can expect the brutality and ruthless killing phenomenon, including amongst rival factions, to reach mainland South Asia as well.

Counter-argument: There is a possibility, although very low, that some ‘Caliphate’ seeking groups in South Asia, unite with unexpected Jihadi organization or organizations, for a singular cause initially to topple the common enemy- ‘democratic’ regimes. Recently, on 17th of September, SITE published news that the Afghan Taliban slammed the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, believing that America is dragging its allies into another war in the region, the only victims of which will be innocent Muslims. Was this a gesture indicative of support from the Afghan Taliban to ISIS? This possibility cannot be ruled out, as one must understand that although Al Nusra, an Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria, may be in odds with ISIS in the Middle-East, it is not necessary that the sub-continent based Al Qaeda nucleus, or its Af-Pak affiliate groups, would never see eye to eye with the global ‘Caliphate’ champions of the decade— ISIS.

ISIS and Al Qaeda join forces in Lebanon.

Moreover, even in the Middle-East, not too far off from the Iraq-Syria flashpoint, from Lebanon as well reports seem to suggest that Al Qaeda and ISIS forces have unified under the Sunni-camp to achieve a common goal first—strike Hezbollah. If this cooperation can emerge in Lebanon, it is hard to rule out as to why it would not emerge in a region like South Asia where a commonality of causes amongst Jihadi groups is in abundance over their relative differences.

Conclusion

Transporting the logic of ‘Al Qaeda versus ISIS’ from the Middle-East to South Asia could be a “grave fallacy”. ‘Emirs’ may clash or may possibly for the time being cooperate with each other to achieve their common goals. Certainly, there could be bandwagoning of smaller groups to larger camps.

However, before hedging bets as to which groups would align with whom, it must be noted that in Syria and Iraq, the struggle was borne out of sectarian clashes from an already war-torn and troubled region. South Asia for one is relatively stable in that regard and the sectarian card can be used only to a certain extent. Neither Pakistan, India or Bangladesh have experienced a war recently, nor in the Muslim majority states such as Pakistan and Bangladesh have there been violent protests to topple respective governments, like the Arab Spring or mass-scale sectarian clashes in Syria. Even the recent struggle in Pakistan against the Nawaz government by Imran Khan and PTI supporters’ bares testimony to the relatively peaceful protests the people are engaged in over violent demonstrations. This implies that there are no strong crisis opportunities that the Jihadi groups as such can avail. Nonetheless, there certainly can be competitions between different Jihadi groups, much like the Middle-East; however, South Asia could also see cooperation between some of them to achieve a common purpose first— that is to topple democratic institutions in a majority Muslim context first, and to pave the way for an eventual ‘Caliphate’.

As a final word, it is true that Zawahiri’s desperation has led to the creation of AQIS. Nonetheless, it is just too early to conclude whether this desperation has led the group to seek support from Pakistani institutions or even to think that an “ISIS vs Al Qaeda” competition would be re-enacted on the South Asian stage as well.

From the very outset, the group is acting in a different terrain to the Middle-East, therefore whether or not it is powerful enough to initiate anything even partially similar to what ISIS could do in Iraq and Syria is doubtful, let alone to perceive that the threat is larger than what it essentially may be. That said, the influx of ideas from ISIS and its ‘Caliphate’, the emergence of new actors owing allegiance to ISIS, Al Qaeda or asserting their own version of a ‘Caliphate’ or ‘Emirate’, certainly implies more damage to be anticipated— either led by inter-group cooperation, competition or perhaps both.

MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BALKAN

THE PRIVATIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE: 

CHALLENGES FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AND BALKAN REGIONS  

The ongoing revelations by private contractor, EDWARD SNOWDEN, have focused attention on the extensive scope of global intelligence gathering by the UNITED STATES (US).1 In particular, highlighting the vulnerabilities of digital data, raising concerns by civil libertarians in EUROPE and NORTH AMERICA on citizen privacy, and causing diplomatic rifts between states, examples being the US and GERMANY, and AUSTRALIA and INDONESIA.2 

However, limited attention has been paid to the challenges of privatization intelligence, especially where this occurs on behalf of the state.3  While current media reports indicate the US is the most active state involved in privatized intelligence, followed by GREAT BRITAIN, it is also likely that other states are engaged in similar operations under the guise of private companies, through contractual arrangements, or by covert infiltration.4   

This paper briefly reviews the challenges posed by the privatization of intelligence, before considering implications for national, regional and international security arrangements of states in the MEDITERRANEAN and BALKAN regions.  The first section reviews issues in relation to intelligence privatization and changes in definition, types and concepts.  The second and third sections consider these themes as they may be applied to states in the MEDITERRANEAN and BALKAN regions, respectively.  In conclusion, the challenges of ensuring state security in the context of an increasingly privatized intelligence domain are noted.    

THE PRIVATIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE 

While intelligence-sharing between the state and private sector is not new, the SNOWDEN disclosures indicate that contemporary US and BRITISH data collection efforts are extensive, and reflect changed definitions and concepts of intelligence.  During the post-Cold War era, the definition of intelligence was widely debated, where it had grown from a previous narrow understanding of national security, to applications for business and economics, often termed 2  

‘market intelligence.’5 This enabled not just the transfer of intelligence applications and advantages to business, but economic security for the state, and new opportunities for retired security professionals.6   

The concept of intelligence also changed, notably during the post-Cold War era, and gathering momentum after the events of September 11, 2001.  Domestic and international security is now measured against multiple threats – from intrastate violence, criminal actors, terrorism, religious extremists and ‘lone wolves,’ in addition to interstate conflict.  National security now encompasses not just intelligence agencies and military forces, but also state and private policing agencies.  

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING APPEARS TO HAVE DIMINISHED IN STATE PRIORITY, 

while an increasing focus on signals intelligence and data collection reflects contemporary technological developments, digital media, and public access.   

The ‘information revolution’ has meant that public access to digital and social media, coupled with targeted marketing and information collection by business – particularly, the commercial, financial and telecommunication sectors – has resulted in immense quantities of data being captured, stored, processed and analysed.7  

From a state perspective, such data may be valuable for its contribution to the intelligence picture, a pre-emptive tool against possible or known threats.  However, the collection and subsequent filtering processes through to analysis require particular skill sets and large numbers of personnel.  For the US, resolution of these issues has apparently been addressed through contracting to private companies, in addition to appropriation of intelligence acquired by business, either through subtle pressure, court-issued warrants, or covert infiltration. 

  

The implications of this push towards privatized intelligence collection and processing may be considered through two dimensions: security issues pertaining to national, regional and international goals; and thematic frames, of data, institutions and personnel.  In this context, the following two sections briefly consider the catalysts and challenges posed by privatized intelligence for states in the Mediterranean and Balkan regions.  

THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION  

While recognized for its geostrategic importance, the 22 states bordering the MEDITERRANEAN Sea still lack a coherent regional framework to promote its potential role as an economic, cultural, religious and political ‘bridge’ between the EUROPEAN UNION, MIDDLE EAST and NORTH AFRICA.8  National security issues for the MEDITERRANEAN states share similar features.  For example, domestic security issues affecting the southern MEDITERRANEAN states of GREECE, SPAIN and ITALY include unrestrained irregular migration from NORTH AFRICA, linked to increasing domestic civil unrest, unemployment, poverty and crime.9 The Arab Spring and resulting intrastate conflict has meant instability in government and civil reform for LIBYA, TUNISIA and EGYPT, while the SYRIAN civil war has also affected TURKEY and LEBANON.10  

Key drivers that may affect the privatisation of intelligence for MEDITERRANEAN states include government austerity measures, lack of internal security expertise, state and private sector interest in natural resources and resultant commercial opportunities, irregular migration and regional conflict.  The 2007 global financial crisis and consequent EUROPEAN austerity measures were reflected in decreased government services, wage reductions and high unemployment.11    

Although limited information is available on the impact of these measures for intelligence services in the affected states (particularly GREECE and SPAIN) Nomikos notes that, in 2012, GREEK intelligence services still required modernization and personnel with ‘high level skills’ such as had occurred in other states.12  Rather than address these perceived deficits through internal processes, however, states may instead decide to contract specific services externally, for example, to companies with expertise in digital data retrieval and analysis.  Despite outsourcing, states would still need to undertake due diligence checks for companies, and vetting arrangements for personnel to ensure security.13 

CLAIMS ON NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE MED

A further catalyst in the privatization of intelligence for MEDITERRANEAN states may also be linked to claims on natural resources.  Examples include the discovery of large, under-water, natural gas fields in the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, with ‘assertive statements of intent’ having been issued by GREECE, TURKEY, ISRAEL, CYPRUS, LEBANESE HIZBULLAH and PALESTINIAN HAMAS groups.14  

The commercial profits generated from such resources could ensure state economic prosperity, but also require private security and intelligence services to protect infrastructure, in addition to generation of new, potentially valuable, datasets on operations and personnel.  

Regional institutions have considered security measures to prevent irregular migration across the MEDITERRANEAN, from the MIDDLE EAST and NORTH AFRICA to EUROPE.  The EUROPEAN UNION (EU) has established a border surveillance system (EUROSUR) that will eventually cover its 30 member states.15 

In addition to cooperation between land-based security and police agencies, the surveillance system includes drones and satellite technology to track seaborne migrants, and enable intelligence-sharing between states.16 Significantly, GREAT BRITAIN is not involved in the program, and other EU states reportedly have refused BRITAIN’S request to provide EUROSUR- derived intelligence to the US.17  Another EU initiative to strengthen border security is its mission in LIBYA, EUBAM, approved in May 2013 to address irregular migration and mentor LIBYAN personnel on an international border management strategy.18  While security arrangements for EUROSUR do not identify whether private security or contracted personnel are involved in the operation, EUBAM is contracted to a BRITISH company, ARGUS SECURITY PROJECTS.19  Reports indicate that intelligence derived from EUBAM and its security operations may not just be useful for border management strategies, but also the commercial ambitions of individual EU member states.20 

BRITISH ALLEGEDLY USED THEIR MILITARY BASE IN CYPRUS TO FACILITATE ACCESS INTO UNDERSEA FIBER OPTIC CABLES’ PASSING BY THE ISLAND

The data generated and collected by private companies in the region has also been subject to allegations of covert infiltration.  For example, the BRITISH are alleged to have used their military base in CYPRUS to facilitate access into ’14 undersea fibre optic cables’ passing by the island, a communications highway between EUROPE, NORTH AFRICA and the MIDDLE EAST.21  The digital data collection is alleged to include ‘tens of millions’ of emails, telephone calls, instant messages, and other web-based traffic.’22  

THE BALKAN REGION  

Located in the south-eastern reaches of EUROPE, states in the BALKAN region have undergone significant security sector reform in the post-Cold War era, independence from the SOVIET UNION being achieved by some through a relatively peaceful process while, for others, after civil conflict.23  Security sector reform has occurred at varying levels of progress, with agencies required to reflect national, rather than SOVIET, interests.   Further issues for intelligence sector reform have included introducing division between internal (domestic) and external (foreign) activity, legislative oversight and compliance, data security, privacy and human rights, changing the professional culture, and relationships with non-state actors.24   

For most Balkan states, security sector reform has meant a change from previous SOVIET state surveillance to similar operations conducted instead by private sector agencies, with correlated allegations of corruption and criminal activity.  One example is that of BULGARIA, where an estimated 9 per cent of the male population are reportedly employed in the private security sector.25  The involvement of private sector companies in intelligence collection and security services is problematic, with limited legislative oversight, data privacy or compliance with human rights. 

THE BALKAN ALSO PRESENTS GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AS THE GATEWAY BETWEEN OXIDANT AND ORIENT 

  

As with some MEDITERRANEAN states, a primary issue appears to be the ‘shortage of experts outside the legacy intelligence services’ who are capable of managing reform, another potential driver towards privatized intelligence and the contracting of personnel with particular skill sets.26  The BALKAN region also presents geostrategic importance for its ‘major land routes between EUROPE and the MIDDLE EAST, and ecological resources,’ issues that would attract national, regional and international interests, and be the focus of intelligence collection – whether through contracted security agencies, or covert infiltration of private sector data.27 

THE PRIVATIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE

The privatization of intelligence has most recently gained prominence through the Snowden revelations.  The immense digital data collection and analysis process undertaken by the US and BRITISH agencies through appropriation of privately-generated intelligence is unlikely to be replicated to such a large extent by states in the MEDITERRANEAN and BALKAN regions, the latter being circumscribed by cost and skilled personnel.  States in these regions are more likely to be targeted by foreign interests, which may include private sector companies contracted to collect intelligence. 

However, similar catalysts for the outsourcing of intelligence activities may be noted for states across the regions.  In the BALKAN states, increased numbers of private security agencies, and their correlated potential to acquire intelligence, may mean that state intelligence services become increasingly reliant upon these private data sources. 

CORRUPTION AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY UNDERTAKEN BY PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES - A KEY ISSUE FOR PRIVATIZATION OF INTEL IN THE BALKAN REGION

Specific issues in this regard are allegations of corruption and criminal activity undertaken by private security companies, with few checks and balances on the collection and use of privately sourced intelligence. For MEDITERRANEAN states, also, there appear to be concerns regarding the need to modernise state intelligence services.  While private companies in these states appear not to be significantly involved in intelligence collection, state concerns regarding potential terrorist threats and undocumented migrants may result in the outsourcing of surveillance and data capture services.  

By Dr. Ruth Delaforce, via   Rieas

Endnotes: 
                                                      
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2 Swaine, Jon.  (16 August 2013).  ‘NSA broke privacy laws thousands of times a year, according to documents leaked by Ed Snowden.’  The Telegraph.  [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10247824/NSA-broke-privacy- laws-thousands-of-times-a-year-according-to-documents-leaked-by-Ed-Snowden.html] last accessed 8 December 2013. ‘Watt, Nicholas and Rowena Watson.  (24 October 2013).  ‘Angela Merkel Phone-Bugging Claims Are Result of Snowden Leaks Says MP.’  The Guardian.  [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/angela-merkel-bugging-snowden-leaks-mp] last accessed 8 December 2013;  Brissenden, Michael.  (18 November 2013).  ‘Australia Spied On Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Leaked Edward Snowden Documents Reveal.’ Australian Broadcasting Corporation.  [http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11- 18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-documents-reveal/5098860] last accessed 8 December 2013.    3 Media and political focus has been on data protection and privacy; see, for example:  Acohido, Byron.  (15 October 2013).  ‘How Edward Snowden Is Nudging Our Privacy Desires.’ USA Today.  [http://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2013/10/15/how-edward-snowden-is- nudging-privacy-desires/2986259/] last accessed 8 December 2013; The Guardian.  (2 December 2013).  ‘How The Snowden Leak Is Changing The Tech Landscape.’ [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/snowden-leak-tech-privacy-nsa-gchq- surveillance] last accessed 8 December 2013. Weinstein, Mark.  (1 August 2013).  ‘How The Fate of Your Privacy Rests In The Hands Of Snowden And Assange.’  Huffington Post.  [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-weinstein/how-the-fate-of-your-priv_b_3685538.html] last accessed 8 December 2013.  European Parliament.  (30 September 2013).  'NSA Inquiry: MEPs Hear US Privacy Experts, Whistleblowers and Snowden Statements.’ [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130930IPR21126/html/NSA- inquiry-MEPs-hear-US-privacy-experts-whistleblowers-and-Snowden-statement] last accessed 8 December 2013.   4 For example, see The Independent.  (8 December 2013).  ‘NSA 'in bed' with German intelligence says US whistleblower Edward Snowden - and GCHQ operates a 'full take' data monitoring system.’  [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/nsa-in-bed-with- german-intelligence-says-us-whistleblower-edward-snowden--and-gchq-operates-a-full-take- data-monitoring-system-8693793.html] last accessed 8 December 2013.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
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International Institute of Security Studies.  (15 May 2013).  Gas finds complicate eastern Mediterranean security. Strategic Comments.  Edition Number 15. 15 EUROSUR became operational on 2 December 2013. 16 EU Business.  (4 December 2013).  European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).   [http://www.eubusiness.com/topics/immigration/eurosur] last accessed 8 December 2013.  European Union.  (2011)  Proposal For A Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Establishing The European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).  [http://eur- lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011PC0873:EN:NOT] last accessed 8 December 2013. 17 Palmer, Richard.  (16 October 2013).  ‘EU Tightens Its Grip on the Mediterranean.’  The Trumpet. [https://www.thetrumpet.com/article/11025.30429.0.0/world/military/eu-tightens-its- grip-on-the-mediterranean?preview] last accessed 8 December 2013. 18 European Union.  ().  EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya.  EU External Action, Common Security and Defence Policy.  [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions_operations/eubam-libya/eubam_factsheet_en.pdf]  last accessed 8 December 2013. 19 EU Observer.  (5 November 2013).  Security Glitch Risks Delaying EU Border Mission.  [http://euobserver.com/foreign/121986] last accessed 8 December 2013. 20 Stephen, Chris.  (17 October 2013).  ‘Libya’s Security At Risk From Allies’ Lobbying.’  The Scotsman.  [http://www.scotsman.com/news/world/libya-s-security-at-risk-from-allies-lobbying- 1-3145410] last accessed 8 December 2013. 21 Squires, Nick.  (5 November 2013)  ‘British Military Base Used to Spy on Middle East.’  The Telegraph.  [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/cyprus/10427890/British- military-base-in-Cyprus-used-to-spy-on-Middle-East.html] last accessed 8 December 2013. 22 Hager, Nicky and Stefania Maurizi.  (7 November 2013).  Cyprus: The Home Of British/American Internet Surveillance In The Middle East.  Cryptome.  [http://cryptome.org/2013/11/cyprus-uk-us-spy.htm] last accessed 8 December 2013; Squires, Nick.  (5 November 2013)  ‘British Military Base Used to Spy on Middle East.’  The Telegraph.  [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/cyprus/10427890/British-military-base-in- Cyprus-used-to-spy-on-Middle-East.html] last accessed 8 December 2013. 

23 For the purpose of this review, specific regional states include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia; the region also includes border states, Greece, Italy and Turkey. 24 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.  (March 2006).  Intelligence Services.  DCAF Backgrounder;  also see DCAF Project on Strengthening Intelligence Oversight in the Western Balkans [http://www.dcaf.ch/Project/Strengthening-Intelligence-Oversight-in-the- Western-Balkans] last accessed 8 December 2013. 25 Gounev, Philip.  (2006)  ‘Bulgaria and Private Security.’  In Bryden, Alan and Marina Caparini (eds) Private Actors and Security Governance. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, pp 109-128; South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons.  (August 2005).  SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: A Cause or Effect of Insecurity? SEESAC, Serbia and Montenegro. 26 Watts, Larry L.  (2004).  ‘Intelligence Reform in Europe’s Emerging Democracies.’  Studies in Intelligence (48:1) 11-25. 27 Moustakis, Fotios.  (2003).  The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO.  Frank Cass Publishers, Portland Oregon.