Sunday, 17 November 2013

YEMEN CONFLICT


 Shi’ite Houthi rebels in YEMEM



YEMEN FIGHTING RISKS DEEPENING SECTARIAN DIVISIONS

Source: Reuters

A deadly assault by Shi’ite Houthi rebels on a Salafi Islamic school planted in their mountain heartland could ignite wider sectarian conflict in YEMEN, where instability has already helped al Qaeda militants to take root.
The Houthis, who belong to the Zaydi branch of Shi’ite Islam, have bombarded the sprawling Dar al-Hadith seminary in Dammaj village for two weeks, killing at least 100 people. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsular (AQAP) pledged revenge for the assault.
Political rivalries may have helped to start the violence, but the struggle over a Salafi outpost deep in Houthi territory is also part of a regional contest between Shi’ite IRAN and Sunni SAUDI ARABIA that has been sharpened by the war in SYRIA.
YOUTH STUDY ULTRA-ORTHODOX SALAFI DOCTRINES
Zaydis have for years been alarmed by young Sunnis flocking to Dar al-Hadith, in the northern province of Saada, to study ultra-orthodox Salafi doctrines that cast Shi’ites as heretics.
Houthi militants, whose rebellion is fuelled by the accumulated grievances of many Zaydis, dominate Saada after fighting government forces on and off for nearly a decade.
They detest Dar al-Hadith, proclaiming on October 30 that the Salafis had “turned Dammaj into a launch-pad for their criminal actions and a training center (for) thousands of armed foreign elements from more than 120 countries”.
Dar al-Hadith’s leaders, who deny any such activities, have condemned al Qaeda, but some militants, including the “AMERICAN TALIBAN”, John Walker Lindh, have been through the school, and its founder was linked to a 1979 Islamist uprising in Mecca.

Background Information:
YEMEN A CRITICAL BUT FORGOTTEN FRONT 
The Dammaj fighting is one of many crises besetting YEMEN, where state failure could further empower an al Qaeda wing that has targeted Western ships and airliners in the past.
JOCKEYING FOR POSITION
YEMEN’S best hope may lie in national reconciliation talks begun in March to draft a new constitution and defuse threats from Houthis, southern secessionists and Islamist insurgents.
That effort followed the negotiated removal of veteran President Ali Abdullah Saleh after mass protests against his rule that began even before a wave of Arab revolts in 2011.
Under the deal, interim President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi must hold elections next year and try to reach a workable compromise among YEMEN’S myriad tribal and political factions.
The Houthis’ onslaught on Dammaj may be a gambit to strengthen their bargaining power before any such deal.
“We are coming to the conclusion of the dialogue and each party is trying to consolidate its presence on the ground,” said YEMENI analyst Abdul-Ghani al-Iryani. “Dammaj is deep in Zaydi territory. The Houthis are trying to capture it militarily.”
Houthi-Salafi strife could further poison the once-relaxed relations between Shi’ites and Sunnis in YEMEN, already strained by IRANIAN-SAUDI rivalry and feelings heated by the sectarian hatred that now imbues SYRIA’S struggle between Sunni Islamist rebels and a president whose Alawite sect derives from Shi’ism.
“YEMENIS don’t hate each other for sectarian reasons,” Iryani said. “But that does not preclude this outcome, down the line, if this crisis is not fixed quickly.”
Saleh, the former president, exploited sectarian sentiments during his successive wars with the Houthis, according to Ibrahim Sharqieh, a YEMEN expert at Doha Brookings think-tank. “This conflict did not start last week,” he said.
Zaydis dominate the rugged highlands of YEMEN, which their Imams ruled for 1,000 years until a 1962 military coup.
Background Information:
BAB EL-MANDAB: STRATEGIC LINK BETWEEN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA, VIA THE RED SEA AND THE SUEZ CANAL athttp://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.co.at/2013/08/yemen.html
They are well-represented in YEMEN’S political, military and tribal elites, but have generally kept their faith out of national politics – even as Salafi influence began to rise in mosques funded by SAUDI ARABIA and other Gulf neighbors.
SAUDI ROLE
The Houthis emerged in the north in the 1990s in response to economic deprivation and waning Zaydi political influence, as well as Salafi inroads in the area, symbolized by Dar al-Hadith.
Saleh’s military attempts to crush the Houthis from 2004 to 2010 prompted IRAN to adopt their cause as fellow-Shi’ites, albeit from two very different branches of the sect, although Tehran denies SAUDI accusations that it armed them.
In 2009 SAUDI ARABIA even fought a brief war with the Houthis, who control territory just over its southern border.
SAUDI FUNDED WAHHABI RELIGIOUS CENTERS IN YEMEN
Wahhabi's 
Riyadh’s links to YEMEN go deep. It has long subsidized the government, as well as funding unruly tribes in a complex quest for influence in its impoverished and more populous neighbor.
Wealthy and often well-connected donors from SAUDI ARABIA and other GULF NATIONS have bankrolled Sunni religious centers in YEMEN, including Salafi ones such as Dar al-Hadith.
The seminary’s founder, Sheikh Muqbil al-Wadi’i, studied in SAUDI ARABIA in the 1970s after converting from Shi’ism.
He fell in with radical preacher Juhayman al-Otaybi, who led the two-week seizure of Mecca’s Grand Mosque in 1979 by militants seeking an Islamist revolution. Otaybi and dozens of his followers were beheaded after the revolt was crushed.
POWERFUL YOUTH RECRUITMENT BY WAHHABIS
Sheikh Muqbil, who did not take part in the attack but was accused of writing a statement for Otaybi, was deported to YEMEN, where he set up Dar al-Hadith. Within a few years it began drawing thousands of YEMENI and foreign students.
According to Mohammed al-Ahmadi, a YEMENI expert on Salafis, up to 7,000, including hundreds from the UNITED STATES, CANADA, EUROPE and SOUTHEAST ASIA study there, some living with their families on the compound in Dammaj, a complex of white-washed concrete buildings in a lush valley surrounded by mud houses.
Former students describe a monkish lifestyle of memorizing the Koran and studying the sayings of the Prophet Mohammad.
The books of medieval theologian Ibn Taymiya, those of the founder of Wahhabism, Sheikh Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and of Sheikh Muqbil himself, fill the seminary’s library.
While many students pay for their education, donations by GULF businessmen helped fund Dar al-Hadith, although these were curbed after the September 11, 2001, attacks on U.S. cities.
GULF backing for Sunnis and IRANIAN support for Shi’ites may suggest outright sectarian conflict, but Salafis and Houthis represent radical ideologies in Islam’s two main wings, not mainstream Sunnis and Shi’ites, and they share some views.
Both advocate a return to the early teachings of Islam guided by sharia law and both call for a restored Caliphate, a single entity ruling the whole Muslim world.
“They may be enemies, but they both reflect the hardline creed of their faiths,” Iryani said.
Comment by Geopolitical analysis and Monitoring:
During missionary development in countries of interest, Sunnis and Shi’ites never engage in battle against each other. On the contrary, in Balkan countries such as BOSNIA Sunni and Shi’ites even cooperate through NGO’s and other means in order to achieve their objective, namely to increase their number of followers and recruitment of youngsters with the potential of turning them into fanatic fundamentalists. The problems start once the recruiting process and country development is concluded, that is the time when the sectarian differences between them start to resurface.     


Friday, 15 November 2013

MALI and FRANCE



FRENCH TROOPS SHOULD HUNT QAEDA 
BEYOND MALI BORDERS

Source: EuroNews

FRENCH troops should be allowed to hunt down al Qaeda-linked militants beyond Mali’s borders, FRENCH army chief Admiral Edouard Guillaud said in a rare interview on Thursday.
Nine months after they were scattered across the Sahara by a FRENCH military offensive, Islamists in MALI have named new leaders and are making a comeback as FRANCE whittles down its military presence. They have launched attacks on U.N. peacekeepers and killed two FRENCH journalists this month.
Speaking to EUROPE 1 radio, Guillaud said Paris would reduce its troop numbers in MALI to between 2,000 and 2,500 by year-end and aimed to reach its target of a 1,000-strong permanent force in MALI “during the winter”.
FRANCE retains about 2,800 soldiers in its former colony, according to a defence ministry statement.
Paris has already delayed drawing the force down to February depending on the roll-out of a U.N. peacekeeping mission, which is so far only at half its mandated strength of 12,600 men.
Background Information:
EU FUNDS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE SAHEL UNTIL 2020

SAHEL BELT
Asked if FRENCH soldiers should be allowed to cross borders when militants leave MALI, Guillaud said: “I think we should hunt them down everywhere. That’s why we are working with our neighbours NIGER, BURKINA FASO and CHAD, and also cooperating with ALGERIA so that there is no sanctuary for them.”
Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius told Reuters in MOROCCO that FRANCE’S military presence in MALI was needed to help a region struggling against militants, who have threatened to attack FRENCH interests and have sought haven in southern LIBYA’S vast deserts.


Background Information:
INSTABILITY IN THE SAHEL COULD PROMPT INCREASED MIGRATION AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING WHICH IS BOUND TO SPILL OVER INTO EUROPE. http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com/2013/11/mali-sahel-and-france.html

KILLINGS OF JOURNALISTS
The two journalists were shot by their captors shortly after being kidnapped earlier this month as they emerged from an interview with a representative of the MNLA Tuareg group in the northern desert city of Kidal, a hotbed of rebel activity.
A number of Tuareg and Arab rebel groups still operate in MALI and are due to hold talks with the new government over long-term solutions to recurring northern uprisings.
These groups have come under pressure since the killings of the journalists. Tuareg rebels in Kidal officially handed control of the government buildings they occupied to United Nations peacekeepers.
Adama Kamissoko, the governor of Kidal, said there had been minor demonstrations by pro-separatist rebel supporters.
Background Information: 
EU INVOLVEMENT IN MALI
Why the SAHEL is crucial to EUROPE'S neighborhood – and its security strategy


MALI QUEST NOT CONCLUDED
Highlighting the continuing threat, Guillaud said FRENCH troops had fought and “neutralised” a number of militants from al Qaeda’s NORTH AFRICAN wing AQIM, about 250 km (150 miles) west of Tessalit in the far north of MALI.
“In MALI, it’s not finished,” he said. “We need to adapt to circumstances. There are still suicide attacks, assassinations of our compatriots and there are (legislative)  elections.”
The task of calming the region has been complicated by increasingly blurred lines between Islamist militants, separatist rebels and gangs of smugglers. Experts are worried FRANCE could get bogged down in an open-ended war unless U.N. peacekeepers can plug the security gap.


Sunday, 10 November 2013

THE ATLANTIC MIRROR:




THE SOUTH ATLANTIC BASIN AS A FUTURE ENERGY HUB

 Via German Marshall Fund

In 1912, the GERMAN meteorologist Alfred Wegener proposed the theory of continental drift, which offered a plausible explanation for what map makers, scientists, and others had noticed for centuries: the AMERICAS seem to fit neatly into the continental landmasses across the ATLANTIC OCEAN. These giant jigsaw puzzle pieces once formed a single land mass known as Pangaea, which, thanks to plate tectonics, slowly drifted apart over millions of years, pressing against the PACIFIC and Nazca Plates and pushing up the mighty Andes and Rocky Mountains. In their wake, the ATLANTIC Basin opened, leaving behind a great ocean that would one day divide the Old World from the New.

THE GEOLOGICAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE SOUTH AMERICAN AND AFRICAN COASTS ARE NOT LOST ON MODERN-DAY ENERGY COMPANIES, which recently began drilling offshore wells to test what, is known as the ATLANTIC Mirror Theory. The same salt layers off the coast of BRAZIL have been found along the WEST AFRICAN coast, roughly mirroring where one would expect them to be, considering how the continents once fit together. The oil reservoirs found on both sides of the ATLANTIC are thought to have formed 100 million years ago, when SOUTH AMERICA and AFRICA were nestled comfortably together.

Beginning in 2007, BRAZIL has found multiple offshore pre-salt oil fields, named for the thick layer of sand, rock, and salt that lie between the ocean and the oil deposits. The largest, discovered in the Santos Basin in 2010, is known as the Libra field and is estimated to contain between 8 and 12 billion barrels of recoverable oil. Amid protests and legal challenges due to the participation of foreign oil companies, BRAZIL auctioned off Libra development rights to a consortium comprised of Petrobras, Shell, Total, CNOOC, and CNPC.

ENERGY MIRROR IMAGE 

In 2011, the Zaedyus exploration well drilled by Tullow Oil bore fruit in the form of a 700 million barrel oil field off the coast of FRENCH GUIANA, which mirrors GHANA’S Jubilee oil field, discovered in 2007. Companies are now rushing to drill exploratory wells off the coast of ANGOLA, where they believe the Kwanza-Benguela and Namibe basins may mirror the Santos and Campos basins of BRAZIL.

ANGOLA AND BRAZIL SHARE COMMON LANGUAGE AND CULTURE

Already, the Lontra field off the coast of ANGOLA is expected to hold over 1 billion barrels. In fact, ANGOLA may soon surpass NIGERIA as AFRICA’S largest oil producer. This prospect bodes well for BRAZIL and its oil giant Petrobras, since ANGOLA and BRAZIL share a common language and culture inherited from their PORTUGUESE colonizers.

Though no future WEST AFRICAN discoveries are expected to be as large BRAZIL’S Libra field, the prospective deposits, combined with BRAZIL’S own huge reserves, will make the SOUTHERN ATLANTIC BASIN a vital energy hub in the coming decades. As the countries of the NORTH ATLANTIC assist in the development of these oil fields through expertise and capital investments, north-south linkages will become increasingly important, but not more so than the south-south ties embodied in the BRAZIL-ANGOLA relationship.

SOUTH-SOUTH RELATIONS ARE DUE TO EXPAND

The political, economic, and social connections that bind the countries of the ATLANTIC Basin together are strongest between the countries of the NORTH ATLANTIC, but north-south and south-south relations are due to expand. Energy is an obvious area in which to pursue cooperation, given how vital it is to all societies, but it should not stop there. Over time, the nations of the ATLANTIC BASIN would do well to deepen their relationships, build a complex web of interdependence, and perhaps one day look at their counterparts across the ocean as if staring into a mirror.

Saturday, 9 November 2013

CHINA AND UYGHUR





SECURITY DILEMMA AND SECURITIZATION IN CHINA'S UYGHUR ISSUE IN XINJIANG PROVINCE

By Charlotte Langridge via securityobserver

The North Western Xinjiang http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xinjiang province of CHINA has had a turbulent past. First occupied by the Western Han Dynasty in 104BC and ruled by a series of dynasties and empires in the years after the Han fell. Xinjiang declared independence in the form of the EASTERN TURKISTAN REPUBLIC in the early 20th century, but was brought back under CHINESE rule in 1949 by the Communist Party and on October 1, 1955 the Xinjiang UYGHUR Autonomous Region (XUAR) was born. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uyghur_people) Troubles in the region are similar to those in TIBET with all the strategic importance for the CHINESE state but without, until recently, the publicity.



Related topic:
TURKEY AND CHINA AT ODDS OVER 10 MILLION TURKISH UYGHUR MINORITIES LIVING IN CHINA

UYGHURS IN XUAR ARE PREDOMINATELY SUNNI MUSLIM

Xinjiang is inhabited by all of CHINA’S 56 ethnic groups, with the UYGHUR population of 9.832 million and the HAN population of 8.363 million comprising the two largest. The UYGHURS in XUAR are predominately Sunni Muslim, following the binding ideologies of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism that make them culturally and ethnically close to Central Asian nations. 

The region is of strategic importance for many reasons. It comprises one sixth of China’s land mass, comparable to the size of IRAN, it shares its borders with five Muslim countries: KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, TAJIKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, and PAKISTAN. As such it is a gatekeeper to the countries along the Silk Route and the Islamic Circle. XUAR has vast natural resources: it holds 250 million cubic meters of timber reserves, 38 percent of the nation’s coal reserves, and is CHINA’S second highest oil producing region and highest natural gas producing region. Moreover, it is set to become CHINA’S largest oil and gas production and storage base by 2015, and is therefore of high importance for CHINA’S energy security.






Related Topic:
CHINA’S LAND BRIDGE TO TURKEY CREATES NEW EURASIAN GEOPOLITICAL POTENTIALS
CHINESE - TURKISH geopolitical and economic ambitions coincide http://geopoliticsrst.blogspot.com/2012/05/china-and-turkey.html



The CHINESE state has been accused of intensifying its crackdown on the UYGHURS after street protests and an attack on a local border police headquarters that killed 16 police officials in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008. On July 5, 2009, the tensions between the majority and minority groups reached a breaking point, erupting into several riots in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. It is estimated, by the CHINESE media, that 197 people were killed, and, according to the BBC, 25 people were sentenced to death.
This article assesses ethnic tensions in the province with reference to two theories: security dilemmas and securitization.

SECURITY DILEMMAS

A security dilemma typically occurs between two states, disposing them to a cyclical condition “in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening”. Although the theory was developed to explain state security, it can also be adapted to analyze human security within a state or region. In this situation, we have an “intra-state security dilemma”, referring to the climate of insecurity brooding between the CHINESE state and the UYGHUR population in XUAR rather than between two states with formal armies and defense budgets. Any move towards independence by the UYGHUR decreases the security of the CHINESE state as it risks losing a region of strategic importance. In contrast, any restrictive policy on religion and increased Han immigration decreases the security of the UYGHUR.

If the UYGHUR’S right to practice religion is threatened, their identity is consequently threatened. In terms of religious restrictions there has been progress from the CHINESE government allowing the building of Mosques, and the stipulation of “freedom of religious belief” in state law. Yet, this development is in contradiction with the six prohibitions and three restrictions placed on the door of a Mosque in Keriya, including prohibiting access for government officials, students or youths under 18 of any activity within the Mosque and the restriction of Salaat-ul-Jumma (“Friday prayer”) to only 30 mins. Furthermore, Muslim men may not grow breads and women may not wear veils. This is seen as a direct insult on the culture and identity of the UYGHUR people, resulting in their increased insecurity.

Related Topics: TURKEYS’ COSMOPOLITAN TRAIL 

The policies which threaten UYGHUR identity are serving to increase Beijing’s security. The CHINESE government sees PAN-TURKISM and PAN-ISLAMISM as the basis for separatism in Xinjiang, viewing it as the vehicle for disintegration of the CHINESE state and a source of insecurity. As highlighted above, XUAR is of great strategic importance to CHINA; therefore losing XUAR would severely compromise CHINA’S energy security and economy, as it is highly dependent on energy-intensive industries. Not only is Xinjiang a source of oil and gas, it is also a critical passage route for oil and gas pipelines from RUSSIA and KAZAKHSTAN into CHINA that flow to Central and Eastern CHINA.

RELIGION AS THE MEANS FOR EXPRESSING ECONOMIC DISCONTENT

As the extractive industry in XUAR grows, so does the economic disparity between the HAN and UYGHUR populations, and large-scale immigration of HAN raises another factor increasing UYGHUR insecurity. Economic disparity and HAN immigration are said to be the true root of UYGHUR insecurity, and religion the means for expressing economic discontent. In addition, Beijing has actively encouraged HAN immigration to XUAR in order to increase stability in the region. Living standards have gradually improved in XUAR, yet most UYGHUR’S feel they have not benefited from the government Reform and Open-up Policy or West Development Campaign

They feel these were aimed at a transfer of natural gas and oil from the UYGHUR to the HAN.  Indeed, increased HAn immigration is a result of the expanding extractive industry in XUAR, and which has increased job availability. For example, the CHINA National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has increased its presence in the area since 2010 with the inception and completion of the Tarim Large Chemical Fertilizer Project in Korla, the CNPC – Urumqi Petrochemical Company xylene aromatics joint device and the South Xinjiang Gasification Project. Investment in the area, by CNPC, has been over 300 billion Yuan. This has resulted in predominantly HAN populated cites, Karamay, Urumqi and Shihezi, seeing their GDP per capita rise at a higher rate than many predominately UYGHUR-populated cities within XINJIANG. The situation will only intensify as power-intensive industries seek to relocate to XINJIANG. In addition to Han immigration, the growing economic disparity is also linked to minority language policy. The amount of jobs available to the UYGHUR population is limited – a direct result of the fact that most UYGHUR do not speak Mandarin, a requirement for a skilled position. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uyghur_language

The CHINESE state has reacted to its sense of insecurity by limiting the UYGHUR identity via religious expression and increased HAN immigration to Xinjiang resulting from increasing jobs in an expanding energy production and storage industry. The Uyghur people have reacted to the Chinese state reforms in the form of protest.

UYGHUR ACTIVISTS ALLEGEDLY LINKED TO AL-QAEDA AND EASTERN TURKISTAN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT

Ethnic conflict and UYGHUR protest in XUAR have been securitized by the CHINESE state as terrorism. Securitization symbolizes “the staging of existential issues in politics to lift them above politics. In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus by labeling it as security an agent claims a need for a right to treat it by extraordinary means”. 

The nature of securitization legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures. Beijing has picked-up on the motifs and language of the global “war on terror”, and has been seduced by the ‘legislative wildfire’, denoting the proliferation in legislation to better detect, prevent, prosecute and eradicate terrorism, sweeping the globe.
The UYGHUR activists have, as a result, been tarred with the same brush as Al-Qaeda, as the CHINESE regime alleges the EASTERN TURKISTAN Islamic Movement has become an arm of Al-Qaeda, receiving funding and training from them. Along these lines CHINA has attempted to ally with the UNITED STATES in the fight against terrorism, yet Washington has made it clear that non-violent separatist activities cannot be classified as terrorism. Furthermore, a conflation of UYGHUR activists and Al-Qaeda does not seem plausible as most UYGHURS lack interest in Salafist Islam, a prerequisite for involvement with the terrorist organization. In addition, the incidences that have taken place have been the actions of a few unorganized separatists within the large UYGHUR community; most groups do not advocate violence at all. The separatists that have formed are too small, dispersed and faceless, to be a threat to the CHINESE state.

Within the CHINESE media, the UYGHUR people have been framed as a criminal “other”. Projection of the criminal other onto the UYGHUR people creates an instant dividing notion. Violent illegitimate UYGHUR protestors are juxtaposed to peaceful law-abiding HAN citizens and the legitimate CHINESE state in an “us-versus-them” rhetoric. Moreover, by linking UYGHUR protestors to Al-Qaeda, CHINA locates the cause of unrest and projects responsibility for the riots outside the state, diverting attention from its internal social policies.

SECURITIZATION
 
By securitizing ethnic conflict in XUAR as terrorism the CHINESE state has sought to legitimize its use of “strike hard” campaigns and anti-terror legislation against the UYGHUR minority. For example, XUAR officials pledge to accelerate trails, increase criminal investigations, and conduct 24-hour police patrols, identity checks and street searches following the deployment of an elite counter-terrorism unit in Kashgar and Hotan. As a result of the legitimization of such discourse, the presence of human rights action and legislation has become increasingly scarce. Amnesty International throws doubt onto the legitimacy of many trials conducted in the wake of the July 2009 protests, and they claim many UYGHUR’S were given harsh sentences for “endangering state security” when they did nothing more than grant an interview to the media. Since July 2009 the CHINESE state has not allowed independent investigation into the events that occurred including the excessive use of force against peaceful protesters. The situation of decreasing human rights and increasing “strike hard” policies only contributes to the atmosphere of insecurity felt by the UYGHUR people.


UYGHUR – XUAR REGION OF GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE FOR CHINA


Ethnic conflict in XUAR is a contentious issue; there are causes for conflict on both sides. The region is of geostrategic importance to the Chinese state, with its access routes and vast natural resources. Furthermore, the secession of XINJIANG may lead TIBET and Inner MONGOLIA to follow as they too have histories of ethnic conflict; therefore the possibility of an independent XINJIANG greatly heightens the insecurity and threatens the integrity of the CHINESE state. 

Having said this, the UYGHUR people also have great cause for their sense of insecurity. Integral parts of their identity are being attacked by the CHINESE government, namely their right to religious freedom. The minority language polices are also effecting the UYGHUR’S ability to obtain and retain skilled jobs, and as a result they are not experiencing the same rise in GDP per capita as their HAN counterparts. Furthermore, the CHINESE state has sought to frame the UYGHUR as foreign terrorists in order to legitimize their “strike hard” policies, bringing its legitimacy and its respect for human rights severely into question.


THE UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT LAUNCHES NEW CHINESE LANGUAGE WEBSITE
By The Uyghur American Association

The UYGHUR Human Rights Project (UHRP) is proud to unveil its new website in the Chinese language, which it hopes will build bridges between the UYGHUR and CHINESE communities as they strive to bring democratic reform to CHINA. UHRP believes a CHINESE language website will help to draw connections between the struggle for UYGHUR human rights and broader CHINESE democracy activism.


"The UHRP-CHINESE website is an important development in the UYGHUR movement for freedom, democracy and human rights," said UHRP director Alim Seytoff in a statement from Washington, DC. "It is a first-of-its-kind initiative to bring together research, original writing and news on the human rights issues that directly affect the UYGHUR and CHINESE people. UHRP hopes that through educating the CHINESE public on the plight of the UYGHUR, we will be able to counteract the demonizing effects of CHINESE government propaganda and seek meaningful solutions to the EAST TURKESTAN issue."


Regarding UHRP's new Chinese language website, Chang Chiu, Program Officer for ASIAat the National Endowment for Democracy said:"The National Endowment for Democracy is pleased to congratulate and support the launch of the UYGHUR Human Rights Project's new CHINESE language website. The UYGHUR Human Rights Project is making an important effort to make its materials available to a CHINESE language audience. This website will help to promote greater understanding in CHINA of the unacceptable human rights conditions faced by the UYGHUR people."


CHINESE democracy and human rights activists also extended their support to UHRP's initiative to engage the Mandarin speaking community.

Yu Dahai, publisher of Beijing Spring magazine, commented:"Congratulations to the UYGHUR Human Rights Project on the launch of your CHINESE website! I believe this website will not only improve the human rights situation of the UYGHUR’S, but will also make an outstanding contribution to promote understanding and friendship between UYGHUR’S and HAN CHINESE."


Hu Ping, prominent writer and democracy activist, added:"Congratulations to the UYGHUR Human Rights Project on your new CHINESE language website—it will enable more CHINESE to hear your voice."


The new CHINESE language website focuses on the human rights research produced by UHRP, and will provide readers with the latest news affecting UYGHUR’S in EAST TURKESTAN. The site not only features UHRP's press releases on recent developments in EAST TURKESTAN, but also its comprehensive reports on UYGHUR political, economic, social and cultural rights. In addition, the site links to UHRP's blog, through which UHRP plans to present commentary on UYGHUR-related issues from CHINESE, UYGHUR and Western contributors, in addition to staff members.